

REF ID: A66666  
9/1/97  
JAPAN

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority WM 969000  
By W&D NARA Date 7/25/02

0 6 9 3

ORIGIN/ACTION			DEPARTMENT OF STATE			POL 2-1 JAPAN		
INR-10			<b>AIRGRAM</b>			FOR RM USE ONLY		
RM/R	REP	AF	A-301			CONFIDENTIAL		
1			NO.			PRIORITY		
ARA	EUR	AF	TO : Department of State			RECEIVED DEPARTMENT OF STATE		
NEA	CU	INR	INFO: BANGKOK CINC PACFLT			DA/ODCSOPS FUKUOKA		
E	7	10	CINCPAC			DA/DUSA HICOMRY		
L	3	12	CINCPACAF			DOD/ISA HICOM/POLAD		
2/14	PC	R/R	CINCUSARPAC			(Halperin) USCAR (conf)		
1	2	1-Halperin	FROM : Amembassy TOKYO			DATE: September 1, 1967		
AGR	2	3	SUBJECT: JOINT WEEKA NO. 35			RECEIVED SEP 6 1967		
INT	LAB	TAR	REF :			RECEIVED SEP 6 1967		
TR	4	10	CONTENTS			RECEIVED SEP 6 1967		
ARMY	10	20	1. Okinawa Tops Japan Political Debate			RECEIVED SEP 6 1967		
OSD	48	11	2. FonMin Miki Holds Discussions on NPT			RECEIVED SEP 6 1967		
USIA		3	3. Election District Revision Issue Returns to News			RECEIVED SEP 6 1967		
NSA		6	4. PriMin Speaks on Defense			RECEIVED SEP 6 1967		
			5. LDP Interim Report on US-Japan Security Treaty			RECEIVED SEP 6 1967		
			6. Defense Agency Proposes FY 1968 Budget			RECEIVED SEP 6 1967		
			7. PriMin Sato Cancels Cambodia Vision			RECEIVED SEP 6 1967		
			8. Attention to Soviet-Held Northern Islands			RECEIVED SEP 6 1967		
			9. Tokyo "War Crimes Tribunal" Attracts Little Attention			RECEIVED SEP 6 1967		
POLITICAL			1. Okinawa Tops Japan Political Debate			RECEIVED SEP 6 1967		
a. Within past few weeks debate on Okinawa issue has moved to new level of precision, with opposition and several major newspapers hardening formal positions urging GOJ request immediate reversion						RECEIVED SEP 6 1967		
USARYIS (7th Psyop Gp)			NAHA			SEOUL		
HONG KONG			MOSCOW			SAIGON		
KOBE-OSAKA			NAGOYA			SAPPORO		
Group 3								
Downgraded at 12-year intervals, not automatically declassified.								
FORM 4-62 D5-323			CONFIDENTIAL			FOR DEPT. USE ONLY		
Drafted by: POL:(see last page)			Contents and Classification Approved by: POL:TWAINSWORTH			In Out		
Clearances:								

DECLASSIFIED  
 Authority NND 969000  
 By WBD NARA Date 7/25/02

CONFIDENTIAL

Page 2, A-301  
from Tokyo

of administrative rights, without US nuclear weapons or US freedom to conduct military operations without prior consultation and consent with GOJ.

b. In addition to new DSP and Komeito formal position papers (Weeka 34, Item 2), there have now been stirrings within even JSP indicating some informal agreement with rapidly building opposition consensus which might be capsulated as: "no nukes or free use; but varying willingness to tolerate continuance conventional bases." In TV panel discussion August 27, Masashi ISHIBASHI of JSP said in response to questions much same thing he had been saying privately for some time: i.e., practical necessities Okinawa issue require tolerance continued high level of US base activity in Okinawa but nukes and free use are unacceptable. Moreover, Shichiro HOZUMI, JSP member of Lower House Diet Committee Mission now in Okinawa, was quoted in Asahi evening edition of August 29 as having said that while complete removal of US bases would be ideal, it might be possible recognize temporary continued existence of bases in Okinawa if they are placed under same restrictions as US bases in Japan. Latter statement attracted particular interest in Tokyo in view fact Hozumi is not moderate of Ishibashi type, but member of far-left Heiwa Doshikai faction of JSP. It should be noted that while JSP headquarters issued statement August 29 to effect party policy on Okinawa has not changed (reversion with removal of bases), headquarters made rather vague step in direction Hozumi statement by saying that it would be "natural" for US bases in Okinawa to come under Security Treaty and SOFA restrictions after reversion. However, said JSP, only "struggles" in Okinawa and Japan would bring about US concessions, and offer by GOJ of base rights equivalent to those in Japan would hardly induce US to give up Okinawa administration.

c. In conversation with Charge August 29, DSP / representatives expressed considerable pride in their development of policy (Weeka 34, Item 2) which appears to them to successfully represent "least common denominator" of Japanese opinion re. specifics of Okinawa issue. They also noted with satisfaction that Okinawa Social/Masses Party (OSMP) apparently feels comfortable with their policy and that there is considerable promise that, given OSMP leader Asato's new stand of relative moderation (HC-LN 724005), they will be able to work together with OSMP to achieve progress toward practical modality of reversion.

d. Komeito told Embassy August 29 that their new policy ("immediate" removal not only of nukes and missiles but also of bulk conventional base with remainder to be phased out within five years) was toughened at last minute because DSP preempted position which Komeito had intended adopt. According to ranking Komeito source, party shift since July 3 convention statement (which emphasized strategic value Okinawa, complexity of problem and generally more practical approach) made necessary because of rising expectation among Japanese

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NND 769000  
By WBD NARA Date 7/25/02

0 6 9 5

CONFIDENTIAL

Page 3, A-301  
from Tokyo

that "significant step" toward Okinawan reversion will stem from November Sato-Johnson meeting. Source said all parties now jockeying for position which would enable them to claim some share of credit. In this connection, Komeito statement itself mentions "conceivable" possibility of US withdrawal to Marianas.

e. On media side, Asahi editorial of August 16 opposing nukes and free use in Okinawa was preceded by August 10 Mainichi and July 21 Sankei editorials of same nature.

f. FonOff, now apparently largely excluded from active involvement Okinawa policy recommendations for Sato visit, has at working level expressed some concern about hardening of opposition and media positions on specifics of Okinawa reversion. There is evidence PriMin Sato shares their concern. PriMin's private secretary (Motonu) has told Embassy that Sato's speech to opening session of New Ohama Committee (Tokyo 1049) was careful attempt to set Okinawa problem more clearly within context Japan's security needs. However, this aspect of PriMin's remarks did not come through in press. We are told by FonOff sources that August 23 playlet in which LDP foreign policy study committee Chairman Shojiro KAWASHIMA publicized alleged FonOff statement to effect US permission for him to inspect Bonins would be "difficult" was in fact "arranged" in order counter expectations that US ready to give concessions ~~re~~ those islands.

g. Pressure on Sato is, however, sufficient that he felt compelled meet DSP Chairman Nishimura on August 30 to discuss Okinawa. (JSP and Komeito turned down Nishimura invitation). Nishimura achieved considerable publicity by meeting, in which he urged joint Diet delegations to US, Sato visit to Okinawa before going to Washington, new development bank for Okinawa and general supra-partisan approach to Okinawa issue to culminate in meeting of party heads prior Sato's meeting with President Johnson. Sato was quoted as having promised "due consideration" for Nishimura initiative but as being doubtful joint LDP-opposition position can be reached and as having cautioned that Okinawa is delicate matter of diplomatic relations. PriMin also quoted as having said his schedule too crowded for Okinawa visit prior to fall meeting with President. DSP-related Domei labor leaders saw Sato August 29 to make something of same approach and received pretty much same answer.  
(CONFIDENTIAL)

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NND 969000  
By WBD NARA Date 7/25/02

0 6 9 6



CONFIDENTIAL

Page 4, A-301  
from Tokyo

2. FonMin Miki Holds Discussions on NPT

a. FonMin Miki welcomed tabling of NPT draft August 24 as step toward preventing proliferation of nuclear weapons. At same time Miki added GOJ interested in further discussion security needs of nuclear have-nots, particularly non-aligned states, and insuring that final treaty does not impede Japanese peaceful nuclear developments. In followup to April 15 first session (Tokyo 7397), Miki met August 29 with representatives of political parties to discuss tabled NPT. DSP and Komeito urged more concrete steps toward nuclear disarmament and concern over security of non-nuclear nations; JSP called for ban on all nuclear weapons and demanded GOJ issue public disavowal of nuclear armament. Following day FonMin met with GOJ Atomic Energy Commission and Japan Science Council. August 31 he met with Atomic Energy Industrial Conference. These groups urged that Article III inspection provisions be stated clearly, that technical spin-off from military research be made available for peaceful use by non-nuclear-weapon countries, and that Japan reserve right to conduct peaceful nuclear explosions, should it become technically possible to distinguish them from explosions for military purposes. Industrial Conference concerned that industrial secrets be protected. FonMin promised to "consider" all opinions. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: Although opinions on NPT draft differ with perspective of viewer, there remains fundamental agreement with provisions of draft among virtually all groups. Considerations raised have long been taken into account by GOJ, and thus Miki discussions probably designed more to give these groups sense participation and to seek create impression of national consensus on at least one issue, than to resolve significant differences. Only remaining discussions scheduled are those with US "experts". (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

3. Election District Revision Issue Returns to News

a. PriMin Sato and LDP SecGen Fukuda, at August 25 "one-day Cabinet meeting" in Wakayama, contributed to perennially controversial question of election district revision by promising that if Election System Deliberation Council could agree on revision recommendation they would present it to next regular Diet session. Fifth Election System Deliberation Council itself held three-day session August 29-31 to consider revision of Lower House election law, attempting combine in one proposal single-seat district system with modified proportional representational system. LDP August 29 presented plan of LDP Election Study Council Chairman Matsuno, which calls for increase of Lower House seats from 486 to 500, and 7 to 3 ratio of small district seats vis-a-vis proportional representation seats, plus type of proportional representation which would tend to reinforce majority party's advantage. Matsuno plan found no agreement among council members. Same day Komeito, in statement opposing any change in

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NMD 969000

By WBD NARA Date 7/25/02

0 6 9 7

CONFIDENTIAL

Page 5, A-301  
from Tokyo

direction of single-seat districts, recalled Soka Gakkai President Daisaku IKEDA's 1965 warning that Gakkai would mobilize 500,000 in Tokyo streets and 3 million throughout the country "to crush" small district system. Not surprisingly, Council ended session without reaching agreement and is scheduled to reopen September 8. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: Election district revision proposals are matter of great concern to leadership and Diet members of all political parties. Portion of LDP leadership advocates revision as key to developing genuine two-party system in Japan and promoting end to factionalism within major parties. Foes say revision would merely amount to device for perpetuating conservative dominance. In any event there strong opposition to revision within LDP as well as from opposition parties. Revisions of type now being contemplated would hit smaller parties hardest, accounting for determined opposition of Komeito and JCP. Above and beyond party considerations, individual politicians understandably intent on preserving their seats. All considered there appears long way to go before even agreement on revision proposal likely. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

4. PriMin Speaks on Defense

a. PriMin Sato on two occasions last week stressed importance of national security. At August 25 "one-day Cabinet meeting" in Wakayama he said that while continuing US-Japanese defense arrangements, Japan should also increase its own defense power in accordance with its national power, indicating that US security guarantees alone would not be enough to protect Japan from attack and should not be sole defense in event of attack. Before Junior Chamber of Commerce August 29 Sato called for "heightened defense consciousness" among all Japanese and said Japan should maintain its security system with the US. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: Both statements preceded by a few days Defense Agency's announcement of its proposed 1968 budget. PriMin's statements probably play oblique role in his preparations for November discussions on Okinawa as well. However, national mood on defense matters has moved to point where it is not politically damaging to make such statements and more will undoubtedly be forthcoming. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

5. LDP Interim Report on US-Japan Security Treaty

a. LDP Security Affairs Research Council chaired by former Lower House Speaker Naka FUNADA August 28 made public its interim report on studies of best method for ensuring Japan's national security and handling security relationships with US after 1970. Report stressed necessity of maintaining US-Japan security relationship for "considerably long time". (UNCLASSIFIED)

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NND 969000  
By WBD NARA Date 7/25/02

CONFIDENTIAL

Page 6, A-301  
from Tokyo

b. Comment: In contrast to May 1966 recommendation of predecessor LDP committee which advocated amending Security Treaty to extend it for ten years, new report avoided recommending extension for fixed term or other specifics of dealing with Treaty. May 1966 report produced some disagreement within LDP, and drew heavy fire from opposition elements which call for abrogation of Treaty when initial term ends in 1970. Funada and number of colleagues feel that necessary Diet and US Senate ratification would present serious problems in extending Treaty for fixed term through amendment, but at same time some misgivings over situation where Treaty could be abrogated on one year's notice after 1970 are clearly implicit in interim report. Funada stressed need for more concrete long-term defense planning to avoid "unstable situation" which might encourage domestic opposition in anti-Treaty efforts or lessen credibility of US commitment to Japan. Funada in comments to press hinted at possible utility of some type of executive statements by both governments which would lay basis for continued long-range planning and cooperation on substantially same basis after 1970 as before, a concept he has also put forth in informal conversations with EmbOffs. (CONFIDENTIAL)

6. Defense Agency Proposes JFY 1968 Budget

a. Defense Agency August 30 announced its proposed JFY 1968 budget. Amount requested is ¥440,300 million (\$1.223 billion), increase of 15.6% over 1967 budget which estimated to be 1.23% of Japan's national income. Increase accounted for by more personnel, a Nike Hercules training unit, domestic manufacture of equipment wherever possible and, reflecting this, 53% rise in R and D expenditures. Domestic manufacture planned for BADGE system, R-30 ground-to-ground rocket, an ASW helicopter carrier and more ASW aircraft. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: Budget now goes to FinMin where if past practice is followed cuts will bring amount closer to 1967 figure of \$1.05 billion. Whether PriMin's call for heightened defense consciousness (see Item 4) among Japanese gets through to FinMin remains to be seen. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

7. PriMin Sato Cancels Cambodia Visit

a. FonMin announced August 29 that PriMin Sato had cancelled his planned September 18-20 visit to Cambodia, scheduled first stop on his Southeast Asian trip. Ministry stated politely but accurately that PriMin and FonMin had agreed to "postpone" visit as it inadvisable to visit Cambodia while "border issue" (i.e. Sihanouk's demand for GOJ declaration recognizing Cambodia's claimed borders) remains unsettled. FonMin Miki later quoted in press as believing that friendly relations between two countries will not be affected by

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NND 969000  
By WBD NARA Date 7/25/02

CONFIDENTIAL

Page 7, A-301  
from Tokyo

cancellation of PriMin's trip. (Tokyo 1294). (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: Cancellation follows unsuccessful negotiations in Tokyo with the Cambodians during which Japanese found themselves increasingly frustrated when they tried to meet Sihanouk's demand for a declaration on Cambodia's borders without giving direct offense to other countries. Rest of Sato itinerary remains unchanged (A-272). (CONFIDENTIAL)

8. Attention to Soviet-Held Northern Islands

a. While political party and legislative inspection teams flocked to Okinawa (see this Weeka Item 1; Weeka 34, Item 2; Weeka 32; Item 6), three-member group (two LDP, one Socialist) from Upper House left August 28 for six-day investigation of situation concerning Soviet-held northern islands. Delegation planned visit Sapporo and Nemuro in Hokkaido and areas of that island nearest Soviet-held Habomai group and discuss situation with local officials and fishing interests. House of Representatives also announced plans for six members of its "Okinawa Problems Etc." Committee, led by Chairman Usui, to visit Hokkaido September 4 to 7 for similar investigation, but said group had abandoned hope of actually visiting Soviet-held islands. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: Announcement of northern inspection efforts did little to counterbalance concentration of interest on Okinawa but inability to obtain permission to visit northern islands highlighted contrast between US and Soviet attitudes toward Japanese territorial claims. Asahi Shimbun reported, without specifying source, "increasing likelihood" that Japanese negotiations with Soviets to explore implications of Kosygin statement on northern territories (Weeka 30, Item 2) would be held in Moscow not earlier than October, and speculated that FonMin Miki might take up subject with Gromyko when they attend UN General Assembly. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

9. Tokyo "War Crimes Tribunal" Attracts Little Attention

a. Tokyo "war crimes tribunal" held three-day session August 28-30 with 17 Japanese "judges", four foreign observers and 700 "participants" reportedly in attendance. "Tribunal" sponsored by JCP-front Japan Committee for Investigation of War Crimes in Vietnam. August 28 and 29 sessions reportedly given over to "testimony" of some 36 Japanese "witnesses" concerning types of inhumane weapons allegedly being used in bombing of North and "evidence" of GOJ cooperation with US. Messages to tribunal from JSP Chairman Katsumata, Sohyo Chairman Horii, Bertrand Russell and Jean Paul Sartre, as well as from JCP Chairman Nosaka, read to August 30 closing session. Predictably "tribunal" found US "guilty" of "imperialist aggressive war crimes in Vietnam unprecedented in world history" and GOJ "guilty" of cooperation with US. "Finding" also called for US pullout from Vietnam, cessation of

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NND 969000  
By W6D NARA Date 7/25/02

CONFIDENTIAL

Page 8, A-301  
from Tokyo


North Vietnam bombing, end to Security Treaty, and return of Okinawa to Japan. Organizers reportedly will present "finding" to expected October Russell tribunal session in Copenhagen. (UNCLASSIFIED)


Comment:

b. /Press coverage of "tribunal" very light. Apart from JCP organ Akahata, only Asahi and Mainichi carried two small articles each. All in all, three-day session and "verdict" passed all but unnoticed in Japan, a situation difficult to imagine even a year ago. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

GP-3

  
OSBORN

  
POL:TBleha:jl;lt 9/1/67  
REArmstrong  
TWAinsworth  
HLevin

  
P/M:SPDawkins

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NND 969000  
By WBD NARA Date 7/25/02

ORIGIN/ACTION		
INR-10		
RM/R	REP	AF
1		
ARA	EUR	EA
	5	6
NEA	CU	INR
	5	
E	P	IO
L	FBO	AID
		12
PC	S/L	RS/RM
2	1	1
AGR	COM	FRB
2	3	
INT	LAB	TAR
	2	
TR	XMB	AIR
4		10
ARMY	CIA	NAVY
10	20	7
OSD	USIA	NSA
48	11	3
		NSC
		6

# AIRGRAM

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

POL 2-1 JAPAN

FOR RM USE ONLY

A-337

CONFIDENTIAL

PRIORITY

HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : Department of State

INFO : BANGKOK CINCUSARPAC DA/ODCSOPS FUKUOKA  
CINCPAC COMNAVMARIANAS DA/DUSA HICOMRY  
CINCPACAF COMSEVENFLT DOD/ISA HICOM/POLAD  
CINCPACFLT COMUS/J (Halperin) USCAR (cont'd)

FROM : Amembassy TOKYO

DATE: September 8, 1967

SUBJECT : JOINT WEEKA NO. 36

REF :

## CONTENTS

1. Sato Aairs Foreign Policy Views
2. JSP Reaffirms "Anti" Policies
3. GOJ/LDP Outlook on Okinawa Reversion Question
4. US Requests Nuclear Surface Ship Visits
5. PriMin Sato Departs for Taipei
6. Mixed Japanese Reaction to SVN Presidential Elections

## POLITICAL

### 1. Sato Aairs Foreign Policy Views

a. Questions to PriMin Sato during course of his September 2 one and half hour press conference centered on his up-coming Southeast Asian trips and Okinawa. Stressing that peace, prosperity and stability of Japan inseparable from SEA, PriMin noted North Vietnamese rejection of unconditional peace negotiations which Japan advocates and South Vietnamese willingness to conduct elections in midst of war situation. Disclaiming unreal expectations about effect of his visit on possible

USARYL (7th Psyop Gp) MOSCOW NAHA SAPPORO TAIPEI  
HONG KONG KOBE-OSAKA NAGOYA SAIGON SEOUL

Group 3

Downgraded at 12-year intervals, not automatically declassified

CONFIDENTIAL

FOR DEPT. USE ONLY

☒ In ☐ Out

Drafted by: POL (see last page)

Contents and Classification Approved by: POL:TWainsworth

Clearances:

FORM 4-62 DS-323

1701 SEP 11 AM 9 24

COPYFLO-PBR

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
RECEIVED

SEP 11 1967

COMMUNICATIONS

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NND 969000

By WBD NARA Date 7/25/02



CONFIDENTIAL

Page 2, A-337  
from Tokyo

Vietnamese peace, and stressing he would not get Japan militarily involved, PriMin stated his purpose was to meet newly elected South Vietnamese leaders and see Vietnamese situation "with own eyes", both of which factors would, he said, increase weight of his statements during mid-November Washington visit. PriMin said there had been no coordination of his visit with scheduled visit of JSP Chairman Katsumata to Hanoi and two visits very different in character, as Sato represents GOJ and Japanese people as well as ruling party.

b. On Okinawa PriMin stressed that reversion cannot be thought of apart from Japanese security and peace in Asia. Thus task is to reconcile hope of Japanese and Okinawan people for reversion with important security role being played by US military bases in Okinawa. Sato said GOJ had not yet formulated definite proposal for Okinawan reversion, but he "must take a concrete plan convincing to Japanese people" with him when he goes to Washington. PriMin said he "not now thinking" of adopting Shimoda thesis and present "assumption" was that with reversion bases would come under Security Treaty. In responses to two direct questions, Sato refused to rule out possibility of reversion with nuclear weapons. During course of Okinawa responses, PriMin went out of his way to focus attention on Soviet-held Northern Territories as well.

c. In brief comment on US-Japan Security Treaty, PriMin said there no change in GOJ position desiring "firm maintenance" of Security Treaty, which "basis of Japan's prosperity". (UNCLASSIFIED)

Comment:

d. / Sato's caution on Vietnam continued standing policy and was doubly understandable on day before SVN elections. Viewed in connection with remainder of week's events concerning Okinawa, it seems clear that PriMin sought to dampen rising crescendo of over-simplified reversionist sentiment in Japan by stressing security aspects of Okinawa issue and linking Okinawa question with Northern Territories problem. (CONFIDENTIAL)

2. JSP Reaffirms "Anti" Policies

a. Fourteen-member JSP delegation headed by party SecGen Koichi YAMAMOTO departed September 5 for Naha. Japanese press gave prominent play to press conference shortly after same day arrival at which Yamamoto announced official JSP Okinawa policy calling for reversion of Ryukyus to Japan by 1970 with complete withdrawal of all US bases from Okinawa. In addition, JSP policy contains sketchy outline of ten-year development program for Okinawa, often-repeated JSP allegation that US has no legal basis to retain Okinawa under Peace Treaty Article III, and reiteration of JSP's "strategic thinking" which urges end to Security Treaty, non-aggression pacts between USSR and Japan and Communist China and Japan, combined Japan-US-USSR-

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NND 969000

By WED NARA Date 7/25/02

CONFIDENTIAL

Page 3, A-337  
from Tokyo

Chicom security system, etc. Following day Japanese press described Yamamoto's "demand" of Hicom Unger that Okinawa be returned, but balanced coverage somewhat with attention to Hicom's statements in meeting with JSP.

b. During September 6 exclusive Japan Times interview, new JSP Chairman Seiichi KATSUMATA admitted that it impossible to form JSP government by 1970, but added since LDP popular vote falling, a coalition JSP/DSP/Komeito/"etc." government by 1970 should be possible. Katsumata also suggested that JSP demonstrations, protests, etc. against Security Treaty should be concentrated in 1969 rather than 1970.

c. During course of week JSP urged scrapping of Security Treaty to obtain return of Northern Territories, demanded PriMin cancel his "anti-(Communist) China" Taiwan visit and normalize relations with Chicoms, opposed PriMin's scheduled Vietnam trip and demanded GOJ refuse permission for US nuclear powered surface ships entry into Japanese ports (Item 4). (UNCLASSIFIED)

d. Comment: During course of busy week Socialists seemed to have cleaned out "pending" basket. Although party's Okinawa proposals, finally made public September 5, are more extreme than those of any other party except JCP, noteworthy that party leadership unable to agree that August 28 statement of JSP Lower House member Shichiro HOZUMI, to effect that non-nuke bases might be permitted in Okinawa after reversion (Weeks 35, Item 1), conflicted with party policy. All in all, however, week served to show that despite recent changes in JSP leadership, party's policies--which often serve to paper over intra-party personal differences--have not varied. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

### 3. GOJ/LDP Outlook on Okinawa Reversion Question

a. In aftermath of Sato press conference (Item 1) which avoided barring from consideration Okinawa reversion with nuclear weapons, press reported and speculated extensively on indications GOJ/LDP actively seeking to resolve conundrum of reversion vs. defense considerations. Press did best to play up theme of differences between PriMin Sato and FonMin Miki, following their September 5 meeting for final discussion before Miki's departure for Joint Economic Conference at Washington. Press asserted Sato told Miki latter's role in Washington would be to "just listen" on Okinawa issue and Miki reportedly complained to press afterwards it would have been much better if he could have been empowered to raise with USG overall GOJ position on reversion. Socialist questioner Motojiro MORI in Diet Upper House Foreign Affairs Committee September 6 attempted to exploit this supposed difference, even urging Miki to resign as FonMin in view of his apparent loss of Sato's

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NND 969000  
By WBD NARA Date 7/25/02

CONFIDENTIAL

Page 4, A-337  
from Tokyo

confidence. Miki countered that he and PriMin got along fine; he indicated he had thought more direct approach to Americans during visit would be advisable but had been more or less won over to PriMin's more cautious scenario.

b. LDP SecGen Fukuda, Executive Board Chairman Shiina (ex-FonMin), Policy Board Chairman Nishimura, and Party Foreign Policy Committee Chairman Kawashima (former LDP Vice President) met with Miki September 7 and, according press, urged on him need to stress defense significance of Okinawa whenever he spoke on reversion issue. Yomiuri September 8 reported Miki authorized on Washington visit to probe deeply into USG planning concerning Okinawa bases, particularly Pentagon thinking on continued need for Mace B capability there.

c. Jumping off from PriMin's press conference September 2 and Miki's Diet replies September 6 which also refused to rule out consideration of special arrangements concerning nuclear weapons after reversion, press late in week asserted FonOff thinking of formula which would permit "tactical" nuclear weapons in exchange for Okinawa reversion. Yomiuri lead article September 8 asserted that there was strong opposition within GOJ to even limited acceptance of nuclear weapons. Added that thought was being given to possibility timeframe for GOJ-USG decisions on basic issues and reaching timetable for Okinawa reversion might have to be moved to mid-1968, with approaching US-Japan talks focusing on declaration of mutual intent to observe such timeframe, together with interim measures such as direct election of GRI Chief Executive, steps to establish committee to discuss promotion of "oneness" of Japan and Ryukyus and consider possibility of reducing size of US bases.

d. On another reversion tack, Soichi USUI, Chairman of Lower House Okinawa "Etc" Committee, led mission of inspection by boat around Soviet-held Habomai and Shikotan islands and then conferred with Hokkaido governmental, fishing and refugee groups. LDP, according press, established new party committee concerning Soviet-held Northern Territories September 7. (UNCLASSIFIED)

e. Comment: PriMin and LDP leadership have clearly embarked on effort to reduce "excessive optimism" concerning possibilities of early Okinawa reversion on terms painless to Japan. There is equally clearly a considerable divergence of views within LDP, less on defense importance of Okinawa than on question of how strong a line party can hold on this issue, vis-a-vis domestic opposition, in terms of domestic political demands. Some of LDP "Okinawa experts" such as Usui hope that playing up issue of Soviet-held Northern Territories can help take heat of Okinawa, but difference of circumstances in terms of Japanese residents, etc. makes it likely Northern Territories would become focus of extensive public interest only after concrete progress began on Okinawa reversion. (CONFIDENTIAL)

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NND 969000  
By WBD NARA Date 7/25/02

CONFIDENTIAL

Page 5, A-337  
from Tokyo

#### 4. US Requests Nuclear Surface Ship Visits

a. Charge met with FonMin American Affairs Bureau Director Togo September 7 to make formal request for entry into Japanese ports of Nuclear Powered Surface Ships (NPSS). Charge said that, although such visits did not come under prior consultation provision of Security Treaty, US wished consult GOJ with respect to NPSS visits as had been case with SSN's, because of concern Japanese people about nuclear propulsion. Togo replied that answer to Charge's request would be made after safety of NPSS's thoroughly investigated.

b. Asahi morning edition September 7 released news prior to Charge's request. Following FonMin press release later in day, all media gave story top billing but only mildly conservative Tokyo Shimbun commented editorially. International considerations should override domestic political differences, paper said, thus acceptance of US request "unavoidable". (UNCLASSIFIED)

c. Comment: September 7 Charge/Togo meeting first formal step of series of events worked out after months of negotiations. Asahi scoop, allegedly based on leak from Chief Cabinet Secretary Toshio KIMURA, disconcerting but in no way affects basic arrangements. Press reports opposition parties plan to ask government to refuse US request and JCP Lower House member Zentaro TANIGUCHI during September 7 protest visit to Embassy promised "massive mobilization" against NPSS entry. ~~According to agreed upon scenario, however, GOJ approval expected in approximately one month.~~ (CONFIDENTIAL)

#### 5. PriMin Sato Departs for Taipei

a. PriMin Sato left Tokyo September 7 for a three-day visit to Taipei. Press, editorially, expressed concern over possible effect of PriMin's Taipei visit on Japan-Chicom trade while issuing usual warnings against creating impression that Japan favors Asian anti-communist alliance. Some 200 left-of-JCP university students, pledged to prevent trip by force, clashed with 400 policemen at time of PriMin's Haneda airport departure and more than ten of the student demonstrators were arrested. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: Visit of Japanese PriMin to Taipei is first since Kishi's 1957 trip. Hand-wringing over alleged anti-communist alliance and damage to Japan-Chicom trade milder than anticipated, primarily because situation on Mainland appears offer little prospect of progress in Japan-China de facto relations. According press reports Sato was immediately hit for Japanese credits to tune of \$150 million upon arrival Taipei. Likely that GOJ will consider GRC request for aid on basis of its estimate of future economic

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NND 969000  
By W6D NARA Date 7/25/02

CONFIDENTIAL

Page 6, A-337  
from Tokyo

advantage to Japan. At same time PriMin will be chary of making political statements gratuitously offensive to Chicoms. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

PSYCHOLOGICAL

6. Mixed Japanese Reaction to SVN Presidential Elections

a. With Japanese correspondents having focussed mainly on SVN civilian candidates' complaints during election campaign, Japanese media reaction to election results was generally negative, strongly suggesting election may have been invalid. Some commentaries, however, accepted validity of polling and expressed guarded hope for improved SVN political situation.

b. FonMin Miki called election "step forward", while FonOff spokesman "welcomed" election outcome and said elections were "epoch-making" step toward SVN political democracy and result was therefore "desirable" one.

c. JSP comment stressed election irregularities, saying they had barred electorate from expressing its will; maintained that heavy urban vote for civilians was undisputed manifestation of voters' wish for peace and civil rule. DSP Chairman Edi SONE said elections were first step toward civilian rule and reflected populace's strong desire for negotiated settlement.

d. September 5 press editorials gave considerable attention to question of fair voting. Asahi somewhat reluctantly admitted election had produced new government "born on basis of will of people". Suggested that this, plus fact that "new VC program includes some realistic policies", should permit new GVN "to take positive steps to build nation on basis of these trends". Mainichi stressed apparent appeal of peace theme in campaign and hoped new GVN will "exert efforts through sincere policies reflecting people's strong desire for peace". Yomiuri said it "cannot imagine peace talks in near future in light of NVN censure of elections" and non-recognition of GVN in new VC political platform, so that "most desirable thing is for new government to become stable regime enjoying support of people". Tokyo Shimbun took similar tack, stressing that hope for peace might now come from strengthened GVN expanding its area of control and "making people recognize its superiority over VC".

e. On Fuji-TV network September 5, Sankei staff member and ex-Saigon correspondent Kunio SHIMIZU held that elections were generally fair, that high voting rate showed Vietnamese are "earnest people" who "probably felt it was their duty to vote" and that election represented GVN's successful test of power with VC. He concluded: "Now, for first time, America has obtained certification for government that represents popular will."

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NND 969000  
By W80 NARA Date 7/25/02



CONFIDENTIAL

Page 7, A-337  
from Tokyo

f. However, follow-up election reports from Saigon correspondents for Japanese newspapers and for NHK generally were strongly critical of polling and concentrated on reporting interviews with dissatisfied citizenry and charges of rigging and manipulation. (UNCLASSIFIED)

g. Comment: Japanese media and JSP would probably be quite taken aback if they realized how closely tone of their treatment of SVN election resembled, to foreign observer, their usual comments on Japanese elections. (UNCLASSIFIED)

  
OSBORN

  
POL:TBleha:lt  
TWainsworth  
REArmstrong  
SDawkins  
  
USIS:HLBurleson

CONFIDENTIAL

0 7 0 8  
DECLASSIFIED  
Authority *NND 969000*  
By *MBD* NARA Date *7/25/02*





Department of State

TELEGRAM

*Pol 2 Japan 119*

CONFIDENTIAL 903

PAGE 01 TOKYO 03036 01 OF 02 022015Z

85

ACTION EA 15

INFO SP 02, SS 20, GPM 03, SC 01, NSC 10, RSC 01, SAH 03, L 03, H 02, P 04,

USIA 12, CIA 04, INR 07, NSAE 00, RSR 01, 088 W

P R 020930Z NOV 67  
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7180  
INFO OSD WASHDC  
DA WASHDC  
CINCPAC  
HICOMRY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 TOKYO 3036

FOR COUNTRY DIRECTOR, JAPAN  
OSD FOR ISA/DR. HALPERIN  
DA PASS ODUSA  
CINCPAC FOR POLAD  
HICOMRY PASS AMCONUNIT.

1. FOLLOWING IS PRIORITY WEEKA ITEM.

PAGE 2 RUALOT 3036D/1 C O N F I D E N T I A L

2. OKINAWA ROUNDUP.

A. ATTENTION THIS WEEK FOCUSED ON DEVELOPMENT BY OHAMA COMMITTEE OF "INTERIM REPORT" TO PRIMIN SATO, BUT THERE WERE OTHER IMPORTANT EDDIES WHICH RESULTED IN TOP LEAD STORIES RE OKINAWA IN ONE OF ANOTHER OF MAJOR NEWSPAPERS ALMOST EVERY DAY.

MICROFILMED BY US/4

CONFIDENTIAL

*Tokyo 3036  
11/2/67*

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NND 969000  
By WBD NARA Date 7/25/02



Department of State

TELEGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 TOKYO 03036 01 OF 02 022015Z

B. OHAMA COMMITTEE NOV 1 AT ITS SEVANTH PLENARY SESSION (WITH PRIMIN SATO, FONMIN MIKI, DIRGEN PMO TSUKAHARA IN ATTENDANCE) ADOPTED "INTERIM REPORT" TO SATO ON OKINAWA ISSUE. REPORT SAID IT "DESIRABLE" U.S. AND JAPAN AGREE "WITHIN TWO OR THREE YEARS" ON TIMING OF REVERSION OKINAWA AND BONJNS AND THAT AN "AGREEMENT TO AGREE" SHOULD BE REACHED DURING PRIMIN'S FORTHCOMING VISIT TO WASHINGTON. REPORT SAID AGREEMENT ON CONTINUING CONSULTATIONS RE REVERSION ALSO DESIRABLE AND BASIC UNDERSTANDING SHOULD BE REACHED BETWEEN U.S. AND JAPAN ON IMPLEMENTATION BY GOJ OF MEASURES TO PROMOTE "ONENESS" OF JAPAN AND OKINAWA IN PERIOD PRIOR RETURN OF ADMINISTRATIVE RIGHTS.

PAGE 3 RUALOT 30360/1 C O N F I D E N T I A L

C. WITH RE-RO TO POSSIBLE TERMS OF REVERSION, REPORT ALLUEDE TO PROPOSAL OF COMMITTEE MEMBER KUSUMI FOR BRINGING ABOUT REVERSION FIRST, THEN MAKING "STEP BY STEP" EFFORHWTO BRING STATUS OF BASES INTO LINE WITH THOSE IN REST OF JAPAN. REPORT SET ITS RECOMMENDATIONS WITHIN FRAMEWORK STRONG PLEA FOR FRANK RECOGNITION OF IMPORTANCE U.S. OKINAWA BASES FOR SECURITY JAPAN AND FAR EAST AND THEIR ROLE IN INTERRELATED SECURITY SYSTEM MAINTAINED BY U.S. IN ORIENT. DOCUMENT REPORTEDLY SAID OKINAWA COULD REVERT UNDER "AMAMI OSHIMA FORMULA" BY DIRECT AGREEMENT BETWEEN U.S. AND JAPAN WITHOUT REFERENCE OTHER PEACE TREATY POWERS. IT ALSO REPORTEDLY MADE RECOMMENDATIONS RE MEASURES FOR PROMOTION OF INTEGRATION AND REMOVAL OF BARRIERS BETWEEN OKINAWA AND JAPAN, INCLUDING PROPOSALS FOR JOINT USJAJAPAN DEVELOPMENT-LENDING ORGAN AND "OPENING WAY TO PERMIT REPRESENTATION OF OKINAWA RESIDENTS' VIEWS IN SOME MANNER IN (JAPANESE) NATIONAL POLITICS."

D. COMMITTEE'S "INTERIM REPORT" WAS RESULT GOVERNMENT

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority *NND 969000*  
By *WBD* NARA Date *7/25/02*



Department of State

TELEGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 TOKYO 03036 01 OF 02 022015Z

PAGE 4 RUALOT 3036D/1 C O N F I D E N T I A L  
REACTION TO PRESS CRITICISM TO EFFECT GOJ EFFORTS TO PRE-  
VENT ADOPTION OF RECOMMENDATIONS WHICH WOULD LIMIT  
PRIMIN'S ROOM FOR MANEUVER IN FORTHCOMING WASHINGTON  
TALKS HAD SMOTHERED LAST WEEK'S ATTEMPT BY COMMITTEE  
PUT FORTH FORMAL REPORT (WEEK 43, ITEM 2). OHAMA  
ATTEMPTED USE RESULTING BARGAINING POSITION TO GET  
(A) RECOMMENDATION AS STRONGLY WORDED AS POSSIBLE FOR USJA  
GOJ AGREEMENT TO DECIDE BY 1970 ON TIMING OF REVERSION,  
AND (B) RECOMMENDATION FOR ESTABLISHMENT USJAJAPAN CON-  
SULTATIVE ORGAN FORMALLY CHARGED WITH DEVELOPMENT OF  
REVERSION FORMULA. GOJ OFFICIALS OPPOSED BOTH POINTS  
AS UNDULY RESTRICTING PRIMIN, AND NEGOTIATIONS WERE  
CARRIED ON WITH OHAMA RIGHT DOWN  
TO WIRE.

E. OHAMA WAS ASSISTED IN HIS EFFORTS GET CONCRETE RECOM-  
MENDATIONS BY VISIT TO TOKYO OF OKINAWAN DELEGATION  
HEADED BY FORMER GOVERNOR TATSUO TAIRA REPRESENTING  
NAHA REVERSION STUDY COUNCIL, AS WELL AS BY CHIEF EXECUTIVE  
MATSUOKA, WHO WAS IN TOW  
FOR YOSHIDA FUNERAL. TAIRA  
REPORTEDLY MADE VERY STRONG APPROACH TO PRIMIN IN COURSE

PAGE 5 RUALOT 3036D/1 C O N F I D E N T I A L  
APPOINTMENT MORNING NOV 1 IN WHICH HE PRESENTED OKINAWAN  
COUNCIL'S "INTERIM REPORT". TAIRA (ACCORDING PRESS) TOLD  
SATO THAT, UNLESS SOMETHING RELATED TO TIMING OF REVERSION  
COMES OUT OF WASHINGTON TALKS, OKINAWAN POLITICAL SITUATION  
LIKELY TO TURN SOUR WITH REAL DANGER OF LEFTIST TAKEOVER  
OF REVERSION ISSUE AND EFFORT TO DISRUPT US BASES IN OKINAWA  
AS RESULT. IN FRONT-PAGE INTERVIEW PUBLISHED NOV 2 TOKYO  
SHIMBUN, MATSUOKA SAID MUCH SAME THING, ADDING OBSERVATION  
LACK OF SOME SUCCESS BY SATO IN WASHINGTON LIULLY INVITE  
"REACTION" FROM WITHIN LDL.

RP-3 JOHNSON  
BT

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority *NND 969000*  
By *WBD* NARA Date *7/25/02*



Department of State

TELEGRAM

PL 2-1 JAPAN 4/4

CONFIDENTIAL 257

PAGE 01 TOKYO 03036 02 OF 02 030213Z

85  
ACTION EA 15

INFO SP 02, SS 20, GPM 03, SC 01, NSC 10, RSC 01, SAH 03, L 03, H 02, P 04,

USIA 12, CIA 04, INR 07, NSAE 00, IGA 02, AID 30, RSR 01, 120 W

P R 020930Z NOV 67  
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7181  
INFO OSD WASHDC  
DA WASHDC  
CINCPAC  
HICOMRY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 TOKYO 3036

F. REFLECTING VIEW HELD STRONGLY BY ITS CHAIRMAN, UPPER  
HOUSE MEMBER KEN YASUI, THAT PARTY AND PRIMIN MUST  
CLARIFY THEIR POSITION ON OKINAWA ISSUE, LDP PARTY COMMITTEE  
ON OKINAWA PROBLEM HELD MEETING OCT 31 TO CONSIDER YASUI  
DRAFT POLICY STATEMENT. AGAINST BACKGROUND STRONG  
STATEMENT THAT PROBLEM SHOULD BE SOLVED BY FRANK EXCHANGE  
WITH AMERICANS WHICH WOULD AVOID ANTAGONISTIC ATMOSPHERE,  
YASUI DRAFT REPORTEDLY CALLED FOR SOME "CLUE, NOT  
QUANTITATIVELY BUT QUALITATIVELY, CONCERNING REVERSION"

PAGE 2 RUALOT 3036D/2 C O N F I D E N T I A L  
AS RESULT WASHINGTON TALKS. ACCORDING PRESS, YASUI HAD  
DIFFICULT TIME WITH FUNCTIONAL AND PARTIAL REVERSION  
FORMULAE ADVOCATES IN OCT 31 COMMITTEE SESSION, AND DRAFT  
WHICH WAS FORWARDED FOR JOINT SESSION NOV 2 OF LDP COM-  
MITTEES ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS RESEARCH, SECURITY AFFAIRS,  
AND OKINAWA PROBLEM WAS PRETTY VAGUE AND MEANINGLESS  
DOCUMENT.

CONFIDENTIAL

Tokyo 3036

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NND 969000  
By WBD NARA Date 7/25/02



Department of State

TELEGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 TOKYO 03036 02 OF 02 030213Z

G. LOWER HOUSE DIET COMMITTEE RELEASED REPORT NOV 1 BASED ON ITS STUDY MISSION VISIT TO RYUKYUS AUG 28 THROUGH SEPT 1. ACCORDING TO PRESS, REPORT RECOMMENDS SUPRA PARTISAN CONSIDERATION OKINAWA ISSUE. COMMITTEE INDICATED IT FOUND OKINAWANS DISSATISFIED WITH U.S. RULE BUT DIVIDED IN THEIR VIEWS AS TO WHAT SHOULD BE DONE WITH U.S. BASES AFTER REVERSION. COMMITTEE THOUGHT MAJORITY WOULD NOT WELCOME REVERSION WITH U.S. RETENTION NUCLEAR CAPABILITY. COMMITTEE REPORTEDLY FELT MAJOR CAUSE OF DISSATISFACTION WITH U.S. RULE WAS "RESTRICTION OKINAWANS' CIVIL LIBERTIES", AND RECOMMENDED TRANSFER OF JUDICIAL RIGHTS TO JAPAN, ELIMINATION OF TRAVEL RESTRICTIONS, AND

PAGE 3 RUALOT 3036D/2 C O N F I D E N T I A L  
OTHER MEASURES IN "HUMAN RIGHTS" AREA. COMMITTEE ALSO REPORTEDLY DETECTED FEELING OF "CAUTION" LEST U.S. CAPITAL INVESTMENT AND ECONOMIC AID TIE OKINAWA TO U.S. IN WAYS WHICH MIGHT PRESENT PROBLEMS IN CONNECTION REVERSION AND ATTENDANT APPLICATION OF JAPANESE LEGISLATION.

H. COMMENT: DR. OHAMA HAS, IN COURSE OF THIS WEEK'S EVENTS, RE-ESTABLISHED HIMSELF IN INDEPENDENT AND IMPORTANT ROLE IN OKINAWA POLICY-MAKING. HE WAS, OF COURSE, FORCED BY PROCESS OF NEGOTIATIONS TO MODIFY HIS IDEAS. HIS ORIGINAL IDEA FOR US-JAPAN CONSULTATIVE ORGAN WAS APPARENTLY ALONG LINES FORMATION BLUE-RIBBON COMMITTEES BY BOTH GOVERNMENTS WITH FEW DIPLOMATS ADDED AT THE END; A CONCEPT VIOLENTLY OPPOSED BY FONOFF. NEVERTHELESS, HE WAS ABLE TO DRAW UPON OKINAWAN SUPPORT AND TO INVOLVE HIS DISTINGUISHED COMMITTEE MEMBERS FOR FIRST TIME IN NUTS-AND-BOLTS DEBATE IN SUCH MANNER AS TO ACHIEVE HIS PRIME OBJECTIVE OF STATEMENT ON TIMING FOR ANNOUNCEMENT OF REVERSION DATE.

GP-3 JOHNSON

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NND 969000

By WBD NARA Date 7/25/02

ORIGIN/ACTION

INR-10

RM/R	REP	AF
1		
ARA	EUR	CAF
	5	6
NEA	CU	INR
	5	
E	P	IO
L	FBO	AID
		12
PC	S/H	RS/K
		1
AGR	COM	FRB
2	3	
INT	LAB	TAR
	2	
TR	XMB	AIR
4		10
ARMY	CIA	NAVY
10	20	7
ORD	USIA	NSA
49	11	3
		NSC
		6

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

# AIRGRAM

POL 2-1 JAPAN

FOR RM USE ONLY

A-565 CONFIDENTIAL

TO : Department of State

INFO: BANGKOK CINCPACFLT  
CINCPAC COMNAVMARIANAS  
CINCPACAF COMSEVENFLT  
CINCUSARPAC COMUS/J

FROM : Amembassy TOKYO

SUBJECT : JOINT WEEKA NO. 43

REF :

## CONTENTS

1. Yoshida Death Cuts Short Sato Visit to Saigon
2. Internal Maneuvers on Okinawa Issue
3. Opposition Parties Debate Okinawa
4. October 21 Anti-Vietnam War Demonstrations
5. GOJ Approves Wage Increase for Government Employees
6. Public Service Unions Stage Walkout

## POLITICAL

### 1. Yoshida Death Cuts Short Sato Visit to Saigon

a. Former PriMin, Shigeru YOSHIDA, political mentor of present PriMin Sato and "grand old man" of post-war Japanese politics, died October 20 at age 89. Sato told Chief Cabinet Secretary by telephone from Manila that he would cut his Saigon visit, final stop on current overseas tour, to three hours. October 21 Sato told newsmen aboard

USARYIS (7th Psyop Gp)

HONG KONG	MOSCOW	NAHA	SEOUL
KOBE-OSAKA	NAGOYA	SAIGON	TAIPEI
		SAPPORO	

Group 3

Downgraded at 12-year intervals; not automatically declassified.

CONFIDENTIAL

FOR DEPT. USE ONLY

☐ In ☐ Out

FORM 4-62 DS-323

Drafted by: POL:(see last page)

Contents and Classification Approved by:

POL:TWAinsworth

Clearances:

1967 OCT 31 PM 3 24

COPY FLO-PBR

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NND 969000  
By WBD NARA Date 7/25/02



CONFIDENTIAL

Page 2, A-565  
from Tokyo

plane returning him to Japan that he had found "strong desire on part of South Vietnamese leaders to probe peace possibilities," but he had not promised to raise Japanese aid to South Vietnam above present levels. Upon arrival in Tokyo saddened PriMin went immediately to pay condolences to Yoshida family. PriMin October 23 announced formal Cabinet approval of state funeral, first in Japan since WW II, for Yoshida on October 31 and of posthumous award of Japan's highest decoration. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: While US lost great and good friend in Yoshida, his death unlikely to affect present Japanese policies. During past few years frequent calls on Yoshida by PriMin and other government leaders made largely out of courtesy rather than to obtain guidance. Chief Cabinet Secretary specifically told press "Yoshida letter" which restricted long-term trade credits for mainland China would not be affected by author's death. At same time death came as shock to Japanese nation and to PriMin Sato personally. Only JCP initially attacked state funeral decision, but JSP "young Turks" October 23 criticized Chairman Katsumata's eulogy for Yoshida and both JSP and DSP unable refrain from quibbling over legal technicalities of state funeral. <sup>Articles</sup> stressing Yoshida's courage and independence as Prime Minister during seven difficult post-war years and his contribution of casting Japan's post-war national policy in the line of economic development within the Free World, dominated Japanese media for most of week, pushing virtually all news of PriMin's Saigon visit into background. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

2. Internal Maneuvers on Okinawa Issue

a. As opposition parties revealed their disarray on Okinawa issue (Item 3), GOJ and LDP embarked on apparent effort to tackle Okinawa problem seriously at high level in preparation for PriMin Sato's November visit to US. Sato, after return from Southeast Asia trip and hurried participation in early phase of mourning for deceased PriMin Yoshida (Item 1) met FonMin Miki October 25 to hear report on Miki's talk with Ambassador Johnson and plan next steps in campaign. Press account of Sato-Miki meeting limited to statement PriMin hoped reach "basic understanding on Okinawa issue in as concrete terms as possible" in talks with President Johnson. Speculative press reports drawing on "official sources" suggested that Japan would seek US agreement to study return of administrative rights "in parallel" with continuing assessment of Far East situation, that some GOJ elements continued hope for definite timetable of US-Japan talks on issue following Sato visit and perhaps for actual reversion timetable, and that Bonins issue might be taken up separately from Okinawa in Johnson-Sato talks and agreement reached on reversion of Bonins.

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NND 969000  
By WBD NARA Date 7/25/02

CONFIDENTIAL

Page 3, A-565  
from Tokyo

b. Ohama committee on October 25 announced abandonment of its efforts to produce "interim report" on Okinawa reversion as recommendation for PriMin before his Washington visit (Tokyo 2867). FonOff refused clear draft report and council members unable agree whether report should include recommendation concerning reversion timetable. Press criticized GOJ handling of committee as superficial.

c. FonMin Miki also gave Okinawa report to LDP Executive Board October 24, and PriMin and LDP SecGen Fukuda agreed October 25 that Sato would meet individually with opposition party leaders (except JCP) to hear views on Okinawa issue. JSP same day confused picture by asking that meeting with Sato take place November 6 or later for JSP convenience, and announcing campaign to oppose Sato's visit to US.

d. Okinawa Peoples Party (communist) Chairman Kamejiro SENAGA arrived Tokyo October 20, ostensibly to press civil suit in Tokyo Court. At Tokyo October 21 mass rally (Item 4) Senaga urged "joint struggle" for Okinawa reversion and later in week made same proposal in meetings with JCP and JSP leaders.

e. Okinawa Democratic Party October 26 call for reversion with US bases under Security Treaty restrictions draw Tokyo press comment October 27 that ODP policy appeared in line with recent opinion poll results but clashed with GOJ/LDP policy. ( UNCLASSIFIED)

f. Comment: Press treatment, apparently GOJ inspired, tended raise public expectations slightly concerning possible results of Sato visit to Washington, but prevailing impression continued that GOJ lack of progress toward firm line on issue was matched only by confusion and contradictions among opposition as they sought to use issue for domestic political purposes. Okinawa Democratic Party pronouncement may strengthen belief of DSP and others that reversion with US bases under Security Treaty represents consensus in Okinawa as well as Japan. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

### 3. Opposition Parties Debate Okinawa

a. According press, second conference of opposition parties' SecGens October 23 was unable to agree on any "practical cooperation" on Okinawa reversion issue because DSP SecGen Kasuga insisted conference not discuss "practical cooperation" but limit itself to "discussion of problem of reversion." Parties did agree to meet again but date was not specified. SecGens reportedly agreed on following six points: (1) opposition to using Okinawa or Bonins for "aggression" or as nuclear bases, (2) public election of chief executive in Okinawa, (3) elimination of travel restrictions between Okinawa and Japan, (4) increase of GOJ economic aid and "rehabilitation

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NND 969000  
By WBD NARA Date 7/25/02

CONFIDENTIAL

Page 4, A-565  
from Tokyo

of Okinawan economy, " (5) opposition to US confiscation of land for bases, and (6) return of Bonin Islanders to Bonins. Newspaper accounts stated that JSP, Komeito and JCP further agreed to three points allegedly advocated by Okinawa Reversion Council: (1) abolition of Article III of Peace Treaty, (2) application of Japanese Constitution to Okinawa, and (3) abolition of nuclear bases in Okinawa and opposition to other type military bases there; DSP rejected these.

b. DSP Central Committee meeting October 26 heard Chairman Nishimura castigate JSP for irresponsible meaningless policies, pro-communist line, and being "more anti-American than JCP." Nishimura also quoted as saying DSP position on Okinawa reversion stands mid-way between LDP desire for "reversion with nuclear bases and free use" and JSP/JCP stand calling for immediate reversion without bases, and that DSP Okinawa reversion plan is only one which can unify Japanese people. Nishimura was reported as saying if US did not return Okinawa, it inevitable that Japanese people change their feeling toward US, so that "America is faced with choice of holding on to small piece of territory or hearts of 100,000,000 people." He said if US ignores DSP's modest demand for reversion, DSP is determined to mount "huge national campaign for reversion." Nishimura's attack on JSP brought quick rebuttal from JSP SecGen Yamamoto, who renewed charge DSP is "second conservative party." (UNCLASSIFIED)

c. Comment: DSP stand in four party conference on Okinawa and Nishimura's acid attack on JSP brought into open private feeling of both JSP and DSP leaders that opposition party conference not likely to produce "joint policy" on reversion or cooperation in public demonstrations. Nishimura's remarks to DSP Central Committee (intermediate organ between party convention and Central Executive Committee) do not constitute change of policy but reflect DSP's desire to cast itself in role of shaper of national consensus on Okinawa reversion and related security issue. It remains to be seen whether DSP can convert Nishimura's fiery oration into popular movement. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

#### 4. October 21 Anti-Vietnam War Demonstrations

a. According to police, total 276 demonstrations attracting 205,000 participants held throughout Japan October 20 and 21 in connection with "international anti-Vietnam war day." Major rally in Tokyo, sponsored by Sohyo and Churitsuroren, drew 36,000 (police count - sponsors claimed 58,000). After evening session of Tokyo rally, two groups of Zengakuren students clashed separately with riot police who successfully contained them. Injuries few and total of eleven students arrested. About 2100 participants in rally

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NND 969000  
By WBD NARA Date 7/25/02

CONFIDENTIAL

Page 5, A-565  
from Tokyo

sponsored by leftist intellectual group, Beheiren, marched past Chancery on afternoon of October 21 without incident. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: Lack of interest in this year's anti-Vietnam rallies is repeat of last year's fiasco. Ministry of Labor official told Embassy officer that Sohyo, which was major sponsor of rallies, had hoped for nationwide turnout at least ten times as large as 200,000 who actually took part. Anti-war demonstrations in U.S. received more prominence than did local versions in Japanese press. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

5. GOJ Approves Wage Increase for Government Employees

a. GOJ announced on October 20 its acceptance, with single exception, of recommendations regarding wage increase for government employees made to it in August (Week 33, item 5) by National Personnel Authority. It approved NPA's recommended average increase of 7.9% as well as introduction of new "urban areas" allowance, but decided to make increase effective from August 1 rather than May 1, 1967, as recommended by NPA. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: While Sohyo-affiliated public service unions such as Nikkyoso predictably continued to attack GOJ for failing to accept May 1 as effective date of wage increase, general press reaction was that GOJ, by making wage increase retroactive to August 1 rather than September 1 (the effective date since 1964), by accepting new allowance and by timing of its announcement had skillfully taken wind out of sails of Sohyo-led fall labor offensive scheduled to climax with October 26 strike of public employees in favor of NPA recommendations. (Item 6). GOJ must yet seek Diet appropriations to cover wage increase and authorization of new allowance to compensate civil servants in major cities for high living costs. (UNCLASSIFIED)

6. Public Service Unions Stage Walkout

a. Spearheaded by Teachers Union (Nikkyoso) and Municipal Transport Workers (Toshikotsu), seven public service unions affiliated with Sohyo launched strikes lasting from 30 minutes to two hours early on October 26 as climax of their fall "labor offensive" designed to secure full implementation by GOJ of National Personnel Authority's recommendations regarding wage increases for civil servants. 700,000-member Prefectural and Municipal Workers Union (Jichiro) called off its participation October 25 in view of GOJ decision October 20 accepting substance NPA recommendations (Item 5). Major effect of strike was traffic snarl in major cities during morning rush hour as over 2,500,000 commuters were deprived of public transportation. Teachers walkout limited in virtually all cases to cancellation of first hour of classroom instruction.

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NND 969000  
By WBD NARA Date 7/25/02


CONFIDENTIAL


Page 6, A-565 from  
Tokyo

b. Both GOJ and Tokyo's leftist-backed Governor Minobe issued warnings to unions before the strike that walkouts would violate the law and would result in penalties being imposed on the strikers. (UNCLASSIFIED)

c. Comment: Sponsors of strike had intended it to be largest "fall offensive" ever, but failure of Jichiro to participate limited scale considerably. GOJ's action in announcing acceptance of NPA recommendations only few days prior to strike limited concrete issues to relatively minor one of date of enforcement of wage increase, and probably succeeded in turning public opinion against strikers and in favor of later disciplinary action by government.

GP-3

JOHNSON  


 POL: RFPfeiffer - 10/27/67  
REArmstrong  
CTBleha  
RMImmerman

USIS:HBurleson  
NAVA:LCdr. S. P. Strickland

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NND 969000  
By WBD NARA Date 7/25/02

ORIGIN/ACTION  
INR-10

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

# AIRGRAM

1  
POL 2-1 JAPAN  
FOR RM USE ONLY

RM/R	REP	AF
1		
ARA	EUR	5
NEA	CU	5
E	GPM	10
L	STP	12
3	PC	RSR
5/12	1	1-HOCKMAN
AGR	COM	FRB
2	3	
INT	LAB	TAR
	2	
TR	XMB	AIR
4		10
ARMY	CIA	NAVY
10	20	7
OSD	USIA	NSA
48	11	3
		NSC
		6

A-503  
NO.

CONFIDENTIAL

PRIORITY

HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : Department of State

INFO: BANGKOK CINCPACFLT DA/ODCSOPS FUKUOKA  
CINCPAC COMNAVMARIANAS DA/DUSA HICOMRY  
CINCPACAF COMSEVENFLT DOD/ISA HICOM/POLAD  
CINCUSARPAC COMUS/J (Halperin) USCAR (cont'd)

DATE: October 13, 1967

FROM : Amembassy TOKYO

SUBJECT: JOINT WEEKA NO. 41

REF :

## CONTENTS

1. Ultra-Left Student Riot at Haneda
2. Coming Attractions on Home Front
3. Comprehensive JCP Attack on Mao
4. Komeito Seeks Northern Territories Return
5. Nike-Hawk Negotiations
6. Okinawa Roundup
7. Prime Minister Sato Abroad Again
8. Dalai Lama Departs: Japan Cool, Peking Hot

## POLITICAL

1. Ultra Left Students Riot at Haneda

a. Approximately 2500 ultra-left anti-JCP Zengakuren students, protesting PriMin Sato's departure October 8 on second leg Southeast Asia

USARYIS (7th Psyop Gp) NAHA SEOUL  
HONG KONG MOSCOW SAIGON TAIPEI  
KOBE-OSAKA NAGOYA SAPPORO CANBERRA  
NEW DELHI MANILA DJAKARTA

Group 3

Downgraded at 12-year intervals; not automatically declassified

CONFIDENTIAL

FORM 4-62 DS-323

Drafted by:

POL:(see last page)

Contents and Classification Approved by:  
POL:TAV Ainsworth

Clearances:

1967 OCT 17 AM 11 01

COPY FLO-PBR

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NND 969000  
By WBD NARA Date 7/25/02



CONFIDENTIAL

Page 2  
A-503 from Tokyo

tour which includes Saigon visit, mounted violent demonstration in which one student was killed, several police vehicles set afire by students and approximately 600 policemen and 100 students injured. Fatality was Kyoto University freshman Hiroaki YAMAZAKI, who was run over by police vehicle captured and driven by fellow students. Nation treated to graphic television coverage showing student groups attempting to force police barricades across three bridges leading to Haneda by stoning and clubbing police with long poles. Police arrested 58 students after breaking up demonstration by using tear gas.

b. Riot given extensive top coverage by all mass media. Reaction to student violence uniformly critical. Editorial and other comment stressed tendency toward planned and systematic violence by extremist student groups (more than half of rioters reportedly came from universities outside Tokyo area) and growing isolation of extremists from general student body. Chief Cabinet Secretary Kimura told press student death was in effect result of extremist groups' rehearsal for violent revolution and Sato's itinerary would not be changed. Komeito and DSP spokesmen also condemned student violence, while reaffirming their opposition to Sato's Vietnam visit. JCP called incident "clash between reactionary and ultra left counter revolutionary Trotskyite forces." Sohyo leaders' statement October 9 criticized student violence as detracting from movement to block PriMin visit to South Vietnam and to abrogate Security Treaty with US. According press, EdMin, HomeMin and Chief Cabinet Secretary agreed October 10 to consider possibility of applying long unenforced Subversive Activities Law of 1952 to student organizations. In House of Councillors' Local Administration Committee meeting October 11, National Public Safety Commission Chairman said no new public peace laws were being considered, but reaffirmed government carefully considering use of Subversive Activities Law. On same day press reported LDP set up special subcommittees in party's education and security committees to study Haneda riots. Committee members reportedly favor application of Subversive Activities Law, treatment of students as "professional rioters" and steps to prevent universities from being hotbeds of radical organizations.

c. Sole support (except for Peking NCNA) for violence of extremist Zengakuren group came in on the spot statement October 8 by JSP People's Movement Director Ioka, who told press Sato's insistence on unpopular South Vietnam visit was responsible for student death and that JSP would demand cabinet's resignation. Statement was retracted by JSP leaders next day but not before LDP SecGen Fukuda and DSP SecGen Kasuga hit JSP for its "approval of violence." JSP Central Executive Committee October 11 reaffirmed that JSP does not support student violence and called for extending JSP influence among students through Shaseido, JSP youth organization.

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NND 969000  
By WBD NARA Date 7/25/02

CONFIDENTIAL

Page 3  
A-503 from Tokyo

d. Bulk of university students clearly disinclined to become involved in violence. Campus demonstrations October 9 to protest death of Yamazaki attracted very little participation. JCP faction which controls roughly three-fourths of Zengakuren "disowned" anti-JCP Zengakuren factions in harsh criticism paralleling that of JCP. (UNCLASSIFIED)

e. Comment: Violent tactics of anti-JCP factions of Zengakuren have isolated them from rest of left wing as well as general public. Although calls for tighter control of student organizations rang out from some quarters of LDP, government likely to wait (at least until Sato's departure for US) for repeat performance before taking major step such as application of Subversive Activities Law. Police may get some new and better anti-riot equipment, but more important effect is clearer public support for firm and proper police control of violence. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

## 2. Coming Attractions on the Home Front

a. While week's political news heavily dominated by Sato visit to Southeast Asia and his resounding sendoff (Item 1) and expectations concerning Okinawa issue in connection subsequent Sato trip to US, LDP SecGen Fukuda dropped new hints about possible Cabinet reshuffle, extraordinary Diet session, and relations with opposition parties. During trip to Osaka October 11 and Nagoya October 12, mainly for purpose of rounding up economic circles' support for LDP in next year's House of Councillors elections, Fukuda told press that LDP "trend heading in direction of Cabinet reshuffle;" while PriMin had not indicated such intention, SecGen would study carefully whether reshuffle appropriate after Sato's return from US. Fukuda also predicted extraordinary session of Diet beginning early December and lasting about two weeks.

b. Fukuda told press at Nagoya that PriMin would meet JSP Chairman Katsumata on Okinawa question before going to US, since JSP had formally asked such meeting, and predicted Sato would also meet DSP and Komeito leaders if latter requested.

c. At same time committees studying major domestic issues on behalf GOJ and LDP admitted they were having difficult sledding. Election System Deliberation Committee (Week 39, Item 2) in effect gave up hope of reaching agreement on revision recommendation. As key sub-committee considering Lower House election districts went into final session October 13, majority continued to support combination of single seat districts and proportional representation, but hold-outs, including representatives of LDP and JSP, still had five other proposals alive. LDP committee on Urban Policy same day announced its report would be delayed one month beyond hoped-for early November date. (UNCLASSIFIED)

CONFIDENTIAL

0 7 2 2  
DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NND 969000  
By WBD NARA Date 7/25/02

CONFIDENTIAL

Page 4  
A-503 from Tokyo

d. Comment: Okinawa and foreign affairs have not distracted interest of large part of LDP, at least, from prospect of Cabinet shifts. As usual, LDP legislators in private comments treat question of reshuffle almost exclusively in terms of intra-party relationships and implications for expected Sato bid for third term as LDP president in 1968. Much speculation centers on whether Foreign Minister MIKI will go or stay (all sources willing to comment assume reshuffle will take place); in spite of activity on foreign affairs front, Tokyo politicians appear assume both Sato and Miki would be motivated only by considerations of LDP factional advantage, rather than substance of foreign policy views, in making such decision. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

3. Comprehensive JCP Attack on Mao

a. Following JCP Central Committee approval, Akahata October 10 published extremely long and harshly critical attack on Mao thought, "Maoist faction" and Cultural Revolution in general. According JCP, Maoist faction is anti-Marxist-Leninist because all facts indicate it has destroyed leadership system of CCP, is trampling under foot principles of Marxist-Leninist parties and is seeking to make CCP its private property. Cultural Revolution is planned political struggle calculated to deify Mao and establish and strengthen limitless despotic control of Maoist faction. Mao thought, being held up as highest guiding theory for international revolutionary movement, is nothing more than revival of Trotskyism. In name of Mao thought Maoist faction pursuing anti-socialist policy of intervening in affairs of other communist parties and struggle to defeat Mao line now major responsibility of all communists. Maoist faction in attempting to destroy international communist movement is similar to modern revisionism of Krushchev, and there no chance Maoist tactics will succeed.

b. Comment: Chicom "interference" in JCP affairs has gradually increased in intensity over past few months: There have been increased Chicom pressure on JCP prefectural committees and front groups to split, and Chicom encouragement of Orthodox Japan-China Friendship Association and Japan International Trade Promotion Association attacks on JCP. Thus formal JCP statement critical of Chicoms was expected. However, Akahata article notable for its comprehensiveness and harshness and puts JCP in forefront of communist parties critical of Mao and cultural revolution. At same time JCP SecGen Miyamoto, speaking at October 9 press conference called to announce Akahata's attack, left impression that JCP in no hurry to return to Moscow fold. For time being, Miyamoto suggested, party's closest ties will be with Workers Parties of North Korea and North Vietnam. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

CONFIDENTIAL

0 7 2 3  
DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NND 969000  
By WBD NARA Date 7/25/02

CONFIDENTIAL

Page 5  
A-503 from Tokyo

4. Komeito Seeks Northern Territories Return

a. Komeito October 11 announced views on Northern Territories calling for immediate Soviet return of Habomai and Shikotan as integral parts of Hokkaido, and Kunashiri and Etorofu as undisputed Japanese territory. At same time Komeito "requested" return of Kurile Islands up to Kurile Straits, from Uruppu in south to Shimushu in north. Admitting Japan gave up claim to Kuriles as result of San Francisco Peace Treaty, party said their ownership remains "undecided" and asked reversion to Japan or their placement under UN trusteeship system with Japan as administering power. To solve Northern Territories question Komeito advocated US-USSR-GOJ tripartite discussion in context of Komeito positions on Okinawa reversion (Weeka 34, 2) and US-Japan Security Treaty. In meantime fishing rights throughout northern islands should be granted Japanese. Komeito also expressed intention of pressing for establishment of Northern Territories Special Committee at next Diet session. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: Position on Kuriles return attracted press attention since most calls for return to Japan have specified only Kunashiri and Etorofu, two islands nearest Hokkaido in Chishima-Kuriles chain. Suggestion of tripartite discussion of Northern Territories return probably reflects Senator Mansfield's Japan-America Assembly proposals (Weeka 38, 2). In any event, by raising question of Northern Territories at this time, Komeito has joined LDP (Weeka 36, Item 3) in reminding Japanese that Okinawa and Bonins are not nation's sole territorial concerns. Call for new Diet Committee ignores fact that special committees on "Okinawa, etc." set up earlier this year include Northern Territories in their scope, at LDP insistence. Komeito move has "top of the head" flavor in some respects but drew favorable comment from influential Mainichi Shimbun October 13. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

5. Nike-Hawk Negotiations

a. Embassy exchanged notes with GOJ covering Nike-Hawk and DOD representative signed memoranda of understanding with counterparts at Japan Defense Agency (JDA) October 13 which provide for:

1. Japanese production of equipment for three Hawk battalions.
2. Procurement from U.S. of ground support equipment for two Nike battalions.
3. Japanese production of Nike Hercules missiles.
4. GOJ procurement of one additional Nike Hercules battalion from U.S. in 1972.

Second round of talks began October 2 between DOD team and JDA and were temporarily suspended October 7 just prior to initialing agreement because of

CONFIDENTIAL

0 7 2 4  
DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NND 969000  
By WBD NARA Date 7/25/02

CONFIDENTIAL

Page 6  
A-503 from Tokyo

suicide death of Mikio MORITA, JDA Equipment Bureau Director. While not directly negotiating with U.S. side, Morita had chief responsibility within GOJ to implement changeover from U.S. grant aid equipment to domestic production, of which Nike-Hawk is first major step. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: GOJ clearly accepted principle of paying pro rata share of R&D cost which had been one major stumbling block in preliminary talks last July. Total dollar value estimated at \$255 million over next several years. Agreement is big step forward under GOJ Third Defense Plan for domestic production of major weapons systems and will increase Japan's air defense capability significantly.

First evening press reaction to Morita suicide was shock over high position of victim and secondly fact that he involved Nike Hawk talks. Later coverage concluded that heavy pressures within bureaucracy, especially from Finance Ministry, coupled with personal traits of insomnia, nervousness and brilliance, came to head during negotiations and pushed Morita over brink. Most papers noted irony of suicide after negotiations apparently settled. U.S. was not given major blame for incident. (CONFIDENTIAL)

#### 6. Okinawa Roundup

a. PriMin Sato told press October 6 that reversion of Okinawa and Bonins related to complex security considerations and he does not think all problems will be solved at one stroke during his November visit to Washington, but that first goal is to reach "fundamental understanding" of how reversion problem is to be solved. PriMin, preparing for Southeast Asia trip, said he had instructed FonMin Miki to present Japanese "fundamental position" on Okinawa to US through diplomatic negotiations with Ambassador Johnson. Miki and Ambassador met October 11; press speculated that Miki had conveyed basic Japanese position to Ambassador who expected to seek instructions from US government before meeting with FonMin again. Press guessed that both sides in October 11 talks agreed that immediate reversion would be impossible in present circumstances and that negotiations would explore steps in expanding Okinawan autonomy and in promoting "integration" of Okinawa with Japan.

b. "Sources within Ohama Committee" were quoted in October 8 Mainichi as saying decision have FonMin negotiate with Ambassador Johnson before receipt of Committee's recommendations "unfortunate." Military critic Tadao KUSUMI, member of Ohama Committee, quoted by Tokyo press as

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NMD 969000  
By WBD NARA Date 7/25/02

0 7 2 5

CONFIDENTIAL

Page 7  
A-503 from Tokyo

saying in Okinawa that he unconvinced of absolute indispensability of American bases in Okinawa. Kusumi reportedly reiterated his argument for reversion by 1970 with "gradual application" to Okinawa bases of limitations of US-Japan Security Treaty after reversion. Doyen of LDP "old guard," Okinori KAYA, told press October 9 that talk of Okinawan reversion was "premature" and that "guaranteeing national security takes priority over national sentiment." Kaya said he intended to present his views at October 13 meeting of combined LDP committees on Foreign Affairs, National Security Affairs and Okinawa.

c. JDA Director General MASUDA was quoted by press as telling Lower House Cabinet Committee October 6 that any reversion of Okinawa which reduced capability of US bases to defend Japan and Far East would be "subject for concern." He said it possible that proposal for reversion of areas other than bases themselves might be made because "US nuclear capability in Okinawa was inextricably linked with numerous other base functions" and restrictions Security Treaty places on US bases in Japan would substantially reduce strength of US bases in Okinawa. Therefore, it might be necessary to make special exception for treatment of US bases in Okinawa. Masuda said presence of US nuclear weapons on Japanese soil would be subject for prior consultation under Security Treaty but would not in itself constitute violation of Japanese Constitution. He added that possession of "defensive nuclear weapons" would not violate constitution and reportedly closed his remarks by saying he could not affirm that Okinawa could fulfill its security role unless Polaris submarines could use it as repair base and Mace B and Nike Hercules were permitted. (UNCLASSIFIED)

d. Comment: Reversion discussion continues to center on treatment of bases after reversion and role of bases in security of Japan and Far East. (UNCLASSIFIED)

#### 7. Prime Minister Sato Abroad Again

a. PriMin Sato left Tokyo October 8 for two week journey which will take him to Indonesia, Australia, New Zealand, Philippines and Vietnam (A-272). His departure from Tokyo was marked by violent demonstration by far-left student groups (Item 1). There has been no significant local editorial reaction to the trip thus far. Press gave prominent play to Sato's statement in Djakarta October 10 that he hoped Indonesia would not close the door to relations with Communist China, and to his remarks in press conference in Canberra on Vietnam, where Sato reportedly said on October 12 Japan would not become involved in Vietnam war and that unilateral stopping of bombing of North Vietnam should be accompanied by reciprocal action on part of Hanoi. (UNCLASSIFIED)

CONFIDENTIAL

0 7 2 6  
DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NND 969000  
By WBD NARA Date 7/25/02

CONFIDENTIAL

Page 8  
A-503 from Tokyo

b. Comment: If PriMin again invokes the technique he successfully employed during his SEA trip last month (Week 40, item 4), his conversations with host government leaders will be expressions of good will and understanding without involving specific political or economic commitments. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

8. Dalai Lama Departs: Japan Cool, Peking Hot

a. Dalai Lama left Tokyo October 10 for Bangkok, concluding visit which began September 25. He adhered scrupulously to terms of visa forbidding political activity in Japan, and visit received little publicity. Indian Ambassador hosted three meals with key GOJ officials. Only adverse note of visit was hostile demonstration at department store art exhibit September 28 (Week 39, Item 4). (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

b. Tokyo press October 13 reported that Chicom decision to cancel Yomiuri Shimbun's permission to station correspondent in Peking conveyed October 12 by "Liao Cheng-chih trade office" to its Japanese opposite number in Chicom capital, "Takasaki trade office." Chicoms in angry outburst reported by NCNA cited Yomiuri role in hosting Dalai Lama visit as reason for cancellation.

d. Comment: Dalai Lama visit went off smoothly. It probably made little impression on Japanese government or people, with possible exception limited and specialized Buddhist circles. Peking's exaggerated reaction is likely to draw more sympathetic Japanese attention to plight of Tibetans than did Dalai's visit itself. Yomiuri ouster leaves three Japanese correspondents (Asahi, Nihon Keizai and Kyodo) in Peking, with NHK and TBS networks still hoping for visas for their replacements who are waiting in Japan. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

  
OSBORN

  
POL: RFPfeifer/riv/jl  
TWainsworth  
CTBleha  
SPDawkins  
HLevin

USIS:HBurleson  
NAVA:Cdr. PBShepard

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NND 969000  
By WBD NARA Date 7/25/02

ACTION			DEPARTMENT OF STATE			NA		
INR-10			AIRGRAM			POL 2-1 JAPAN		
RM/R	REP	AF	A-538			CONFIDENTIAL		
1			NO.			PRIORITY		
ARA	EUR	FE				HANDLING INDICATOR		
NEA	CU	INR						
E	P	IO						
1	2	3						
1	5/P	13						
AGR	COM	FRB						
2	3							
INT	LAB	TAR						
TR	XMB	AIR						
4		10						
ARMY	CIA	NAVY						
10	20	107						
OSO	USIA	NSA						
48	11	13						
		NSC						
		6						
			TO : Department of State			DA/ODCSOPS FUKUOKA		
			INFO: BANGKOK CINC PACFLT			DA/DUSA HICOMRY		
			CINCPAC COMNAV MARIANAS			DOD/ISA HICOM/POLAD		
			CINCPACAF COMSEVENFLT			(Hallerin) USCAR (con'd)		
			CINCUSARPAC COMUS/J					
			FROM : Amembassy TOKYO			DATE: October 20, 1967		
			SUBJECT: JOINT WEEKA NO. 42					
			REF: [Handwritten: Note]					
			[Handwritten: 0820/1967]					
			[Handwritten: INR (REP) INB]					
			CONTENTS					
			1. Aftermath of Ultra-Left Students' Demonstration (Weeka 41, 1)					
			2. Okinawa Roundup					
			3. CPSU Delegation to Visit Tokyo?					
			4. Prime Minister Sato Island-hopping					
			5. Soka Gakkai Presents Impressive Spectacle					
			6. Asahi Poll on Okinawa Reversion Question					
			POLITICAL					
			1. Aftermath of Ultra-Left Students' Demonstration (Weeka 41, 1)					
			a. Having offered own apology to Cabinet for students' misbehavior at Haneda Airport, EdMin Toshio KENNOKI scheduled three meetings October 13-17 with university authorities in attempt to encourage tightening of campus discipline. While Kennoki received apologies from university presidents for students' "unruly action" and					
			USARYIS (7th Psyop Gp)			SEOUL		
			HONG KONG MOSCOW			TAIPEI		
			KOBE-OSAKA NAGOYA			CANBERRA		
						WELLINGTON		
			Group 3					
			Downgraded at 12-year intervals; not automatically declassified.					
			CONFIDENTIAL			FOR DEPT. USE ONLY		
			FORM 4-62 DS-323			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> In <input type="checkbox"/> Out		
Drafted by:			POL: (see last page)			Contents and Classification Approved by: POL: TWAINSWORTH		
Clearances:								

DECLASSIFIED  
 Authority NND 969000  
 By WBD NARA Date 7/25/02



CONFIDENTIAL

Page 2, A-538  
from Tokyo

pledges to seek "normalization" of student movement, most prexies suggested nation as whole had some responsibility for incident and some went so far as to suggest review of entire post-war education system.

b. About 4,500 people, mostly students, October 17 staged "peoples' funeral" for killed Kyoto University freshman Hiroaki YAMAZAKI. Following "funeral" 1,500 students paraded through Tokyo rain under close surveillance of roughly twice that number of policemen. No incidents occurred.

c. Police attempts to identify those responsible for October 8 violence continued throughout week. October 16 police raided student group strongholds at Hosei, Chuo and Waseda Universities, seeking evidence to prove Haneda airport violence premeditated. Although numerous materials collected, police statement that number of documents burned before their arrival suggests they not completely satisfied with raid. That evening Hosei and Chuo presidents protested police entry on campuses, which fourth since 1960; Waseda president saw act as "regrettable" but not an infringement on campus freedom. Police October 17 arrested extremist Sampa Rengo Zengakuren Chairman Katsuyuki AKIYAMA as he attempted to address "funeral" marchers near Tokyo Station. Some say Akiyama personally planned and directed Haneda violence and police have court permission to hold him for 10 days of questioning, but thus far he has refused to talk. October 19 procurators office indicted 13 of 34 students arrested for causing injuries to policemen at Haneda. (UNCLASSIFIED)

d. Comment: Press comment continued critical of students' violence, an attitude which apparently came as surprise to ultra-left students involved. At same time large police turnout for October 17 demonstration and varieties of riot control equipment in evidence indicate they not likely to be caught off guard again soon. Less encouraging were responses from university authorities who, while obviously feeling some responsibility for students' conduct, showed no inclination to take the sort of disciplinary steps, such as expulsions, necessary to eliminate control of professional extremist organizers over the student movement. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

## 2. Okinawa Roundup

a. Okinawa news this week reflected continued efforts by Government to make sure no one has unrealistic expectations about what PriMin likely achieve in Washington on Okinawa issue, fissures in opposition party cooperation on issue, and launching of Asahi Shimbun campaign to "warm up"

CONFIDENTIAL

0 7 2 9  
DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NND 969000  
By WBD NARA Date 7/25/02

CONFIDENTIAL

Page 3, A-538  
from Tokyo

issue as topic public concern. Week's press also full of speculative articles making more or less sophisticated guesses about parameters GOJ policy position on entire Okinawa-Bonin issue.

b. At joint session of LDP committees on defense policy, Okinawa, and foreign affairs October 13, FonMin Miki reportedly gave quite specific summary of political difficulties he had been told (during Washington talks) US administration would face in making any major moves on Okinawa in election year and in midst uncertainties Vietnam conflict (Tokyo 2523). FonMin at lengthy meeting October 16 also reportedly gave Dr. Ohama stiff lecture on need for caution in speaking with press. Ohama reportedly presented to Miki views held by some members of his Council to effect Government negotiations with Ambassador Johnson in absence their recommendation made their work superfluous. Bland release to press after Ohama-Miki session said Miki told Ohama his Council's work valuable and should continue. However Council at its October 19 meeting reportedly backed off considerably from its previously announced plans submit reversion formulae to PriMin prior to his Washington visit and indicated Council's "interim report" to be issued early November would merely summarize views presented to Council and would contain no firm recommendations as to timing of reversion.

c. On opposition side JSP Central Committee decided pull back from any consideration of shifting to policy accepting "bases at homeland level" on reversion, i.e., bases allowed to remain subject to Japan-US Security Treaty restrictions on use and nuclear weapons (Tokyo 2631). DSP Chairman Nishimura made clear that in first advocating "homeland level" formula his party was seeking build "national consensus" to include ruling LDP, rather than specifically opposition thesis; in process of saying this he took several swipes at JSP. Nishimura statement drew sharp rejoinders from JCP and Komeito, but JSP SecGen Yamamoto turned the other cheek.

d. Senior Asahi Shimbun reporter told EmbOff October 11 his paper felt Okinawa issue insufficiently in public eye. This week, Asahi launched campaign rectify this situation with extensive coverage of issue designed support paper's position that GOJ should make strong approach to US for reversion with bases at "homeland level" in interest good long-term US-Japan relations. Asahi devoted much of its October 17 morning edition to publication and analysis of poll conducted in Okinawa and Japan, reading results as giving support Asahi position (Item 5 and Tokyo 2590). Asahi also

CONFIDENTIAL

0 7 3 0  
DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NND 969000  
By WBD NARA Date 7/25/02

CONFIDENTIAL

Page 4, A-538  
from Tokyo

launched series of interpretive front page articles with considerable emotional content. However October 20 article did carry quite sophisticated analysis, stressing flexible and changing role US bases over last two decades. In this connection, Tadao KUSUMI, military critic who is member of Ohama Committee, quoted as saying after his return from visit to Okinawa that it his impression role of bases in Vietnam war now decreased.

e. Press this week full of highly speculative articles on shape of GOJ thinking concerning Okinawa and details of GOJ negotiating posture for Sato-Johnson talks. Asahi October 15 said Sato not thinking of giving any specific commitments on changes in GOJ policies on operation US-Japan security arrangements. However, article said, PriMin and ruling party considering effort to expand Japan's "point of view" from that of simple concern with Japan's own security to that of concern with security of Far East. Asahi speculated this would mean new "positive" cooperation with US within framework existing Japan-US Security Treaty, on such matters as calls by US nuclear-powered submarines and aircraft carriers, more public relations activities directed at diminution Japanese people's "nuclear allergy" and new more forthright stand by Government spokesmen in Diet. These actions would prepare way for reversion Okinawa "within several years". Article asserted, however, that opposition to any such development of GOJ and LDP policy would stem not only from anti-mainstreamers in LDP, but also from some members Sato's own faction who feel new moves by Government in security area would give too much raw material to forces organizing opposition to US-Japan security arrangements with eye toward 1970. (CONFIDENTIAL)

f. Comment: Dr. Ohama is among last elements to be edged over to more realistic appraisal of likely outcome of November Sato-Johnson talks as GOJ and LDP coordinate views among their subordinate elements. Feuding among opposition parties over tactics in support of reversion with US Okinawa bases under Security Treaty restrictions may weaken opposition's pressure on GOJ to seek their formula. At same time, press remains united in urging national consensus in support of that formula and presumably will continue to favor rapid reversion without nuclear weapons or free use even after conclusion of Sato's visit. (CONFIDENTIAL)

### 3. CPSU Delegation to Visit Tokyo?

a. According October 13 Akahata, Japan Communist Party has agreed to meet CPSU mission for discussions in Tokyo sometime during November. Agreement came after exchange of telegrams between CPSU and JCP Central Committees. In October 12 response to Soviet October 4 message, JCP agreed to receive Soviet delegation and suggested November

CONFIDENTIAL

0 7 3 1  
DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NND 969000  
By WBD NARA Date 7/25/02

CONFIDENTIAL

Page 5, A-538  
from Tokyo

as appropriate meeting time. Akahata article explaining JCP move asserted consistency of JCP position and noted CPSU statement that latter no longer connected with anti-JCP (and pro-Soviet) "Voice of Japan" group led by Yoshio SHIGA. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: Announcement came just three days after JCP's elaborate and harsh attack on Chinese (Week 41, 3). According Public Safety Investigation Agency source, CPSU, although it may be somewhat inconvenient, likely to send delegation in November as JCP suggests and normalization of relations between parties likely to result. However, whether Soviet offer to send delegation to Japan and statement it has cut ties with Shiga constitute "apology for past interference", which JCP SecGen Miyamoto has set as condition for JCP attendance at Moscow 50th anniversary celebration, still unclear. (CONFIDENTIAL)

4. PriMin Sato Island-hopping

a. Press continued to follow closely PriMin Sato's visits to Australia, New Zealand and Philippines. Articles emphasized that at each stop PriMin and host chief of government agreed to work for Vietnam peace. Also noted were PriMin Holt's support for NPT; agreement to GOJ-New Zealand ministerial talks as necessary; and "promise" of Philippine President Marcos to push Japan-Philippine Treaty of Commerce and Navigation. PriMin scheduled to return home October 22. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: While PriMin's progress has been front page news, most Japanese interest focussed on Sato's final one day stop in Saigon (October 21). (UNCLASSIFIED)

5. Soka Gakkai Presents Impressive Spectacle

a. Soka Gakkai October 15 staged its Fourth (annual) Culture Festival at Tokyo's Olympic Stadium. Seventy-two thousand spectators, including 42,000 member flash card section, were duly impressed with organization and precision of more than 10,000 participants. Maintaining mass gymnastics format, Gakkai this year emphasized its educational program--new Gakkai High School opens in April 1968--its work toward a "Third Civilization" based on Nichiren Sect of Buddhism, and its "One-worldism" which assertedly leads to lasting world peace. Among spectators were prominent Japanese politicians and businessmen, as well as liberal sprinkling of foreign diplomats. (UNCLASSIFIED)

CONFIDENTIAL

0 7 3 2  
DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NND969000  
By WBD NARA Date 7/25/02

CONFIDENTIAL

Page 6, A-538  
from Tokyo

b. Comment: Culture Festival was third on grand scale following Gakkai's 1964 festival in Tokyo and 1966 Osaka Festival. As in past this year's performance impressed all who saw it with Gakkai's strength, organizational ability and affluence. (UNCLASSIFIED)

PSYCHOLOGICAL

6. Asahi Poll on Okinawa Reversion Question

a. October 17 Asahi prominently and fully reported findings of poll it conducted in September on Okinawa issue. Unique features of poll were that (1) it conducted simultaneously in Okinawa (2,000-person sample) and in Japan proper (3,000-person sample), and (2) respondents asked about reversion formulae in separate questions, allowing them to express opinion on each formula. Result was to show how opinions in Ryukyus agree or disagree with those in Japan on same questions, and to measure degree of popular support for various reversion formulae.

b. Poll found 5 out of 6 in both Japan and Ryukyus want reversion; only 2% in Japan and 4% in Ryukyus were opposed. "Early" reversion supported by same number in Japan, but only by 60% in Ryukyus, and was opposed by 6% in Japan and 20% in Ryukyus.

c. Reversion "with nuclear weapons" acceptable to 15% in Japan and 9% in Ryukyus; but substantial numbers accepted almost any reversion formula except "nuclear" one. In Japan 52% agreed to reversion with bases on same footing as in Japan proper; precisely same number agreed to reversion with prior removal of all bases. Similar number of Ryukyuans (57%) backed "same footing" formula, but their support for "total removal" formula dropped (to 40%)--perhaps out of fear that pushing such formula might delay reversion, or perhaps out of concern over economic impact.

d. In response to question for Ryukyuans only, minority of 14% said they personally inconvenienced or harmed by presence of US bases, against 86% saying they are not. 29% said they benefit economically from bases, while 61% said they do not.

CONFIDENTIAL

0 7 3 3

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NND 969000  
By WBD NARA Date 7/25/02


CONFIDENTIAL

Page 7, A-538  
from Tokyo

e. Accompanying Asahi editorial on October 17 concluded that poll findings support Asahi position that, in interest of long-term US-Japan relations, USG should return Okinawa without nuclear weapons and with bases subject to limitations set by Japan-US Security Treaty. (UNCLASSIFIED)

GP-3

  
JOHNSON

POL: TBleha:jl 10/20/67  
REArmstrong  
HLevin 

USIS:HLBurleson 

CONFIDENTIAL

0 7 3 4  
DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NMD 969000  
By WBD NARA Date 7/25/02

ORIGIN/ACTION <b>INR-10</b>			DEPARTMENT OF STATE <b>AIRGRAM</b>			POL 2-1 JAPAN FOR RM USE ONLY		
RM/R 1	REP 5	AF 5	A-485 NO.			CONFIDENTIAL		
ARA 1	EUR 5	EA 5	TO : Department of State			PRIORITY		
NEA 1	CU 5	INR 5	INFO: BANGKOK CINCPCFLT DA/ODCSOPS FUKUOKA			HANDLING INDICATOR		
E 1	IO 5	IO 5	CINCPAC COMNAVMARIANAS DA/DUSA HICOMRY					
L 1	AID 5	AID 5	CINCPACAF COMSEVENFLT DOD/ISA HICOM/POLAD					
PC 2	RSR-HAGMAN 1	RSR-HAGMAN 1	CINCUSARPAC COMUS/J (Halperin) USCAR (con'd)					
AGR 2	COM 3	FRB 3	FROM : Amembassy TOKYO			DATE: October 6, 1967		
INT 2	LAB 2	STATE 2	SUBJECT: JOINT WEEKA NO. 40					
TR 4	XMB 10	AIR 10	REF: 1967 OCT 11 PM 11					
ARMY 10	CIA 20	NAVY 10	1. Foreign Minister Talks on Vietnam and Reversion					
OSD 48	USIA 11	NSA 3	2. Opposition Parties Seek United Action on Okinawa					
NSC 6			3. Okinawa Headlines					
			4. PriMin Sato Returns from Southeast Asia					
			5. Extraordinary Diet Session Slated					
			6. JCP Chairman Blasts Cultural Revolution					
			7. Mainichi Poll Findings on Okinawa Reversion Sentiment					
1967 OCT 11 PM 12 02 COPYFLG-PBR			<u>POLITICAL</u>					
			<p>1. <u>Foreign Minister Talks on Vietnam and Reversion</u></p> <p>a. FonMin Miki in October 5 speech to America-Japan Society endorsed US view of need for reciprocal action by Hanoi if bombing of North Vietnam to stop and expressed confidence that mutual care and consideration in conduct of US-Japan relations will "inevitably" lead to just solution of Okinawa reversion problem. Miki, referring to his long standing personal ties with US, contrasted</p>					
			USARYIS (7th Psyop Gp)			NAHA		
			HONG KONG			MOSCOW		
			KOBE-OSAKA			NAGOYA		
						SAIGON		
						SAPPORO		
			Group 3			SEOUL		
			Downgraded at 12-year intervals, not automatically declassified.			TAIPEI		
			FORM 4-62 DS-323			CONFIDENTIAL		
						FOR DEPT. USE ONLY		
						<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> In <input type="checkbox"/> Out		
Drafted by:			POL: (see last page)			Contents and Classification Approved by:		
						POL: TWAINSWORTH		
Clearances:								

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NND 969000  
By WBD NARA Date 7/25/02

CONFIDENTIAL

Page 2, A-485  
from Tokyo

predominant US concern over Vietnam with Japanese preoccupation with Okinawa reversion, and noted connection between two issues. He expressed view that simple cessation of bombing North Vietnam would not solve problems there and would be dangerous gamble entailing risk of further escalation. He stressed need to verify possibility of meaningful reaction from North Vietnam to bombing halt and said he had sought unsuccessfully in Moscow, Warsaw and at UN for signs of such possibility. He suggested that at same time as friends of Hanoi guarantee favorable response to bombing halt, as Ambassador Goldberg urged in UN speech, countries friendly to US reciprocate by serving as guarantors toward Hanoi to dispel latter's fears that US seeks keep permanent bases in Vietnam and destroy Hanoi government. Miki said he would "like to think" such reciprocity could pave way toward peaceful talks, with informal contacts between US and Hanoi and between GVN and "National Liberation Front" opening way to international meeting of Geneva Conference type.

b. Turning to reversion issue, Miki expressed belief that Secretary Rusk understood Japanese national sentiment in seeking early return of Okinawa and Ogasawara Islands, but US public and Congress less interested because of Vietnam. Referring to US view need to maintain military effectiveness of Okinawa, Miki noted that interests of two countries coincided since handling of Okinawa problem also vital security issue for Japan, keystone of whose security was US-Japan Security Treaty. Miki voiced conviction that difference of views could be adjusted if both countries approached problem on basis of mutual goal of strengthening US-Japan relations. Miki hoped November talks between President Johnson and Prime Minister Sato, following preparatory work at diplomatic level, would "mean major step forward toward overall solution of this problem." (UNCLASSIFIED)

c. Comment: Miki speech received unusually prominent treatment in Japanese language press, considering that it was delivered in English before predominant foreign audience. Miki remarks on Vietnam amount to encouragingly strong support, in Japanese political terms, for US policies on Vietnam conflict and possible steps toward its settlement. Superficial appearance of equating treatment of US and North Vietnam in "reciprocal guarantees" suggestion is misleading if taken out of context of Japanese climate of opinion, where media at time Miki made speech were playing up other countries' calls at UN and elsewhere, e.g., British Labor Party convention, for unconditional bombing halt. Speech is indication of Japanese leaders' increasing self-assurance in regional questions and degree to which they assume other countries now understand Japan's position as important power devoted to principle of peace through reconciliation. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NND 969000  
By WBD NARA Date 7/25/02



CONFIDENTIAL

Page 3, A-485  
from Tokyo

2. Opposition Parties Seek United Action on Okinawa

a. Press reported JSP and DSP SecGens agreed October 2 to meeting of SecGens of all four opposition parties, including JCP, on October 6, in order to seek joint opposition position on Okinawa reversion issue. DSP SecGen Kasuga reportedly at first resisted JSP proposition that JCP be included in discussions but finally accepted JSP SecGen Yamamoto's argument that Okinawa question is "national issue on which all opposition parties should concentrate their efforts." Next day JCP and Komeito agreed to participate in October 6 meeting. JSP reportedly planning to request sessions of Upper and Lower House Special Committees on Okinawa if government does not convoke Extraordinary Diet session (Item 5) before PriMin's departure for US in mid-November. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Press reported JSP had decided to "postpone" sending of party mission to UN to plead for reversion of Okinawa because party not optimistic that mission would have appreciable effect on US public opinion or be received by UN SecGen U Thant. "Heavy schedule" of SecGen Yamamoto, who had been designated to lead mission, also mentioned as reason for postponement. JSP sources have indicated privately to Embassy that SecGen Yamamoto said he did not want to lead "fool's mission" to UN, and that "postponement" really means abandonment of mission. Yamamoto reportedly favors joint mission with other opposition parties if they agree on this, because this would have somewhat greater probability of success and because it would "relieve JSP of public obligation to send its own mission to US." (CONFIDENTIAL)

c. DSP SecGen Kasuga told EmbOff that he had only received one reply to approximately 25 letters sent September 23 to US legislators, scholars and other public figures asking whether they would receive a DSP mission to discuss Okinawa before visit of PriMin Sato. He said the reply was favorable and came from "a scholar". (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

d. Comment: All-opposition petition to government to convene extraordinary Diet session, first since 1954, reflects opposition parties' desire to build up popular interest in Okinawan reversion and to try embarrass GOJ/LDP on Okinawa and other issues in Diet forum. October 6 meeting may produce agreement on reversion formula treating Okinawa bases like those in Japan. This sort of joint position would allow opposition to continue to press LDP even though, as seems likely, LDP does not convene Diet until Sato returns from US. Whether four party opposition can agree on more formidable projects like mission to US or on joint Diet resolution based on common position, not to mention joint public demonstrations (desired by JSP/JCP and opposed by DSP/Komeito) remains to be seen. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

CONFIDENTIAL

0 7 3 7  
DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NND 969000  
By WBD NARA Date 7/25/02

CONFIDENTIAL

Page 4, A-485  
from Tokyo

3. Okinawa Headlines

a. FonMin Miki after reporting to PriMin morning of October 3 on US trip, told press only that US attaching great importance to role of Okinawa in maintaining Far East security, and PriMin just listened without expressing his own views. Ambassador to US Takezo SHIMODA, after meeting Sato same day, in characteristic blunt fashion told press US opinion on Okinawa divided between those who wish to make concessions to Japanese feeling on reversion in interest of long term US-Japanese relations and those, now in ascendancy, who feel that security role of Okinawan bases is overriding at present. In any event, Shimoda said, US unlikely return Okinawan administrative rights unless it fully convinced Japanese willing and able to assume greater role in ensuring security of entire Far East. Immediate removal of nukes from Okinawa might be ideal, but in light of present world conditions proposal not realistic. Shimoda said that even if Okinawa returned to Japan, US hopes bases could be used as freely as in past or even more freely. In absence of firm guarantees to this effect from GOJ and Japanese people, Shimoda thought return of Okinawa impossible. Thus it up to Japan to develop independent national consensus on basis of which it can take responsible attitude toward its security problems and put US anxieties at ease. Shimoda described Okinawa problem as "difficult but not impossible" while cautioning that adoption of aggressive attitude by Japan in demanding return of Okinawa would only invite unfavorable US reaction.

b. Later in same busy day PriMin met with Okinawan legislative delegation headed by DSP SecGen Choko KUWAE. Kuwae reportedly told Sato that Okinawans want US bases there placed under Security Treaty but efforts to achieve reversion should not be slowed in attempt to remove special features of US bases. Sato promised to exert utmost efforts to solve problem of Okinawa reversion during forthcoming Washington visit. At same time, however, Sato reportedly asked that legislators seek understanding of Okinawan people for difficulties involved. Same day Mainichi Shimbun published public opinion poll, taken in Japan, which indicated that largest group (32.8%) of those interviewed favor reversion of Okinawa with US bases under similar restraints as those on Main Islands (see Item 7).

c. At October 4 press conference LDP SecGen Fukuda, underscoring problems raised by Ambassador Shimoda, promised that PriMin would be ready to present US with concrete proposal on Okinawa reversion at time of his US visit. Same day Council on Okinawa Problems, charged with advising PriMin, heard council member Teichiro MORINAGA say

CONFIDENTIAL

0 7 3 8  
DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NND 969000  
By W&D NARA Date 7/25/02

CONFIDENTIAL

Page 5, A-485  
from Tokyo

Okinawan economy would suffer if US bases completely withdrawn and propose creation of US-Japan financing agency to bolster Okinawan economy. Japan Chamber of Commerce representative then emphasized Okinawan balance of payment problem, where imports more than three times exports. Council Chairman Ohama himself returned from brief trip to Okinawa for meeting; he was quoted as having said at airport October 3 that his committee would submit several alternate proposals to PriMin prior to latter's trip since council's "ideal" proposal might be unacceptable to Sato. Ohama also reportedly said Okinawan leaders had promised own "unified" view on reversion by October 25.

d. Mainichi, arguing editorially from its poll, urged reversion of Okinawa with bases under Security Treaty and called on opposition parties to agree to joint support of this proposal which now advocated by DSP. Press and opposition parties October 5 attacked Shimoda statements and used opportunity to take swipe at PriMin Sato. Asahi editorialized that seeking Japanese public consensus on basis acceptance of nukes in reverted Okinawa would be 180 degree turn away from government policy to date and could only lead to harder political confrontation in Japan and increasing Asian tension, and urged that US bases be under Security Treaty after Okinawa reversion. Yomiuri worried about Japan accepting any share of responsibility for Far East security in exchange for reversion of Okinawa. FonMin Miki in speech same day chose to strike diplomatic note while coupling Japan's interest in reversion to US concern with Vietnam. (see Item 1) (UNCLASSIFIED)

e. Comment: Shimoda's blockbuster on security consideration has done much to remove what little doubt may have existed in Japanese minds about harsh realities concerning Okinawa reversion. Sato and Miki reportedly scheduled to set "final policy" in consultations October 6 and press reports Miki will carry position into negotiations with Ambassador Johnson October 11. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

#### 4. PriMin Sato Returns from Southeast Asia

a. PriMin Sato and party returned to Japan September 30 following 13-day trip to Burma, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, and Laos. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: PriMin Sato's four aims during tour were to gain personal impressions of area, to explain GOJ post-World War II policies, to exchange views on Communist China and Vietnam, and to review bilateral questions, largely of an economic nature. FonOff sources state that PriMin

CONFIDENTIAL

0 7 3 9  
DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NND 969000  
By WBD NARA Date 7/25/02

CONFIDENTIAL

Page 6, A-485  
from Tokyo

satisfied with warm reception received in countries visited and with conversations held there. Sources also noted generally favorable attitude of Japanese public toward trip. At same time there appear to be no concrete political results of trip, although all of countries visited apparently made it plain they wished good relations with Japan (see Tokyo 2264).  
(CONFIDENTIAL)

5. Extraordinary Diet Session Slated

a. In reply to JSP request for extraordinary Diet session before PriMin Sato's mid-November departure for US, LDP SecGen Takeo FUKUDA October 3 stated extraordinary Diet session planned for late November after Sato's return. At same time Fukuda held out possibility of "summit conference" on Okinawa between PriMin and opposition parties' leaders just before US trip. JSP, DSP, Komeito and JCP October 5 presented written request signed by 199 opposition Lower House members for early Extraordinary Diet session. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: Article 53 of Japanese Constitution requires government to convoke special session of Diet when requested by one-fourth of total Lower House membership (122); however, Constitution leaves timing of session up to government. Although opposition pressure likely to increase until PriMin's departure for US, there virtually no chance of Extraordinary Session until his return. Extraordinary Session beginning late November or early December would run almost to start of regular session normally convened in late December. (UNCLASSIFIED)

6. JCP Chairman Blasts Cultural Revolution

a. Asahi Shimbun October 4 quoted JCP Chairman Sanzo NOSAKA as leveling harsh attack on "Maoist faction" and Chicom "Great Cultural Revolution." Occasion for Nosaka blast was October 3 Tokyo welcome home for former JCP Peking representative Sunama and former Peking Akahata correspondent Konno who returned to Japan September 25 (Week 39, Item 3). Asahi quoted Nosaka as saying that "Maoist faction" destroying CCP organization and Chicom mass movement in name of Cultural Revolution and, if situation continues, achievements of Chicom revolution likely to be lost. At the same time Maoists seeking to destroy communist parties and mass movements of other nations which refuse to buckle under to Mao policy line. "Premeditated terrorist" attack on Sunama and Konno in Peking August 3-4, Nosaka said, reflects true nature of Cultural Revolution: it not "cultural" but "barbaric", and not "revolutionary".

CONFIDENTIAL

0 7 4 0  
DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NND 969000  
By WBD NARA Date 7/25/02

CONFIDENTIAL

Page 7, A-485  
from Tokyo

but "anti-revolutionary." In most serious charge, Nosaka said Maoist faction has not only destroyed unity of international communist movement, but has caused weakening of authority of Marxist-Leninism; thus Maoist faction "international criminals." Only American "imperialists" and Japanese "reactionaries", Nosaka added, can take comfort in this. While it unlikely that situation on Mainland will return to normal so long as Maoist faction holds power, "great Chinese people under leadership of Marxist-Leninists" will surely be victorious. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: Harsh attack on Cultural Revolution by Nosaka, himself a Yenan veteran, represents elaboration of Hakamada statements of August 15 (Week 33, Item 3) and Akahata article of August 21 (Week 34, Item 3). Akahata October 4 carried only brief description of Nosaka remarks with no mention of Cultural Revolution, but unlikely that JCP attempting avoid publicity for Nosaka attack since statements made at large public gathering. More likely that Akahata withheld remarks pending publication of full scale theoretical analysis and critical attack on Cultural Revolution. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

PSYCHOLOGICAL:

7. Mainichi Poll Findings on Okinawa Reversion Sentiment

a. Mid-September 1967 Mainichi opinion poll included five probing questions about Okinawa reversion. Apparently assuming all Japanese want reversion, Mainichi asked only about reversion formulae and need for US bases in Japan and Okinawa. Poll found 46.5% accepted post-reversion retention of US Okinawa bases, with varying degrees of restriction, as against 14.6% calling for reversion with US bases totally removed. 38% expressed no opinion on matter. Only 1.6% (among above 46.5%) would accept retention of "nuclearized" US bases in Okinawa. In event US-Japan difficulty in agreeing on complete reversion, poll found 62.5% would agree to step-by-step reversion formula, while 9.8% would oppose this.

b. Asking about necessity of US Okinawa and Japan bases for security of Japan and Far East, poll found substantially lower percentages accepting need for bases than would accept retention of Okinawa bases as condition for reversion. Some 26-28% considered US bases in

CONFIDENTIAL

0 7 4 1  
DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NND 969000  
By WBD NARA Date 7/25/02



CONFIDENTIAL


Page 8, A-485  
from Tokyo

Japan and Okinawa either "absolutely necessary" or "more necessary than unnecessary" for security of Japan and Far East. Almost same percentage said bases "not particularly necessary"; and about 19% held bases "actually dangerous" to Japan's security. (UNCLASSIFIED)

GP-3

  
JOHNSON

  
POL: TBleha:jl/mv 10-6-67  
RFPfeiffer  
REArmstrong  
TWAinsworth  
HLevin 

USIS:HBurleson 

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NND 969000  
By WBD NARA Date 7/25/02

0 7 4 2

ORIGIN ACTION

1NR-10

RM/R	REP	AF
1		
ARA	EUR	EA 4
NEA	CU	5
		IO
PC	S/L	12
2	1	
AGR	COM	FRB
2	3	
INT	LAB	TAR
	2	
TR	XMB	AIR
4		10
ARMY	CIA	NAVY
10	20	7
OSD	USIA	NSA
48	11	3
NSC		
6		

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

# AIRGRAM

22

A-446

NO. CONFIDENTIAL

TO : Department of State

INFO: BANGKOK CINCPCFLT DA/ODCSOPS FUKUOKA  
CINCPAC COMNAVMARIANAS DA/DUSA HICOMRY  
CINCPACAF COMSEVENFLT DOD/ISA HICOM/POLA  
CINCUSARPAC COMUS/ (Halperin) USCAR (con'd)

FROM : Amembassy TOKYO

SUBJECT: JOINT WEEKA NO. 89

REF :

DATE: September 29, 1967

CONTENTS

1. Opposition to Seek Common Ground on Okinawa
2. Small Constituency Revisions shelved
3. JCP Representatives Return from Peking
4. Dalai Lama in Japan
5. Press Coverage of Prime Minister's Tour
6. Okinawa Roundup

POLITICAL

1. Opposition to Seek Common Ground on Okinawa  
are  
a. JSP, DSP, Komeito, and JCP leaders expected to start conversations in early October to seek common denominator of agreement on reversion of Okinawa. In September 23 press statement JSP Chairman Katsumata said that JSP could not accept DSP position (reversion with bases treated like bases in Japan proper) but that he would like to discuss Okinawa problem with DSP, Komeito and JCP with purpose of developing opposition consensus on reversion. At same press interview, JSP General Affairs Director Ishibashi stated that in case reversion took place with Okinawa bases treated like bases in Japan, the JSP would accept

RANGOON	KUALA LUMPUR	SINGAPORE
USARYIS (7th Psyop Gp)		NAHA
HONG KONG	MOSCOW	SAIGON
KOBE-OSAKA	NAGOYA	SAPPORO

Downgraded at 12-year intervals, not automatically declassified.

FORM 4-62 DS-323

CONFIDENTIAL

FOR DEPT. USE ONLY

☒ In ☐ Out

Drafted by: POL:(see last page)

Clearances:

Contents and Classification Approved by: POL:TWainsworth

RECEIVED

POL 2-1 JAPAN

FOR RM USE ONLY

PRIORITY

HANDLING INDICATOR

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

RECEIVED

OCT 4 PM 1 25

1967 OCT 3 AM 9 06

COPYFLO-PBR

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NND969000

By WBD NARA Date 7/25/02

CONFIDENTIAL

Page 2  
A-446 from Tokyo

it. On September 24 DSP Chairman Nishimura told press DSP would be happy to respond if JSP requested talks. Nishimura suggested that discussion aim at Diet resolution on reversion representing joint position of opposition parties which would be presented to LDP and passed by Diet in order to "give Sato bipartisan support" in November talks in Washington. On same day Komeito SecGen Yano said that Komeito was interested in discussing Katsumata's proposal. JSP SecGen Yamamoto told press DSP not likely to join "necessary" extra-parliamentary joint struggle for reversion because of JCP participation. JSP Central Executive Committee September 27 authorized SecGen Yamamoto to begin negotiations with other parties. First discussions scheduled for October 2. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: Opposition attempts to coordinate efforts on reversion issue complicated by apparent differences in real objectives of DSP (and presumably Komeito) on the one hand the JSP and JCP on the other. DSP, hoping to elevate its status by promoting consensus within Japan on Okinawa issue, has selected its position with view to where it thinks popular consensus would fall. JSP hopes to use Okinawa issue to stir up popular support for its opposition to security arrangements with US and its attacks on GOJ/LDP. Nishimura talk of Diet resolution appears at present to be veiled gibe at JSP, ~~to moderate its position~~ because successful resolution would need LDP blessing.

c. Bargaining between opposition parties likely to continue into mid-October with all sides watching closely for signs from Washington and from GOJ that concessions may be imminent and for sharper interest from Japanese public in Okinawa reversion. Joint opposition action in form of street demonstrations not likely because of DSP-Komeito dislike of this tactic and their opposition to cooperation with JCP. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

## 2. Small Constituency Revision Shelved

a. Election Commission Deliberation Council subcommittee meeting September 28 could not agree on recommending any one of the Lower House election district revision proposals before it. Committee simply decided to list without recommendation in its early October report to the full Council the three proposals--straight single member district system, multi-member district system, and a combination of single seat districts (70%) with proportional representation (30%)--with which it started a year ago, plus new variants suggested by the LDP, the JSP and Komeito. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: Current Deliberation Council's term of office expires November 1. Subcommittee's failure to agree on one preferred revision proposal means virtual shelving of issue for time being. Opposition parties quick to claim credit for "smashing" revision schemes, but combination

CONFIDENTIAL

0 7 4 4  
DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NND 969000  
By WBD NARA Date 7/25/02



CONFIDENTIAL

Page 3  
A-446 from Tokyo

single member/proportional representation revision, which was only real possibility, in fact scuttled by publicized opposition within LDP itself, where leadership apparently decided issue too hot to handle.  
(LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

3. JCP Representatives Return from Peking

a. After allegedly being roughed up at Peking airport August 3 and 4 and convalescence in Pyongyang (Weeks 32, 4), JCP Central Committee representative Ichiryo SUNAMA and Akahata correspondent Junichi KONNO arrived in Osaka September 25. Pair, according Akahata, accorded hero's welcome by some two thousand well-wishers, including JCP Chairman Sanzo NOSAKA. In September 25 statement, at September 26 Osaka welcome home party and at September 27 Tokyo JCP headquarters gathering, Sunama and Konno had harsh words concerning "premeditated organized terrorism" they subjected to at Peking airport by "Maoist extreme left opportunist big power chauvinist faction." At same time all had praise for warm welcome and kind treatment given pair by North Korean Workers Party.

b. Comment: As yet pair has said nothing publicly about internal mainland situation, nor has tenor or level of JCP attack on Chicoms changed. Interesting aspect of Sunama and Konno's return to Japan was encouragement offered them directly, and to JCP indirectly, by North Koreans, which JCP obviously fully appreciates. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

4. Dalai Lama in Japan

a. Dalai Lama and a party of six arrived in Tokyo on September 25 on Air India flight from New Delhi. He is expected to remain in Japan approximately two weeks but onward itinerary still unannounced. Visit was described by press as strictly non-political and so far publicity has been minimal, even in Yomiuri, which is jointly sponsoring visit with the private Buddhist Mission Society. Press also gave scant coverage to Peking People's Daily attack on Sato government for allowing "symbol of reaction" to visit Japan.

b. About a dozen representatives of JSP-backed "Orthodox" Japan-China Friendship Association and "Association of Chinese Merchants in Tokyo" sponsored small protest demonstration on September 28 at Tokyo department store which is sponsoring exhibition of Tibetan art treasures. Same groups reportedly will repeat protest, which objected to treatment of Dalai Lama as "representative of China" and to exhibition map showing Tibet as independent country, to Chief Cabinet Secretary Kimura, Yomiuri Shinbun and department store authorities. (UNCLASSIFIED)

CONFIDENTIAL

0 7 4 5  
DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NND 969000  
By WBD NARA Date 7/25/02

CONFIDENTIAL

Page 4  
A-446 from Tokyo

5. Press Coverage of Prime Minister's Tour

a. Throughout past week, Primin Sato's activities and state-ments on tour of Burma, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand have received unusually prominent and full coverage in major newspapers, and somewhat lesser treatment in other news media. Correspondents' dispatches have been straight news, without evaluation of significance or accomplishments of tour.

b. One of few exceptions was September 23 Tokyo Shinbun editorial, which chided Sato for incomplete grasp of ramifications of Burma's neutralist foreign policy. Also, September 27 evening edition Tokyo Shinbun carried front-page cartoon depicting Primin as rich uncle with children -- Burma, Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand -- crowding around, clinging to his legs and holding out hands for gifts. Sato says: "Well, let's see."

c. Photo coverage has been moderate and routine, although possibly not very helpful shot front-paged in September 28 AM press showed Primin in Bangkok receiving honorary doctorate, grinning self consciously under apparently oversized academic cap. (UNCLASSIFIED)

d. Comment: Evaluation editorials, panel discussions, etc., may be expected to appear after Primin and press corps return from trip. Extensiveness of news coverage to date exceptional when compared to that given overseas trip of Japanese premiers in past. (UNCLASSIFIED)

6. Okinawa Roundup

a. Media speculation about cool USG attitude toward reversion of Okinawan administrative rights continued to mount during past week. Although FonMin Miki has refused to discuss contents his Washington talks (for his airport press conference see Tokyo 2048), reports citing Fonoff sources began to appear by end of week. According to Yomiuri report September 29, Secretary Rusk told Miki that it is impossible for US to discuss specifics of reversion formula until some of more basic underlying issues are settled. According to Yomiuri, Secretary said USG doubts if Japan could support politically and psychologically role of US bases in reverted Okinawa in assuring security of ROK and GRC. Miki reportedly replied Secretary was speaking of matter of highest national policy which could appropriately be discussed only by PriMin Sato. In speech to business group, EPA DirGen MIYAZAWA said Secretary McNamara had told him seaborne nuclear capabilities have not replaced land-based nuclears and asked for GOJ cooperation in fulfilling the US commitment for maintenance of security in Far East.

CONFIDENTIAL

0 7 4 6  
DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NND 969000  
By WBD NARA Date 7/25/02

CONFIDENTIAL

Page 5  
A-446 from Tokyo

Reports from Washington interviews with Okinawan legislators visiting there also stressed alleged rigidity of US position and "thickness of US wall."

b. Another blow to hopes of any early progress on reversion was supplied by wire stories from Washington summarizing conclusions of final report Price subcommittee. Report was given only moderate coverage in Japanese press, but its apparently quite strongly-worded denials of any US intent to agree to reversion of Okinawa added to general impression US inflexibility. "High Fonoff official" (probably Vice FonMin USHIBA) was quoted as commenting that advocacy of reversion logically implied willingness accept economic burdens of aid to Okinawa and that Japan should be willing to see decrease or even end to US aid for Okinawa. This observation drew sharp rejoinder from SecGen FUKUDA of LDP to effect there is no reason why GOJ should object to US aid to Okinawa; Fonoff reportedly replied that its original comment had been meant only to emphasize that increased GOJ responsibilities in Okinawa would bring increased aid commitments.

c. Delegation from Okinawa headed by DP SecGen Choko KUWAE arrived in Tokyo. Kuwae reportedly took line that base issue should be settled between US and Japanese governments and not be permitted to interfere with return of Okinawan people to Japanese administration. Kuwae was reportedly quite critical of what he characterized as Japanese attitude of refusal to take back lost child just because it has an ugly deformity (US nuclear bases). Okinawan legislators in number of high-level appointments in GOJ and party circles reportedly pushed hard on long-standing proposal that Okinawa be given some form of representation in Japanese Diet.

d. Primin's advisory council (Ohama Committee) held its second plenary meeting September 26 with FonMin Miki in attendance. FonMin declined give detailed report on his talks in Washington, saying that his first report would have to be given to Primin Sato himself when Sato returns from Southeast Asia. Council heard report on legal aspects Okinawa reversion from former Cabinet Legislative Bureau Director Shuzo HAYASHI. Hayashi told council that in his view government has considerable legal flexibility in approaching problem of reversion; Okinawa could be (A) turned back just like Amami Oshima by US-GOJ agreement without reference to other peace treaty powers, (B) placed under Security Treaty without amending that document; and (C) subjected to special arrangements permitting free use by US of its bases and possession by US of nuclear capability there either by conclusion of inter-governmental agreement subject to Diet approval or by new "understandings" in form of executive agreement. Hayashi argued that prohibition of introduction of nuclear weapons into Japan is merely government policy and is not dictated by Article 9 of constitution; he felt even Japanese Self-Defense Forces could legally have nuclear

CONFIDENTIAL

0 7 4 7  
DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NND 969000  
By WBD NARA Date 7/25/02


CONFIDENTIAL

Page 6  
A-446 from Tokyo

weapons so long as they were of "defensive" type. Council also heard detailed report by member Yosoji KOBAYASHI (Vice President Yomiuri Shinbun) on possible measures in administrative, welfare and economic fields to bring Okinawa closer to Japanese levels. (UNCLASSIFIED)

e. High official of Primin's office who attends Ohama Committee meetings told Emboff committee members are bit unhappy with their chairman. September 24 Tokyo Shimbun reported Dr. Ohama decided "unify" committee's thinking along lines recommendation to Primin that he seek reversion within five years with bases to be subject full security Treaty restrictions. Such recommendation would represent considerably "harder" line than what Ohama had earlier given out to be his position (reversion by 1970 to be followed by transitional period eventually leading to subjection US bases to Security Treaty limitations). According source, other committee members are opposed to tinkering with speculative formulae and questioned Ohama closely at September 24 meeting about Tokyo Shimbun story; Ohama claimed he had been misquoted. After meeting, Ohama left for Okinawa, where he reportedly urged increased Okinawan pressure on GOJ for action on reversion issue and necessity for taking tough bargaining position in dealing with US. (CONFIDENTIAL)

f. Comment: It is clear FonMin Miki has decided stand aside from any public posture on Okinawa and leave decisions on how handle GOJ stance vis-a-vis issue to Sato -- for whatever political pluses and minuses they may bring him. Lacking any hint of GOJ top policy conclusions, public discussion is somewhat random and aimless at moment, with everyone waiting for Primin's return and some indication from him as to whether he intends actively contest what now appears to Japanese to be very tough USG attitude on basics of Okinawa-Bonins reversion. As for forthcoming continuance of discussions in diplomatic channels which Miki mentioned in his airport press conference, Fonoff source was reported in Japan Times to have noted that unless Sato makes known his position upon basics of Okinawa issue there "will be no room" for "technical talks." Primin will, therefore, be under heavy pressure for decisions on Okinawa upon his return from Southeast Asia. (CONFIDENTIAL)

  
JOHNSON

POL: RFPfeiffer/jl/mv - 9/29/67  
REArmstrong  
TBleha  
HLevin

USIS:HBurleson  
NAVA:MHHoskins

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NMD 969000  
By WBD NARA Date 7/25/02

ORIGIN/ACTION		
InR-10		
RM/R	REP	AF
1		
ARA	EUR	AF
	5	6
NEA	CU	INR
	5	
E	PM	IO
7		
L	57	AID
3	1	12
3/2	PC	R3/2
1	2	1-HOCHMAN
AGR	COM	FRB
2	3	
INT	LAB	TAR
	2	
TR	XMB	AIR
4		10
ARMY	CIA	NAVY
10	20	7
OSD	USIA	NSA
48	11	3
		NSC
		6

1967 SEP 17 PM 3 13

COPYFLO-PBR

# AIRGRAM

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

POL 2-1 JAPAN

FOR RM USE ONLY

A-369		CONFIDENTIAL	PRIORITY
NO.		RECEIVED	HANDLING INDICATOR
TO : Department of State		DATE: September 14, 1967	
INFO :	BANGKOK CINCUSARPAC	DA/ODCSOPS	FUKUOKA
	CINCPAC	COMNAVMARIANAS	DA/DUSA
	CINCPACAF	COMSEVENTHFLT	BRAND/ISA
	CINCPACFLT	COMUS/J	(Halperin) USCAR (contd)
FROM :	Amembassy TOKYO		
SUBJECT :	JOINT WEEKA NO. 37		
REF :			

1. Okinawa Roundup
2. Extraordinary Diet?
3. JSP Chairman Discusses Short-Term Policy
4. PriMin Sato Returns from Taipei
5. Chicom-Japanese Relations

## POLITICAL

### 1. Okinawa Roundup

a. FonMin Miki departed September 10 for ECONCOM carrying instructions on Okinawa which, according press, gave him considerable leeway to conduct deep and ranging probe of USG thinking and intentions concerning Okinawa and Bonins but which did not extend to delineation of any final GOJ position (Tokyo 1623). As Miki was making his preparations to leave, several press stories appeared (Tokyo 1618) concerning possible broad outlines of eventual Japanese positions on basic issues involved. Stories suggested GOJ would want

USARYIS (7th Psyop Gp) HONG KONG NAHA SAPPORO TAIPEI  
 KOBE-OSAKA NAGOYA MOSCOW SAIGON SEOUL

Group 3

Downgraded at 12-year intervals, not automatically declassified

FORM 4-62 DS-323

CONFIDENTIAL

FOR DEPT. USE ONLY  
☒ In ☐ Out

Drafted by: POL (see last page)

Contents and Classification Approved by: POL:LMPurnell

Clearances:

DECLASSIFIED  
 Authority NND 969000  
 By WBD NARA Date 7/25/02

CONFIDENTIAL

Page 2, A-369  
from Tokyo

establishment of joint US-Japan committee to discuss timetable for reversion; timetable would hopefully be produced and announced prior to 1970 and would provide for reversion within transitional period which would end with American bases being subjected to same limitations as are placed on US bases in Japan. Further detail was added later in week at second meeting of new "Ohama Committee" which is to produce formal recommendations on Okinawa for PriMin prior to his visit to Washington. After delivery of lecture to Committee (with PriMin attending), military critic Tadao KUSUMI told press he favored establishment of joint committee as above, but with reversion itself to be timed prior to 1970. Kusumi formula envisages "transitional period" during which US would be permitted to retain "tactical" or "defensive" nuclear capability in Okinawa. Upon end of negotiated transitional stage, however, US bases would be subjected to same limitations as apply in Japan. Kusumi offered comment that he thought his formula would be best balance of political and strategic considerations likely be acceptable to US and Japanese Governments. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

b. Comment: Miki set off for US apparently contented with prospect of leaving discussion with USG of "ultimate issues" connected with Okinawan reversion to his boss and LDP party rival, PriMin Sato, in November. Scanty press comment thus far on "Kusumi formula" has avoided idea that even "defensive" nukes would be acceptable to Japanese people. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

## 2. Extraordinary Diet?

a. JSP Central Executive Committee, in Akita to spur on Socialist candidate in Upper House by-election, met September 11 and decided request GOJ convene late October extraordinary Diet session. Session would hear PriMin report on Southeast Asian trips and deliberate disaster relief measures, proposed civil service pay increases (Week 33, Item 5) and price rises. LDP SecGen Fukuda, also in Akita September 11, replied that session, if called, must be held late November or early December. At September 13 Tokyo meeting Fukuda and PriMin Sato reportedly agreed that extraordinary Diet session, "if requested", might be held in late November or early December. Session would have to be of more than ten days duration and consider GOJ supplementary budget. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: Main difference between JSP and GOJ/LDP positions is question of timing. JSP would like short session to air party views on Okinawa before PriMin's scheduled mid-November trip to Washington. Conservatives, on other hand, not willing to convene session until PriMin has returned from US. In addition they seek longer "working session", extending beyond required interpellations which serve mainly as opposition party forum.

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NND 969000  
By WBD NARA Date 7/25/02

0 7 5 0

CONFIDENTIAL

Page 3, A-369  
from Tokyo

As regular Diet session scheduled begin late December in any event, JSP may not be interested in Fukuda proposal, which would leave conservatives smiling through tears. (UNCLASSIFIED)

3. JSP Chairman Discusses Short-Term Policy

a. JSP Chairman Katsumata at press conference in Akita September 10 said in light of decreased LDP strength in last general election, possibility of government by coalition of "opposition progressive parties" was becoming greater, and therefore JSP in period up to 1970 should concentrate on increasing its strength in order to lead such coalition government. Katsumata said idea of JSP taking power by itself in 1970 (stated in long-range policy approved by JSP Convention in January 1966) was unrealistic. Specifically, Katsumata called for party to begin "conversation with people" on issues close to people like inflation, government subsidies to prefectural governments, etc. to gain their confidence and to increase party membership. On foreign policy issues, Katsumata called for establishment of Japan-Chicom diplomatic relations, a Pacific nuclear-free zone, and "complete" return of Okinawa (including removal of US bases), Bonins and Northern Territories. He said Okinawa problem could not be solved without strong popular support and called for "people's movement" on April 28, which would be designated "Okinawa Day". He added that if PriMin Sato wished to lead difficult campaign for complete reversion, JSP not averse to supporting him, but leaders of all parties should meet with Sato to ascertain where he stands on Okinawa reversion. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: Katsumata's public recognition that prospect for pure JSP government by 1970 "unrealistic" is backhand rebuttal of his predecessor's dogmatic position and first step in JSP public evaluation of defeat in January election and assessment of what party should do to reverse falling trend of popularity. Apparent trend toward more realistic domestic JSP policies may lead to greater influence of less dogmatic "Japanese-style" socialism advocated by both Katsumata and Vice-Chairman Saburo EDA. JSP public stand on foreign policy issues (Security Treaty, Okinawa, diplomatic relations with Chicom) not likely to change in near future. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

4. PriMin Sato Returns from Taipei

a. PriMin Sato returned to Tokyo September 9 from three-day visit to Taipei. Foreign working level officials consider that visit itself went off without difficulty. No concrete results had been sought, and none were obtained. Topics discussed by Sato with GRC officials included situation on mainland,

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NND 969000  
By WBD NARA Date 7/25/02

CONFIDENTIAL

Page 4, A-369  
from Tokyo

progress of Japanese economic assistance to Taiwan, security problems in Asia, and NPT. (CONFIDENTIAL)

b. Comment: This first visit in ten years of a Japanese PriMin to Taiwan had been opposed by some within GOJ who believed it would lead to more difficulties in Chicom-Japan relations, and questioned by large sector of press which worried editorially about impact on prospects for renewing Liao-Takasaki trade agreement. However, intemperate manner in which Chicoms registered their disapproval of visit (see Item 5), and apparently mild political atmosphere created by GRC, has not led to any growth of criticism of PriMin for making visit thus far. (CONFIDENTIAL)

5. Chicom -Japanese Relations

a. Chicoms have carried on vigorous and abusive propaganda campaign attacking PriMin Sato for visiting Taiwan. On September 8 Chicom trade officials in Peking and Tokyo issued statements, followed by brawls September 8 and 9 between Tokyo-resident Chicom trade office personnel and Japanese newspapermen and members of right-wing Japanese group respectively. On September 10 Chicoms announced expulsions from Peking of three members of Japanese press corps, with replacements from same newspapers explicitly barred. GOJ reaction thus far has been to formally point out to Chicom trade office personnel in Tokyo their violations of non-political nature of their status in Japan, and to reject, but fairly gently, Chicom protest alleging police brutality and collaboration with rightists (Tokyo 1702). (CONFIDENTIAL)

b. Comment: Despite provocative Chicom attitude there is no desire within GOJ to escalate quarrel with Chicoms, though police would like to be allowed to take more vigorous action in running down local Chicoms who have illegally detained Japanese. With Liao-Takasaki Agreement up for renewal before end of year, GOJ will be as patient as possible before moving toward a harder anti-Chicom line. (CONFIDENTIAL)

OSBORN

POL:RFPfeiffer  
REArmstrong  
CTBleha  
HL Levin

USIS:HLBurleson  
NavA:LCdr Strickland

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NND 969000  
By WBD NARA Date 7/25/02



**ACTION**

*INR-10*

R	REP	AF
1	5	6
2	5	17
3	5	12
4	5	12
5	5	12
6	5	12
7	5	12
8	5	12
9	5	12
10	5	12
11	5	12
12	5	12
13	5	12
14	5	12
15	5	12
16	5	12
17	5	12
18	5	12
19	5	12
20	5	12
21	5	12
22	5	12
23	5	12
24	5	12
25	5	12
26	5	12
27	5	12
28	5	12
29	5	12
30	5	12
31	5	12
32	5	12
33	5	12
34	5	12
35	5	12
36	5	12
37	5	12
38	5	12
39	5	12
40	5	12
41	5	12
42	5	12
43	5	12
44	5	12
45	5	12
46	5	12
47	5	12
48	5	12
49	5	12
50	5	12
51	5	12
52	5	12
53	5	12
54	5	12
55	5	12
56	5	12
57	5	12
58	5	12
59	5	12
60	5	12
61	5	12
62	5	12
63	5	12
64	5	12
65	5	12
66	5	12
67	5	12
68	5	12
69	5	12
70	5	12
71	5	12
72	5	12
73	5	12
74	5	12
75	5	12
76	5	12
77	5	12
78	5	12
79	5	12
80	5	12
81	5	12
82	5	12
83	5	12
84	5	12
85	5	12
86	5	12
87	5	12
88	5	12
89	5	12
90	5	12
91	5	12
92	5	12
93	5	12
94	5	12
95	5	12
96	5	12
97	5	12
98	5	12
99	5	12
100	5	12

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

# AIRGRAM

*POL 2-1 JAPAN*

FOR RM USE ONLY

**A-414**

**NO.**

**CONFIDENTIAL**

**PRIORITY**

**HANDLING INDICATOR**

**TO :** Department of State

**INFO :** BANGKOK CINCACFLT  
CINCPAC COMNAVMAIRANAS  
CINCPACAF COMSEVENFLT  
CINCUSARPAC COMUS/J

**FROM :** Amembassy TOKYO

**SUBJECT :** JOINT WEEKA NO. 38

**RECEIVED**

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DA/ODCSOPS FUKUOKA  
DA/DUSAF HICOMRY  
DOD/ISA HICOM/  
(Halperin) POLAD

DATE: **September 22, 1967**

**REF :**

**CONTENTS**

- Realism Injected Into Okinawa Debate
- Japan-America Assembly
- Opposition Parties' Maneuvering on Okinawa Issue
- Sohyo Shows Flexibility on Okinawa Reversion and Backs Ken- / rokyo Affiliation with ICFTU
- Sato Visits Burma
- JDA Director General Appointed Acting Prime Minister
- Off-Season Shifts in Diet
- Sohyo Announces "Fall Struggle" Plans
- Leftist Violence at Universities
- New Soviet Consul-General Arrives in Japan
- Media Reaction to US ABM Decision
- Press Reaction to Washington US-Japan Cabinet-level Talks

**POLITICAL**

**1. Realism Injected Into Okinawa Debate**

a. Very few people in Tokyo this week had any hard information concerning results of FonMin Miki's talks with American leaders about

USARYIS (7th Psyop Gp)

HONG KONG MOSCOW

KOBE-OSAKA NAGOYA

NAHA

RANGOON

SAIGON

SAPPORO

SEOUL

TAIPEI

**Group 3**

Downgraded at 12-year intervals, not automatically declassified.

**CONFIDENTIAL**

**FORM 4-62 DS-323**

**FOR DEPT. USE ONLY**

☒ In ☐ Out

**Drafted by:** POL: (see last page)

**Clearances:**

**Contents and Classification Approved by:** POL: TWainsworth

DECLASSIFIED  
 Authority NND 969000  
 By WBD NARA Date 7/25/02

CONFIDENTIAL

Page 2, A-414  
from Tokyo

Okinawa. FonMin Miki himself, even when hounded by long-distance telephone, refused to say much more than "I am neither optimistic nor pessimistic". What Japanese press was able to pick up from public statements in Washington led to sober treatment which pictured FonMin's soundings encountering firm and united USG response which stressed importance of Okinawa bases to security not only of Japan but also of neighboring Asian countries. GOJ/LDP spokesmen in Tokyo, carefully avoiding any suggestion that talks had been in any sense unfriendly, stressed expected nature USG response and noted need for further Japanese consideration of security side of Okinawa problem. Japanese were also shaken by reports from Japan-American Assembly (Item 2), where Japanese participants found that their friendly, well-disposed and generally knowledgeable American counterparts, even after considerable education as to intensity of Japanese feelings on Okinawa, were unbending on security aspects of problem. Japanese were particularly disappointed in Senator Mansfield's speech which appeared to them to add up to indefinite postponement of Okinawa reversion with Bonins to be tossed back as sop to Japanese feelings.

b. In reaction to cool breeze from Washington, editorialists engaged in some peculiarly Japanese exercises in "self-reflection". They noted that flowering of reversion formulae which has taken place over recent months had assumed settlement of Okinawa problem concerned only Japan and US and had leap-frogged real study of security aspects. GOJ spokesmen emphasized need for careful thinking on security side of problem and Chief Cabinet Secretary Kimura, while reiterating standard GOJ policy against introduction nuclear weapons onto Japanese soil, once again stated GOJ would not exclude possibility of negotiations for reversion would include question nuclear weapons.

c. By end of week, some of pessimistic reaction appeared to be wearing off. SecGen Fukuda of LDP said Miki had found US attitude "not inflexible". Okinawan Chief Executive Matsuoka, stopping by Tokyo on his way to Latin America, said he thought prospects for reversion had brightened considerably in view of fact US representatives had apparently lost some of their nervousness concerning conversations which include word "reversion". Matsuoka also said, according press, that nuclear bases on Okinawa not "welcome" but he not certain whether reversion could wait until Okinawan bases put on par with those in Japan proper. Washington Post September 20 editorial urging early reversion received prominent Tokyo play. In move which marked return to indirect and informal debate on possibilities for reversion formulae, "high FonMin official" was quoted in September 21 press as suggesting new prominence of ABM issue may lead to recognition of distinction

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NND 969000  
By WBD NARA Date 7/25/02

0 7 5 4

CONFIDENTIAL

Page 3, A-414  
from Tokyo

between "defensive" and "offensive" nuclear weapons; implication was clear that room might be found for former on Okinawa after reversion. Press commented that this sounded like groundwork for "Kusumi Plan" (Week 36, Item 1)--formula which Dr. Ohama of PriMin's Advisory Council made clear to one of Senator Mansfield's party would be basis for his group's eventual recommendation to Sato. (CONFIDENTIAL)

d. Comment: Reports of Washington reaction to Miki soundings have given pause to everyone involved in Okinawa issue, and some adjustments in positions may be expected. One editor (conservative Tokyo Shimbun) told EmbOff he assumes rest of press is waiting, just as he is, for Miki's return in order attempt find out what parameters of possible developments in Sato-Johnson talks may be. Renewed heavy coverage of Okinawa issue would then be keyed to what appears to be possible. Conservatives in LDP appear to be toying with idea of using security aspect of Okinawa issue to push whole matter of increasing Japan's capability for self-defense, but to date this is matter for internal discussion within LDP and not for public declamation. Opposition appears to feel it has good nationalistic issue, but has been cautious in committing real resources to "struggles" over Okinawa issue. This week's indications that no dramatic changes in US position are to be expected may be what opposition was looking for in order decide how to play Okinawa (See Item 3). (CONFIDENTIAL)

## 2. Japan-America Assembly

a. Under sponsorship of Japan Council for International Understanding and in association with Columbia University's American Assembly, Japanese-American Assembly convened in Shimoda September 14-17. Conference brought together some seventy Japanese and American participants, but Japan Socialist Party withdrew at last moment.

b. Main headlines captured by Senator Mike Mansfield's proposals on East Asian security and Okinawa. Mansfield suggested that Japan organize three-power--Japan/USSR/US--meeting to seek resolution of Japan's territorial claims and to discuss Far East security matters. He added that Communist China might also participate at some future date should Mainland conditions improve. Senator saw "no major blocks" to return of Bonin Islands and argued that return of Bonins need not be linked to Okinawa issue. Mansfield dismissed argument that requirements of Vietnam war should be considered compelling reason for continued US administration of Okinawa.

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NND 969000  
By WBD NARA Date 7/25/02

0 7 5 5

CONFIDENTIAL

Page 4, A-414  
from Tokyo

c. "Final report" of conference omitted Senator Mansfield's proposals, praised post-war Japanese-American relationship, and urged mutual "special attentiveness to the concerns of the other country". On specifics, report called for making economic development of Asia major common objective of US and Japan, broader multilateral framework for aid activities in Asia, and more active Japanese participation in international community. It somewhat grudgingly said "it is difficult to find a generally agreed upon alternative to a mutual Security Treaty" between two countries at this time, but called for careful study of alternative future possibilities. On China and Vietnam policy, report found agreement on major aims in spite of differences on specifics. It called on US to "make every effort to overcome whatever obstacles may exist to speedy return of Bonin Islands to full Japanese sovereignty" and said Okinawa should be returned to Japan "in the nearest possible future" but with full regard for requirements of Asian and American security. (UNCLASSIFIED)

d. Comment: Conference important in bringing together, under private sponsorship, high level delegates from both countries for wide-scale discussions. Extent of agreement, as reflected in final report, and general consistency of informal conclusions with major US policy lines was encouraging, since differences on policy usually get lion's share of attention in Japan. US Congressional participants found meeting rewarding, and certain members indicated active interest in working for realization of inter-parliamentary exchanges suggested in final communique. (UNCLASSIFIED)

3. Opposition Parties' Maneuvering on Okinawa Issue

a. Following September 13 JSP Central Executive Committee approval in principle of sending mission to US and UN, Chairman Katsumata in press interview September 17 announced that delegation would be led by SecGen Yamamoto and that purpose would be to appeal for Okinawa reversion at UN and to convey feelings of Japanese people concerning Okinawa to US Government and people. JSP staff member quoted Yamamoto as saying privately he thought mission should concern itself primarily with petition to UN SecGen and lobbying among neutral and Asian UN delegations in order to garner publicity within Japan. (CONFIDENTIAL)

b. DSP SecGen Kasuga told EmbOff September 18 that he favors DSP mission to US, which he would lead before Sato's visit, to convey party's views on Okinawa to US Congressmen, representatives of mass media, labor leaders, scholars and military critics and that party would consider his proposal very soon. In press conference September 20, Kasuga disclosed DSP was considering US mission and said it would include "scholars and members of press." (CONFIDENTIAL)

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NND 969000  
By WBD NARA Date 7/25/02

0 7 5 6

CONFIDENTIAL

Page 5, A-414  
from Tokyo

c. According press, JSP SecGen Yamamoto on September 21 asked for meeting between PriMin Sato and JSP Chairman Katsumata to allow latter to present JSP position on Okinawa to Sato before he leaves for Washington in November, and LDP SecGen Fukuda said he would try to arrange it. Fukuda suggested meeting take place after Sato returns from second phase of Asian tour (Item 5) on October 22 and reportedly said that "summit talks" between Sato and opposition leaders on Okinawa would allow full expression of opposition parties' views without getting into Diet debate which might affect Sato's position in Washington talks. However Yamamoto reportedly indicated that JSP would formally request opening of extraordinary Diet session in late October to debate Okinawa issue, disaster relief measures, wage bill for civil service workers and increase in consumer price for rice; Fukuda replied Diet session before Sato leaves for US not likely but that he would take up matter with Sato when he returns from present Asian trip. (UNCLASSIFIED)

d. Comment: If DSP decides to send mission to US it is likely that Komeito will also do so. Opposition leaders apparently feel Japanese public interest in Okinawa issue rising and are attempting to place their parties in position either to claim share of credit for any concessions PriMin Sato may get from US during November visit or, alternatively, to flay Sato for not fighting harder. Neither JSP nor DSP leaders appear to believe US will make concessions on Okinawa in near future and they probably plan on using Okinawa as major campaign issue. (CONFIDENTIAL)

4. Sohyo Shows Flexibility on Okinawa Reversion and Backs Kenrokyo Affiliation with ICFTU

a. Sohyo's Special Committee on Okinawa, Chaired by Sohyo President Horii, September 21 reaffirmed long-standing policy calling for immediate, total and unconditional reversion of Okinawa and Bonins. However, in view "strong desire of Okinawans to achieve early return to motherland", committee agreed to "accept" reversion with US bases in same status as those in rest of Japan if such proposal made by US and approved by majority of Okinawans.

b. At same meeting, Sohyo for first time announced support for proposed affiliation of Okinawan Prefectural Council of Trade Unions (Kenrokyo) with International Confederation Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) at time of Kenrokyo mid-October convention (Tokyo 1551). (UNCLASSIFIED)

c. Comment: Sohyo's sudden display of apparent flexibility on reversion issue seems to be tactical move to improve Sohyo's image

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NND 969000  
By WBD NARA Date 7/25/02

0 7 5 7

CONFIDENTIAL

Page 6, A-414  
from Tokyo

(by coating it with realism) among Okinawan leaders whom SecGen Iwai will meet when he attends Kenrokyo convention and, in addition, appears to be attempt to neutralize any possible advantages scored by Domei leadership as result of latter's recent call upon PriMin Sato urging that he negotiate reversion when visiting US this November (A-400).

d. Reaction to Sohyo committee's backing of Kenrokyo's ICFTU affiliation follows predictable pattern, with Sohyo leader (President Ichikawa of Zenchuro) telling Embassy that such backing necessary to avoid break-up of Kenrokyo and consequent adverse effect on role of Okinawan organized labor in reversion campaign, while Domei organizer Nishihara calls Sohyo backing mere "smokescreen" camouflaging renewed efforts of Sohyo-linked unions in Kenrokyo to block affiliation. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

5. Sato Visits Burma

a. PriMin Eisaku SATO arrived in Rangoon September 20, accompanied by Mrs. Sato and an entourage of 24 in first phase of two-stage swing through Southeast Asia. He will continue his eleven day journey by special plane to Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and Laos before returning to Tokyo September 30. Tokyo press has given prominent coverage to warm and lavish reception accorded him in Rangoon. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: Tokyo press varied its usual attitude of searching for points to criticize in PriMin's activities, and displayed open gratification over what it saw as Burmese turn toward Japan as new important foreign friend. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

6. JDA Director General Appointed Acting Prime Minister

a. On September 19 JDA DirGen Kaneshichi MASUDA was appointed Acting PriMin during PriMin Sato's 11 day visit to Southeast Asia. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: This first time that a JDA DirGen appointed Acting PriMin. While move primarily a reflection of Masuda's personal prestige and close ties with Sato, and results in part from fact FonMin Miki is still abroad, choice of defense chief to head GOJ, even temporarily, would not have been possible a few years ago. Although little public reaction discernable SDF personnel interpret this as step forward in public acceptance of JSDF. (UNCLASSIFIED)

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NND 969000  
By WBD NARA Date 7/25/02

0 7 5 8

CONFIDENTIAL

Page 7, A-414  
from Tokyo

7. Off-Season Shifts in Diet

a. JSP candidate Masaji SAWADA won September 15 by-election in Akita Prefecture for Upper House seat vacated by death of LDP Counselor Matsuno. Margin of victory only 1750 votes over LDP runner-up, with DSP and JCP trailing. Press attributed Sawada victory to fact that he was best known of candidates, having served one term in Lower House and having strong Sohyo support. He is former Vice Chairman of Metal Miners Federation, a major Sohyo affiliate. Press also noted that LDP campaign was slow to start.

b. Present Upper House strength is as follows: LDP-137, JSP-74, Komeito-20, DSP-6, JCP-4, NIIN Club-3, and Independents-2. There are four vacancies; two in local constituencies will be filled through by-elections before next regular Upper House election in summer of 1968.

c. House of Representatives Member Miss Shizue YAMAGUCHI, after 20 years as JSP member of Lower House, was accepted as member of LDP on September 14. Miss Yamaguchi had resigned from JSP in May after fellow Socialists charged members of her staff committed irregularities during January general election campaign. Miss Yamaguchi told press that present JSP was quite different from Socialist party she entered 20 years ago. Deploing factional infighting and increasing pro-Chicom sentiment in JSP, she said JSP no longer reflects peoples' desires and in last general election she had not campaigned on party platform. She added that her constituents would have a chance to judge her decision in next general election.

d. This left Lower House strength as follows: LDP-281, JSP-139, DSP-31, Komeito-25, JCP-5, Independent-3, and vacancies-2.  
(UNCLASSIFIED)

8. Sohyo Announces "Fall Struggle" Plans

a. Sohyo headquarters September 14 revealed plans for its annual "fall offensive". Major political demands are end to US "aggression" in Vietnam and complete reversion Okinawa and Bonin Islands, with activities in support of demands as follows: (a) September 22-23 - National conference of "activists"; (b) from early October to Sohyo 1968 convention - 40 million signature campaign on behalf reversion; (c) October 7 - workshop rallies opposing PriMin visit to South Vietnam; (d) October 7-21 - period for unified anti-war action; (e) October 21 - observance of International Joint Action Day, with rallies in each prefectural capital hopefully attracting total of 2 million people including Tokyo rally of 200,000 which will feature airing of international appeals and mass march; and (f) early November - rally in Tokyo, planned jointly with political parties and "democratic organizations," opposing Sato's mid-November visit to US.

CONFIDENTIAL

0 7 5 9  
DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NND 969000  
By WBD NARA Date 7/25/02

CONFIDENTIAL

Page 8, A-414  
from Tokyo

b. Major economic demands include full adoption National Personnel Authority's recommended wage increases for government workers (A-238), minimum wage system for government workers, and opposition to industrial rationalization and increase in consumer rice price. Activities in support of these demands will include: (a) early October to October 23 (first struggle period)- street demonstrations and shop rallies; (b) October 6 - joint shop rallies conducted by Public Service Joint Struggle Committee; (c) October 26 - strike by public workers for at least one hour from start of work day (on assumption PriMin will schedule October 27 Cabinet meeting to decide NPA wage issue); and (d) Second struggle period at end November (Tokyo 1790). (UNCLASSIFIED)

c. Comment: Most significant aspect "blueprint" is unspoken acknowledgment by Sohyo leadership that union membership will not respond significantly to strike call centering on Vietnam issue. Sohyo apparently not willing to risk recurrence of last year's half-hearted, poorly attended October 21 anti-Vietnam war strike which resulted mainly in imposition disciplinary measures on public workers.

d. "Fall Offensive" blueprint for the first time distinguishes political and economic demands and specifies types of activities scheduled in support of each. This appears to be attempt by leadership to counter rank and file resentment against continued mixing political and non-political objectives in cases where rank and file's real concern is with economic demands, as well as response to growing body of judicial rulings to effect that public workers' activities in pursuit "proper" union goals (e.g. wage benefits) not subject same type penalties as political activities. It remains to be seen whether leaders Sohyo local unions will make same careful distinction between economic and non-economic "struggles."

e. If GOJ acts on NPA wage increase recommendation before October 26, strikes scheduled for that date will most likely be converted into general protest rallies which will attract few workers. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

#### 9. Leftist Violence at Universities

a. Some 1000 students gathered September 13 for "mass bargaining" session with Hosei University president and faculty deans over disciplining of 7 students as result of mid-June dispute. After 7 hours of "bargaining" and scuffling between pro-JCP student group and rival left-of-JCP student group, some 300 left-of-JCP students prevented president and deans from leaving room. In early hours of September 14 police were

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NND 969000  
By W&D NARA Date 7/25/02



CONFIDENTIAL

Page 9, A-414  
from Tokyo

called to free officials and in resulting melee between police and students, 284 students (including 27 coeds) arrested and 100 police injured. Half of those arrested were not Hosei students, according police investigation. Later in day, Hosei associate professor responsible for "student guidance" was held prisoner for 25 hours until university authorities agreed to second "mass bargaining" session. On September 18 some 2,000 students met with representative of Hosei president, who hospitalized after earlier ordeal, and deans for long inconclusive session which saw singing of Internationale and renewed squabbling between pro-JCP and left-of-JCP student groups. At cabinet meeting September 19, Prime Minister Sato expressed concern over Hosei situation, but EdMin Kennoki reaffirmed "academic freedom" at universities. However during September 21 Hosei Student Self-Governing Association meeting, influence of apolitical students prevailed over that of leftist militants and campus expected to return to normal September 22.

b. Roughly 120 left-of-JCP students September 16 prevented opening of scheduled meeting to elect new Meiji University president. Students reportedly protested election since it would "nullify" an administration agreement to meet with students to discuss tuition increases, etc.  
(UNCLASSIFIED)

c. Comment: Ringleader in both cases was left-of-(and anti-) JCP Sampa Rengo, one of three groups now claiming Zengakuren title and would-be Japanese approximation of Red Guards. Portion of this group nominally tied to JSP, but in reality students acknowledge no outside leadership. Significance of these campus clashes, with record number of arrests, at Hosei, lay in unanimity with which major newspapers condemned actions of left-wing student groups. End to tacit press sympathy for student radicals could greatly reduce their potential importance as sparkplug of violence in political demonstrations. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

10. New Soviet Consul-General Arrives in Japan

a. Yevgeniy G. ZABRODIN, newly appointed Soviet Consul-General in Sapporo, Hokkaido, arrived in Yokohama aboard Soviet passenger ship "Baikal" on September 18. He is first Soviet Consul-General to be stationed in Japan since end of World War II. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: According FonOff, Soviet Hokkaido Consulate will officially open sometime week September 25, operating for time being from one of large hotels in Sapporo. Local press prominently reported Zabrodin's career, including previous service in Japan as Minister (and Charge) and posts as Ambassador elsewhere, and noted, without drawing open conclusions, that he is unusually prominent personage for ConGen assignment. (CONFIDENTIAL)

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NND 969000  
By WBD NARA Date 7/25/02

CONFIDENTIAL

Page 10, A-414  
from Tokyo

11. Media Reaction to US ABM Decision

a. Secretary McNamara's announcement of decision for "thin" ABM network prominently treated in afternoon news media September 19. Comment has been rather strongly emotional, expressing fear of renewed N-arms race and anxiety about future of NPT talks although number of commentaries granted that US decision was understandable.

b. Yomiuri editorial September 21 expressed regret that "reasonable" USG position in President's State of Union message abandoned. Suggested that US and USSR seeking conditions "to make Pax Russo-Americana decisive." Concluded "US ABM deployment may serve only to prolong international tensions." Tokyo Shimbun editorial same date granted possibility of Chicom's making "miscalculated N-attack" on US and its allies, but foresaw US-Soviet ABM race that would "destroy stability of ... N-deterrent... thus endangering very roots of peace in nuclear age." Urged immediate halt to this trend.

c. Most commentaries also expressed expectation that "thick" ABM network would follow after US installation of "thin" system; and several renewed theme that America's protecting its own cities behind ABM screen would make US nuclear umbrella less credible to its allies.  
(UNCLASSIFIED)

d. Comment: US action is latest in series of events that is providing strong stimulus to searching Japanese re-consideration of Japan's general security situation and bringing debate on defense down from previously abstract level to concrete analysis of specific policy decisions Japan now faces, or soon will face. (UNCLASSIFIED)

12. Press Reaction to Washington US-Japan Cabinet-level Talks

a. Japanese press displayed mixed reaction to outcome of Washington meeting of Joint US-Japan Committee on Trade and Economics. Editorials assumed standard critical line press takes on most meetings to which GOJ is official party: that results were disappointing, being "too abstract and superficial", and GOJ should work harder to get Japanese wishes reflected. Comment on Okinawa issue was restrained, as press had not built up expectations that major progress would be made on that issue. On other hand, Japanese correspondents in Washington generally expressed satisfaction with meeting, taking line that there had been new

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NND 969000  
By WBD NARA Date 7/25/02


CONFIDENTIAL

Page 11, A-414  
from Tokyo

atmosphere of equality which suggested US-Japan relations have entered "new stage." For example, September 18 Asahi panel of paper's Washington correspondents said, "Since purpose of this committee is to build equal partnership, in one sense we could say committee is no longer needed because it has come this far."


b. Likewise, in Mainichi September 21, Washington correspondent Kawamura spoke of meeting's "business-like atmosphere devoid of emotion," which he attributed to "vast amount of mutual contact in all fields...so that broken dialogue has been restored." Added that Japan has lost some of its inferiority complex, number of taboos in US dialogue with Japan has decreased, and with US and Japan now having common interests in Asia, "Japan-US relations have become 'Japan-US relations in Asia'." So, said Kawamura, while relationship is still far from being like that of US and UK, Japan and US no longer are "unstable allies." (UNCLASSIFIED)

GP-3

  
POL: T Bleha:jl 9/22/67  
TWainsworth  
HLevin  
REArmstrong  
TESawyer  
RFPfeiffer  
RMRuenitz

  
OSBORN

LABATT:RMImmerman 

ARMA: LtCol AJRoach 

USIS:HBurleson 

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NND 969000  
By WBD NARA Date 7/25/02

ORIGIN/ACTION			DEPARTMENT OF STATE			POL 2-1 JAPAN		
INR-10			<b>AIRGRAM</b>			FOR RM USE ONLY		
RM/R	REP	AF	A-585			CONFIDENTIAL		
1	5	6	NO.			PRIORITY		
ARA	EUR	AF				HANDLING INDICATOR		
5	5	6						
NEA	CU	INR						
5	5	6						
E	P	IO	TO : Department of State			DA/ODCSOPS FUKUOKA		
			INFO: BANGKOK CINCPACFLT			DA/DUSA HICOMRY		
			CINCPAC COMNAVMAIANAS			DOD/ISA HICOM/POLAD		
			CINCPACAF COMSEVENTH			(Halperin) USCAR (con'd)		
			CINCUSARPAC COMUSMACV					
L	FBO	AID	FROM : Amembassy TOKYO			DATE: November 3, 1967		
		12	SUBJECT: JOINT WEEKA NO. 44					
PC	S/L	RS/R	REF :					
2	1	1						
AGR	COM	FRB						
2	3							
INT	LAB	TAR						
	2							
TR	XMB	AIR						
		10						
ARMY	CIA	NAVY						
10	20	7						
OSD	USIA	NSA						
49	11	3						
		NSC						
		6						
			<p>1. State Funeral for Former PriMin Yoshida</p> <p>2. Okinawa Roundup</p> <p>3. NPSS Entries "Approved"</p> <p>4. Opposition Parties at Odds on Okinawan Reversion</p> <p>5. SDF Review</p> <p>6. Media Reaction to SVN Presidential Inauguration</p>			<p>RECEIVED</p> <p>NOV 7 1967</p> <p>AM 10 16</p> <p>DEPARTMENT OF STATE</p> <p>RECEIVED</p>		
			<p>POLITICAL</p> <p>1. State Funeral for Former PriMin Yoshida</p> <p>a. State funeral for former PriMin Shigeru YOSHIDA, Japan's first since war, was held October 31 at Tokyo's Hall of Martial Arts. Funeral attended by proxies of Emperor and Empress and by Crown Prince and Princess, government leaders and overseas representatives from about 15 countries in addition to Tokyo Diplomatic Corps. High-light of simple ceremony was five minute eulogy by PriMin Sato during which he stressed Yoshida's inspiration of Japanese people to re-build</p>					
			<p>USARYIS (7th Psyop Gp) NAHA</p> <p>HONG KONG MOSCOW SAIGON SEOUL</p> <p>KOBE-OSAKA NAGOYA SAPPORO TAIPEI</p>					
			<p>Group 3</p> <p>Downgraded at 12-year intervals; not automatically declassified.</p>					
			CONFIDENTIAL			FOR DEPT. USE ONLY		
			FORM 4-62 DS-323			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> In <input type="checkbox"/> Out		
Drafted by:			POL: (see last page)			Contents and Classification Approved by: POL:TWainsworth		
Clearances:								

NOV 6 PM 4 51

CCPYFLO-PBR

0 7 6 4

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NND 969000  
By WBD NARA Date 7/25/02

CONFIDENTIAL

Page 2, A-585  
from Tokyo

nation following war, Yoshida's role in shaping direction of post-war Japanese politics and Sato's personal debt to his late political mentor. Only JCP and Sohyo refused to attend funeral. Apparently unintentional slight to Komeito Chairman during ceremony was later rectified by formal apology. About 30,000 members of public, as well as over 6,000 present at ceremony, filed past to place flowers at memorial portrait of Yoshida. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: Ceremony itself, which televised throughout nation, impressive in its simplicity and dignity. While noting some slight scattered opposition, press uniformly accorded funeral prominent, uncritical coverage. Most Tokyoites, many of whom were enjoying a half-day holiday as result of funeral, proceeded about their business as usual. All religious content was excluded from ceremony, both because of Constitutional injunction against state support of any religion and (presumably) because sectarian rivalries would have been inevitable. Catholic services were held earlier, as Yoshida had been baptized on deathbed. Self Defense Forces, on other hand, had prominent and impressive part in final rites for their post-war founder. (UNCLASSIFIED)

2. Okinawa Roundup

a. Attention this week focused on development by Ohama Committee of "interim report" to PriMin Sato, but there were other important eddies which resulted in top lead stories regarding Okinawa in one or another of major newspapers almost every day.

b. Ohama Committee November 1 at its seventh plenary session (with PriMin Sato, FonMin Miki, DirGen PriMin's Office Tsukahara in attendance) adopted "interim report" to Sato on Okinawa issue. Report said it "desirable" US and Japan agree "within two or three years" on timing of reversion Okinawa and Bonins and that an "agreement to agree" should be reached during PriMin's forthcoming visit to Washington. Report said agreement on continuing consultations regarding reversion also desirable and basic understanding should be reached between US and Japan on implementation by GOJ of measures to promote "oneness" of Japan and Okinawa in period prior return of administrative rights.

c. With regard to possible terms of reversion, report alluded to proposal of committee member Kusumi for bringing about reversion first, then making "step by step" efforts to bring status of bases into line with those in rest of Japan. Report set its recommendations within framework strong plea for frank recognition of importance US Okinawa bases for

CONFIDENTIAL

0 7 6 5  
DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NND 969000  
By WBD NARA Date 7/25/02

CONFIDENTIAL

Page 3, A-585  
from Tokyo

security Japan and Far East and their role in inter-related security system maintained by US in Orient. Document reportedly said Okinawa could revert under "Amami Oshima formula" by direct agreement between US and Japan without reference other peace treaty powers. It also reportedly made recommendations regarding measures for promotion of integration and removal of barriers between Okinawa and Japan, including proposals for joint US-Japan development-lending organ and "opening way to permit representation of Okinawa residents' views in some manner in (Japanese) national politics."

d. Committee's "interim report" was result government reaction to press criticism to effect GOJ efforts to prevent adoption of recommendations which would limit PriMin's room for maneuver in forthcoming Washington talks had smothered last week's attempt by committee put forth formal report (Week 43, 2). Ohama attempted use resulting bargaining position to get (A) recommendation as strongly worded as possible for US-GOJ agreement to decide by 1970 on timing of reversion and (B) recommendation for establishment US-Japan consultative organ formally charged with development of reversion formula. GOJ officials opposed both points as unduly restricting PriMin, and negotiations were carried on with Ohama right down to wire.

e. Ohama was assisted in his efforts get concrete recommendations by visit to Tokyo of Okinawan delegation headed by former governor Tatsuo TAIRA representing Naha reversion study council, as well as by Chief Executive Matsuoka, who was in town for Yoshida funeral. Taira reportedly made very strong approach to PriMin in course appointment morning November 1 in which he presented Okinawan Council's "interim report." Taira (according press) told Sato that, unless something related to timing of reversion comes out of Washington talks, Okinawan political situation likely to turn sour with real danger of leftist takeover of reversion issue and effort to disrupt US bases in Okinawa as result. In front-page interview published November 2 Tokyo Shimbun, Matsuoka said much same thing, adding observation lack of some success by Sato in Washington likely invite "reaction" from within LDP.

f. Reflecting view held strongly by its chairman, Upper House member Ken YASUI, that party and PriMin must clarify their position on Okinawa issue, LDP party committee on Okinawa problem held meeting October 31 to consider Yasui draft policy statement. Against background strong statement that problem should be solved by frank exchange with Americans which would avoid antagonistic atmosphere, Yasui draft reportedly called

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NND 969000  
By WBD NARA Date 7/25/02

CONFIDENTIAL

Page 4, A-585  
from Tokyo

for some "clue, not quantitatively but qualitatively, concerning reversion" as result Washington talks. According press, Yasui had difficult time with functional and partial reversion formulae advocates in October 31 committee session, and draft which was forwarded for joint session November 2 of LDP Committees on Foreign Affairs Research, Security Affairs, and Okinawa problem was pretty vague and meaningless document.

g. Lower House Diet Committee released report November 1 based on its study mission visit to Ryukyus August 28 through September 1. According to press, report recommends supra-partisan consideration Okinawa issue. Committee indicated it found Okinawans dissatisfied with US rule but divided in their views as to what should be done with US bases after reversion; committee thought majority would not welcome reversion with US retention nuclear capability. Committee reportedly felt major cause for dissatisfaction with US rule was "restriction Okinawans' civil liberties," and recommended transfer of judicial rights to Japan, elimination of travel restrictions, and other measures in "human rights" area. Committee also reportedly detected feeling of "caution" lest US capital investment and economic aid tie Okinawa to US in ways which might present problems in connection reversion and attendant application of Japanese legislation. (CONFIDENTIAL)

h. Comment: Dr. Ohama has, in course of this week's events, re-established himself in independent and important role in Okinawa policy-making. He was, of course, forced by process of negotiations to modify his ideas; his original idea for US-Japan consultative organ was apparently along lines formation blue-ribbon committees by both governments with few diplomats added at tag end, a concept violently opposed by FonOff. Nevertheless, he was able to draw upon Okinawan support and to involve his distinguished committee members for first time in nuts-and-bolts debate in such manner as to achieve his prime objective of statement on timing for announcement of reversion date. (CONFIDENTIAL)

3. NPSS Entries "Approved"

a. FonOff November 2 handed over GOJ note approving NPSS visits to DCM, thus ending lengthy negotiations designed to make US bases in Japan available to nuclear powered surface ships (Weeks 36, 4). Enterprise, Bainbridge, Long Beach, Truxton and future NPSS's now able to enter Japanese ports for logistic support, re-supply and crew recreation under procedures similar to those for SSN's. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: Although prior consultation not required under US-Japan Security Treaty we have, as in the case of SSN's, agreed to discuss with GOJ prior to NPSS entry and to respect GOJ desire concerning

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NND 969000  
By WBD NARA Date 7/25/02

CONFIDENTIAL

Page 5, A-585  
from Tokyo

mooring and berthing. Newspapers nevertheless criticized GOJ decision, arguing (1) there no guarantee nuclear weapons not on board; (2) entry of Enterprise would "involve" Japan in Vietnam war; (3) classified data on reactor safety not given JAEC; and (4) JAEC had inadequate time to examine safety aspect. Embassy has received expected protests from JSP, Sohyo and JCP affiliates, which stress charges of nuclear weapons "entry" into Japan and Vietnam "involvement". Komeito source, however, told EmbOff that safety should be only criterion for entry decision.  
(CONFIDENTIAL)

4. Opposition Parties at Odds on Okinawan Reversion

a. DSP leaders October 31 confirmed to press DSP position that four-party opposition conferences should be limited to "exchange of views" on Okinawa reversion and that DSP cooperation with JCP would not extend beyond these discussions. DSP SecGen Kasuga quoted as saying DSP wished to explore possibilities of joint cooperation with JSP and Komeito after JSP SecGen Yamamoto returns in mid-November from Moscow celebration 50th anniversary Bolshevik revolution.

b. JCP SecGen Miyamoto told press November 1 that JCP would not budge from policy of "immediate, complete and unconditional reversion" and that DSP announcement equivalent to breaking off four-party conferences. Miyamoto said that he had never had any hope that conferences would reach agreement on joint position or joint action if DSP were included, because DSP intention is cooperation with LDP. Miyamoto added that DSP suggestion it cooperate with JSP and Komeito on Okinawa will not work, and that likelihood is greater for cooperation between JCP/JSP/Komeito because latter three parties agreed on nine points which last four-party conference took up, while DSP opposed these points (WEEKA 43, 3).

c. JSP last week announced schedule for Okinawa reversion campaign up to November 12 when PriMin departs for Washington (Tokyo 2910). This week, however, JSP eliminated opposition to PriMin's trip to Washington as purpose of November 9 national rally in Tokyo, partly in order to please Okinawa Reversion Council (one of rally's sponsors) and partly (according JSP official's comment to press) to avoid endangering chance for Chairman Katsumata to meet PriMin and present party views on reversion. PriMin now scheduled to meet with chairmen of JSP, DSP and Komeito for 30 minutes each on afternoon November 7.

d. JSP Chairman Katsumata, in Niigata to support Socialist candidate in Upper House by-election, told press November 1 that JSP would shortly set up national "mass organization" to coordinate anti-security

CONFIDENTIAL

0 7 6 8  
DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NND 969000  
By WBD NARA Date 7/25/02



CONFIDENTIAL

Page 6, A-585  
from Tokyo

treaty campaign in 1970. Katsumata said new movement would not repeat mistakes of 1960 anti-treaty campaign and that it would concentrate on problem of return of Okinawa and Bonin Islands. (UNCLASSIFIED)

e. Comment: Opposition parties now publicly giving up hope for significant results from four-party conferences on Okinawa but each party trying make rivals appear at fault. JSP "Okinawa Reversion Week" does not at this time appear to be well coordinated or vigorous program. Both DSP and Komeito officers have told EmbOff that all parties are absorbed in preparations for Upper House election scheduled for June 1968. At this point, it appears that opposition waiting for results of PriMin Sato's talks in Washington before it commits itself to further substantial efforts concerning reversion issue. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

#### MILITARY

##### 5. SDF Review

a. Seventeenth anniversary of establishment Self Defense Forces commemorated at Tokyo's National Stadium October 29. PriMin Sato, Defense Agency DirGen Kaneshichi MASUDA, and Lower House Speaker Mitsujiro ISHII reviewed parade of 4500 personnel of three services, 280 vehicles, and 100 aircraft fly-by. Formations were precise and review seemed well received by estimated 350,000 spectators. However event marred by crash of F-104 fighter returning to base, which resulted in death of pilot. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: Format for this year's review virtually same as that for 1966 event. Newspapers continued to relegate news to small articles on city news pages. (UNCLASSIFIED)

#### PSYCHOLOGICAL

##### 6. Media Reaction to SVN Presidential Inauguration

a. With top priority given to state funeral of former PriMin Yoshida (Item 1) and to unmanned Soviet satellite docking, Japanese media accorded only moderately prominent attention to inauguration of SVN President Thieu. Reporting event from Saigon, Japanese correspondents primarily stressed difficulties GVN expected to face and political troubles expected from reported Thieu-Ky confrontation.

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NMD 969000

By WBD NARA Date 7/25/02

CONFIDENTIAL

Page 7, A-585  
from Tokyo


b. November 1 Yomiuri column concluded: "Although procedures on surface followed fine democratic system, in content this was no more than change of costume from uniforms to civvies. . . US seemed to want at least formal system, if not content, of democracy, but disparity between form and content may produce unexpected evils. "


c. By contrast, unusual degree of empathy for GVN expressed in two November 2 press editorials. Yomiuri saw "many serious difficulties ahead for new regime symbolized by VC shelling of presidential palace", but expressed approval for Thieu-enunciated basic policies and urged GVN to seek "speedy realization of political stability" and "stabilization of national livelihood through pacification programs." Editorial also warned that aims of civilian rule might be thwarted by reported Thieu-Ky confrontation and continuing military-civilian alienation.


d. Noting "pessimistic majority view" on prospects for new GVN, Tokyo Shimbun said, "It is too much to expect flawless democracy from outset in SVN, where people are politically immature and country is still at war." Added that "if new government succeeds in winning populace over by stabilizing livelihood through determination and earnestly executed reforms, then Communists will find themselves unable to keep denying its existence." (UNCLASSIFIED)

GP-3

  
JOHNSON

  
POL: TBleha:jl 11/2/67  
REArmstrong  
RFPfeiffer  
SDawkins

  
AIRA:Maj. Russell

  
USIS:HBurleson

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NND 969000  
By WBD NARA Date 7/25/02

ORIGIN/ACTION

1NR-10

REP	REP	AF
1		EA
ARA	EUR	6
NEA	CU	INR
E	P	IO
L	FBO	AID
2	1	1
AGR	COM	FRB
2	3	
INT	LAB	TAR
	2	
TR	XMB	AIR
4		10
ARMY	CIA	NAVY
10	20	7
OSD	USIA	NSA
49	11	3
		NSC
		6

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

# AIRGRAM

POL 2-1 JAPAN

FOR RM USE ONLY

A-618

CONFIDENTIAL

PRIORITY

HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : Department of State

INFO: BANGKOK CINCPACFLT DA/ODCSOPS FUKUOKA  
CINCPAC COMNAVMARIANAS DA/DUSA HICOMRY  
CINCPACAF COMSEVENFLT DOD/ISA HICOM/POLAR  
CINCUSARPAC COMUS/J (Halperin) USCAR(con'd)

DATE: NOVEMBER 11, 1967

FROM : Amembassy TOKYO

SUBJECT : JOINT WEEKA NO. 45

REF :

## CONTENTS

1. Okinawa-Bonins Issue Rolls Toward Crest
2. Extraordinary Diet Session to Begin December 4
3. LDP Wins Two Upper House By-Elections
4. Electoral District Reform Fails Again
5. JCP Revises Views on International Communist Meeting
6. U.S.-Japan Experts Discuss Nuts and Bolts of NPT
7. Annual JMSDF Ship Review
8. Kyodo Press Poll on Okinawa Reversion

## POLITICAL

1. Okinawa-Bonins Issue Rolls Toward Crest

a. Political and media attention focused on Prime Minister Sato preparations to deal with Okinawa issue in next week's Washington meetings with President. Prime Minister announced Foreign Minister Miki would accompany him to Washington, a move which, according to press, some of Miki's political supporters saw as attempt by Sato to make Miki share

USARYIS (7th Psyop Gp) NAHA SEOUL  
HONG KONG MOSCOW SAIGON TAIPEI  
KOBE-OSAKA NAGOYA SAPPORO

Group 3

Downgraded at 12-year intervals; not automatically declassified

CONFIDENTIAL

FORM 4-62 DS-323

Drafted by: POL:(see last page) 11-9-67

Contents and Classification Approved by: POL:TWainworth

Clearances:

FOR DEPT. USE ONLY

☒ In ☐ Out

1967 NOV 14 AM 11 53

COPY FILED-PER

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NND969000  
By WBD NARA Date 7/25/02

CONFIDENTIAL

Page 2, A-618  
from Tokyo

responsibility for outcome of talks. LDP leader Shojiro Kawashima submitted to Sato LDP report on Okinawa and Bonins which reflected clear recognition of difficulty Prime Minister would face in Washington talks and gave him slight assist by avoiding setting any unreasonable goals or conditions for negotiations. Preparatory negotiations between Foreign Minister Miki and Ambassador Johnson wound up November 7 and 8 amid reasonably sympathetic public reception based on general press speculation that in Washington talks USG would agree to give back Bonins, concede greater role for GOJ in Okinawa affairs, and at least indicate willingness to talk about reversion of Okinawa concretely sometime after 1968 US Presidential elections.

b. Prime Minister met separately November 7 with JSP, DSP and Komeito leaders, as well as with Ryukyus Legislature delegation, and used sessions to get before public essentials of his stance on Okinawa-Bonins issue. Press reports of his November 7 and 8 talks made it appear that Prime Minister's posture included following elements: (1) He will be seeking "definite prospect" for reversion of Okinawa, but in diplomatic negotiations where one cannot foretell reactions of opposite party he can only promise Japanese and Okinawans "best efforts;" he realizes setting actual date for reversion would be difficult at this stage, and reversion might also require some sort of preparatory or "interim" period; (2) Reversion of Bonins first would be good thing, if U.S. is so inclined, but no one should interpret any action re return of Bonins as indicating GOJ desire to avoid hard issues connected with question of Okinawan reversion; (3) GOJ has no intention to change policy of not introducing nuclear weapons into main islands of Japan but it pointless to discuss question of nuclear weapons in Okinawa until priority question of securing more definite prospect concerning reversion is agreed upon with U.S. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

c. JCP's Okinawa policy, published in Akahata November 2, not surprisingly called for "immediate, unconditional and complete" reversion to Japan of Okinawa and Bonins. JCP said it would "abrogate" Articles III and VI of San Francisco Peace Treaty and Security Treaty and force removal of US Okinawa bases and withdrawal of US forces there. JCP turned out 60,000 demonstrators in Tokyo November 5 for "nation-wide unified action" focussed on opposing Sato US visit and demanding Okinawa reversion along with end of Vietnam war. Event passed without incident and attracted little publicity although turnout nearly double that of JSP/Sohyo-sponsored October 21 "international" anti-Vietnam war rally (Week 43, 4). After meetings with PriMin November 7, JSP, DSP and Komeito leaders voiced varying degree of dissatisfaction with what they saw as Sato's approach to negotiations at Washington. Only concrete development came from JSP CEC meeting November 8, which reversed last week's announcement that party would not oppose

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NND 969000  
By WBD NARA Date 7/25/02

CONFIDENTIAL

Page 3  
A-618 from Tokyo

Sato's Washington trip (Week 44, 4). JSP spokesman told press unless Sato took stronger stand for reversion, there was no sense in his going to US. (UNCLASSIFIED)

d. Comment: With Prime Minister Sato's visit to Washington less than a week away, media interest in and organizational agitation concerning reversion of Okinawa and Bonins rose to peak. Although there is genuine widespread interest in subject, "struggle" tactics of demonstrations and petitions are familiar features of any controversial issue on Japanese political scene and their significance in this case should not be overestimated. Prime Minister during week appeared to be in reasonably good control of complicated situation. Apart from partisan opponents who are attempting to use issue for own ends, many politicians and opinion leaders are mildly dissatisfied with Sato's handling of reversion. None of them, however, has yet come forth with realistic and more appealing approach. (CONFIDENTIAL)

2. Extraordinary Diet Session to Begin December 4

Chief Cabinet Secretary Kimura told press November 7 that LDP and Government had agreed that Extraordinary Diet Session would be convened December 4 for period of approximately 2 weeks. Official date of session will be approved at Cabinet meeting on November 24. Kimura said Extraordinary Session agenda would be restricted to approval of pending supplemental budget and report by PriMin on trips to Southeast Asian countries and the United States. Kimura also told press that supplemental budget draft would be approved at Cabinet meeting on November 28. Important part of supplementary budget is provision for pay increases for public service employees (Week 43, 5). (UNCLASSIFIED)

3. LDP Wins Two Upper House By-Elections

a. LDP candidates won seats in by-elections November 5 for vacancies in House of Councillors in Chiba and Niigata Prefectures. Gisaku SUGENO was elected by large margin in Chiba Prefecture and Takashi SATO won closer victory over JSP rival in Niigata. Both men fill vacancies left by death of LDP Councillors.

b. Party strength in Upper House is now LDP 139, JSP 74, Komeito 20, DSP 6, JCP 4, Niin Club 3, Independents 2, and vacancies 2. (UNCLASSIFIED)

c. Comment: Both LDP and JSP made strong effort in these campaigns, which are last by-elections until Upper House election scheduled for June 1968, when one-half of Upper House seats will be at stake. LDP

CONFIDENTIAL

0 7 7 3  
DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NND 969000  
By WBD NARA Date 7/25/02

CONFIDENTIAL

Page 4

A-618 from Tokyo

victories follow JSP wins in similar by-election in Akita (Weeks 38, 7) and Shiga; November 5 contests were viewed by both parties as fairly important in terms of both testing and influencing national political "mood." (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

4. Electoral District Reform Fails Again

a. The Fifth Election System Deliberation Council, charged by PriMin with recommending reforms in various aspects of election system for national legislature, failed at last session November 2 to reach agreement on recommendations concerning election district system for House of Representatives, most important and controversial aspect of task. Six proposals for reform were voted on but there was obviously no possibility of reaching unanimity needed to make formal recommendation for change in system. Press reported that Council's report, handed over to PriMin November 6, contained recommendations on electioneering practices. Both Home Affairs Minister Fujieda and LDP SecGen Fukuda voiced regret at inability of Council to make recommendations on major issue but stated government and LDP will continue efforts to develop better electoral system. Opposition parties all criticized Council saying general public and their respective parties opposed government efforts to change present electoral system. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: Substantial reason for Council's inability to agree, despite intensive efforts by Chairman who is also top official of influential Yomiuri Shimbun, is disagreement within LDP itself on nature of desirable changes in present Lower House electoral system, plus reluctance to battle united opposition front on issue. Five years of work by joint public-private councils have brought little or no visible progress toward actual change in this aspect of Japanese parliamentary politics. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

5. JCP Revises Views on International Communist Meet

a. In long-winded November 7 Akahata editorial on occasion Fiftieth Anniversary of October Revolution, "meaning" of that revolution seen simply as ushering in of "socialist era." Communist achievements during past 50 years shown by citing growth in number of communist nations, their populations and industrial production. Long range view also taken of "opportunism," such as that of Khrushchev and Mao, which only temporary obstacles in broad stream of history supporting communist unity and progress. Reiterating now familiar position, JCP described main current problem as "mistakes" of both right and left extremes within international communism. Opportunism of Khrushchev and Mao has led to disunity of international communism, which aids US "imperialism" in Vietnam and North Korea "where socialism actually being challenged" and lessens attraction of communism to capitalist nations working classes. JCP support of international communist united front then repeated.

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NND 969000

By WBD NARA Date 7/25/02

CONFIDENTIAL

Page 5  
A-618 from Tokyo

b. Commenting specifically on international communist meeting, JCP recalled it had backed principle that conference should be held only with agreement and participation of all 81 nations which participated in 1957 and 1960 Moscow meetings. There now two theories of future communist meeting: one would achieve international communist unity "at a stroke;" other aims at creation of international communist united front. JCP believes preparatory meeting for conference with latter purpose would have "positive significance" now. However, prior to conferences there must be discussion and understanding of "all concerned (communist) parties" on conference character, agenda and participation. Thorough study of whether or not positive results can now be achieved also necessary. Then in notable switch, editorial states that so long as Mao opportunists oppose true Marxist-Leninist parties by calling them "anti-revolutionary" and "revisionist," position that CCP participation absolute condition for convening international communist meeting "no longer corresponds with reality."

c. "Lecture and Movie Evening to Celebrate Fiftieth Anniversary of Socialist Revolution" held in Tokyo November 7 featured speech by lowest ranking Presidium member Tomio NISHIZAWA and attracted crowd of 2,000. (UNCLASSIFIED)

d. Comment: After considerable reluctance, JCP's conditional support for conference preparations without CCP represents significant shift toward Soviet position. Along with failure to send party representatives to Moscow celebrations, this change in JCP position on international meet may well be part of involved bargain struck during JCP/CPSU negotiations which led to, and will continue at, two parties' November meeting in Tokyo. At same time, JCP does not appear overly anxious to rush rapprochement with CPSU. Differences within JCP leadership probably account for part of hesitance. However, having proven its control over rank and file through two major shifts in party policy during past year and half, also likely that JCP wishes to continue greater influence on international communist movement which derives, in its view, from its relative independence of both CCP and CPSU. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

6. US-Japan Experts Discuss Nuts and Bolts of NPT

a. Twelve member US delegation composed of representatives of Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and Atomic Energy Commission arrived in Tokyo on October 29 for week of discussions with Japanese counterparts of legal and technical problems connected with Non-Proliferation Treaty. US experts visited nuclear installations, had working sessions behind closed doors and met informally with Japanese government officials, industry figures, journalists and scholars concerned with the nuclear energy industry. (UNCLASSIFIED)

CONFIDENTIAL

0 7 7 5  
DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NND 969000  
By WBD NARA Date 7/25/02

CONFIDENTIAL

Page 6  
A-618 from Tokyo

b. Comment: Both American and Japanese participants in talks indicated satisfaction with exchange of views which, however, did not directly touch on NPT text Japanese would prefer or whether they would sign NPT (Japan expected eventually to sign treaty). Japanese side received detailed answers to most of their questions. Americans gained better understanding of Japanese hopes and concerns about effect of NPT on development of their nuclear industry and its future ability to compete in international markets. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

7. Annual JMSDF Ship Review

a. Annual Maritime Self-Defense Forces review was conducted in Ise Bay on November 5. Review was basically the same as past years with review of major class combatant ships and fly-over of aircraft. Vernacular press coverage was very light and consisted of short straight news articles. Review was not well publicized and therefore not well attended by general public. Demonstrations by several hundred hard core Zengakuren and JCP in Nagoya November 4 and 5 were orderly and kept out of pier area by police. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: Demonstrations had no effect on conduct of the review. Intelligence sources said "professional organizers," many from outside Nagoya area, and locally hired students accounted for most of small number of demonstrators. Embassy observer noted demonstrators appeared to be on outing rather than on serious protest. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

PSYCHOLOGICAL

8. Kyodo Press Poll on Okinawa Reversion

a. November 6 Tokyo Shimbun morning edition reported results of opinion poll on Okinawa reversion conducted October 21-22 by Kyodo Press Service, with about 2,400 completed interviews from nationwide random sample of 3,000 Japanese adults. Findings similar to those reported for earlier polls by Asahi and Mainichi (Weeks 40, 42).

b. Reversionist sentiment was reflected in 37% favoring "total reversion of all Ryukyus" and 45% choosing "step-by-step reversion beginning with whatever is possible" -- total 82% for reversion. One percent accepted "continuing present U.S. administration," and rest were "don't know" answers. Similarly, asked about acceptability of U.S. administration, 43% said it is "impermissible," 37% "unavoidable" and 2% "only natural." Balance were "don't know" responses.

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NND 969000  
By W6D NARA Date 7/25/02



CONFIDENTIAL

Page 7  
A-618 from Tokyo


c. Given choice of four reversion formulae, 34% chose "reversion with all bases abolished," 33% opted for "bases reduced to par with those in Japan proper, with N-arms removed," 6% were for "free use of bases, without N-arms," and 3% okayed "free use of bases including N-arms." Remainder were "don't know" answers.

d. On question of usefulness of U.S. Okinawa bases for "defense of Japan and security and peace of Far East," 8% said "very useful," 20% "more useful than not," 19% "not particularly useful," 20% "actually dangerous," and balance "don't know."

e. Also, 9% held that Sato Cabinet is "taking firm stand for reversion," while 52% said Cabinet has been "weak-kneed about reversion." (UNCLASSIFIED)

f. Comment: Technical quality of poll and framing of questions was generally good and comparable to press polls noted above. Also, Kyodo poll was prefaced by number of cognitive questions showing degree of general knowledge about Okinawa situation. (For example, 88% knew Okinawa is Japanese territory, and 85% knew U.S. has administrative control, 69% knew US dollars were used in Okinawa, 73% knew Soviets control "Northern territories," 58% knew Okinawa plays important role in Vietnam war, 56% think US has nuclear bases in Okinawa.) (UNCLASSIFIED)

  
OSBORN

  
POL:PFPfeiffer/mv  
TWAinsworth  
REArmstrong  
CTBleha  
HLevin

USIS:HBurleson  
ARMA:LtCol. J. R. Marsh

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NND 969000  
By WBD NARA Date 7/25/02

ACTION		
1 NR-10		
RM/R	REP	AF
1		
ARA	EUR	EA8
NEA	CU	5
25/2-HOCKMAN		10
L	FBO	AID
		12
PC	S/IL	
2	1	
AGR	COM	FRB
2	3	
INT	LAB	TAR
	2	
TR	XMB	AIR
4		10
ARMY	CIA	NAVY
10	20	7
OSD	USIA	NSA
49	11	3
NSC	WHH/K	
6	3	

# AIRGRAM

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

POL 2-1 JAPAN

FOR RM USE ONLY

TO : Department of State

INFO: BANGKOK CINCPACFLT DA/ODCSOPS FUKUOKA  
 CINCPAC COMNAV Marianas DA/DUSA HICOMRY  
 CINCPACAF COMSEVENFLT DOD/ISA HICOM/POLAD  
 CINCUSARPAC COMUS/J (Halperin) USCAR (Cont'd)

FROM : Amembassy TOKYO

SUBJECT : JOINT WEEKA NO. 46

DATE: November 17, 1967

REF :

## CONTENTS

1. Sato Visit and Okinawa-Bonins Issue
2. Students Harass Leftists, Battle Police
3. Cabinet Reshuffle Expected
4. Anti-VN-War Group Exploits Navy Ship Jumpers
5. JSP Secretary General Returns from Moscow
6. Self Defense Force Personnel Shuffle

## POLITICAL

1. Sato Visit and Okinawa-Bonins Issue

a. Insofar as Japanese media and public are concerned, almost entire interest of PriMin's visit to U.S. this week focussed on results he would obtain in his negotiations on Okinawa-Bonins issue. It was very

USARYIS (7th Psyop Gp)	NAHA	SEOUL
HONG KONG	MOSCOW	SAIGON
KOBE-OSAKA	NAGOYA	SAPPORO

## GROUP 3

DOWNGRADED AT 12-YEAR INTERVALS; NOT AUTOMATICALLY DE-

CONFIDENTIAL

CLASSIFIED  
FOR DEPT. USE ONLY

FORM 4-62 DS-323

☒ In ☐ Out

Drafted by:

POL:(see last page) 11/17/67

Contents and Classification Approved by:

POL:TWAINSWORTH

Clearances:

1967 NOV 24 AM 10 00

COPYFILE-PDR

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
RECEIVED

REF/OP  
Date of Action Nov 28 1967  
Action Office Symbol 1001001001  
Name of Officer 46. F. F. F.  
Direction to RM/R File

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NND 969000  
By WBD NARA Date 7/25/02

CONFIDENTIAL

Page 2  
A-660  
from Tokyo

difficult to judge from media coverage as to actual expectations concerning results, since almost all papers apparently felt called upon in their traditional tutelary role to take "maximum positions" which assumed that Bonins would be returned as matter of course and urged PriMin to zero in on achievement of date for actual reversion of Okinawa. Editorials which followed announcement of communique followed directly in line with papers' earlier positions and were almost uniformly critical of Sato's failure to achieve "maximum position."

b. Running parallel with media's formalistic "maximum position" line, however, was much more realistic and factual coverage of Washington negotiations. Correspondents accompanying Sato party apparently had almost constant opportunity to badger their GOJ sources, so that press in Tokyo was able provide what <sup>looked like</sup> blow-by-blow account of final steps in formulation GOJ position and at least one-sided accounts of actual negotiations themselves. Picture presented by these reports was of PriMin shooting for reversion of Bonins and establishment new committee which would discuss modalities of Okinawa reversion and set date for reversion in say 1969. Actual results contained in communique amounted to marked progress when weighed against what GOJ appeared to be seeking and many reporters clearly said so in their initial stories. While some papers (particularly Asahi) highlighted fact that communique wording claimed by GOJ as its "basic understanding" was unilateral Sato statement, most reporters and commentators appeared to accept Chief Cabinet Secretary KIMURA's televised remarks (which came in late November 16 by satellite) to effect PriMin's remarks regarding establishment timing for reversion within "two or three years" had President's "tacit consent."

c. Media reaction November 17--even if ritualistic critical editorials were excluded--reflected clear case of "morning after" doubts and concern. Papers expressed considerable worry about both explicit GOJ commitments in communique (characterization of ChiComs as "threat," sympathy for U.S. role in Viet Nam, and recognition role of Okinawa bases in Far East security) as well as about what broader commitments might lie behind public document. Asahi speculated U.S. might even have in mind Japanese military contributions to Far Eastern security, but most papers, basing themselves on clarifications from Washington sources, assumed that only economic contributions were involved. Nevertheless, there was media concern that what U.S. has in mind would be out of proportion to Japanese resources and political overtones might involve Japan in much more rigid posture vis-a-vis Communist China.

d. Private comment to Embassy has been indicative of relief and satisfaction within Government and LDP ranks that talks came out at least as well as expected, coupled with concern that very serious work lies ahead in formulating GOJ position on Okinawa reversion. However, Mainichi November 17 quotes

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NND 969000  
By WBD NARA Date 7/25/02

CONFIDENTIAL

LDP anti-mainstream leader FUJIYAMA as criticizing Sato in strong terms for assuming unwanted obligations in Washington. Conservative "action force" represented by Okinawa advisory council chairman OHAMA appeared quite satisfied by outcome; Ohama was quoted as saying communique did not use his committee's words, but did use its ideas. Opposition public statements reported thus far suggest that both publicly and privately opposition caught somewhat off-guard and urging old slogans while searching for new points of attack.

e. Reaction within Okinawa has been given quite low-key coverage by Japanese media, but what has appeared is presented in terms of quiet disappointment with Sato leadership which is reported to extend even into business community and DP leadership. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

f. Comment: There was no dancing in Tokyo streets over Bonins reversion; only minority of former residents interviewed by media expressed desire to return to islands. Government and LDP would appear at this point to have been given wherewithal to hold off opposition on reversion issue for time being. At same time, hard line which JSP encountered in Moscow on northern islands reversion (Item 5) likely undercut left's campaign concerning Okinawa to some extent. However, full implications of balance Sato struck in Washington apt to be subject of attack by opposition and lively debate within LDP itself. (CONFIDENTIAL)

## 2. Students Harass Leftists, Battle Police

a. Combined JSP-Sohyo/JCP/Okinawa Fatherland Reversion Council-sponsored reversion rally ended in debacle October 9 when 1200 uninvited ultra-left Zengakuren students invaded gathering of about 6000. Heckling between students and JCP delayed rally schedule and led to behind scenes squabble between JSP, which nominally controls portion of invading students, and JCP. Scheduled addresses by JSP Chairman, Sohyo SecGen and JCP Central Committee member cancelled, as were planned post-rally demonstration marches. Students did stage demonstration march and, in clash with police, 12 were arrested.

b. Tension began building in Tokyo on November 11, eve of PriMin's U.S. departure, as same ultra-left (and anti-JCP) students were joined by 1300 comrades from outside Tokyo to "stop Sato by force." Ignoring appeals by faculty members at University assembly sites, about 1800 students in hard hats, armed with rocks and two-by-twos, clashed with over 4,000 police in front of small railway station about one kilometer from Haneda airport entrance. Police quickly dispersed students with tear gas, but during off-and-on melee 250, mostly police, were injured. Police arrested 333 students, largest number since 1960 Security Treaty riots. As in October 8 Haneda incident (Week 41) mass media overwhelmingly critical of student actions. (UNCLASSIFIED)

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NND 969000  
By WBD NARA Date 7/25/02

CONFIDENTIAL

Page 4  
A-660 from Tokyo

c. Comment: October 9 fiasco was blow to first real effort of combined JSP-Sohyo/JCP/Okinawa Reversion Council structure urging immediate Okinawa reversion without U.S. bases. In spite of internal difficulties, Left will probably continue to use this organizational structure to press its views on Okinawa, attempting to link reversion with Security Treaty and Vietnam issues.

d. Both incidents shed further light on ultra-left students' motivations. November 9 incident, which students described as "preliminary skirmish," reflected their contempt for JSP/Sohyo/JCP "Left Establishment," which they say has "abandoned revolutionary goals leaving masses leaderless." Students November 12 clearly aimed at fighting with police, not at blocking or even directly harassing PriMin's departure. This attitude has alienated virtually all potential sympathy from media, intellectuals, or more rational elements of Left. Additional, but less obvious, motive is continuing competition among student groups themselves to prove "militancy," sine qua non of radical student movement. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

### 3. Cabinet Reshuffle Expected

a. Before leaving for U.S., PriMin Sato, according press, instructed LDP SecGen Fukuda to begin sounding out various LDP factions and individual politicians with view to Cabinet reshuffle on or about November 26. Fukuda has limited statements to press on subject to minimum, but general prediction of press and political circles is that reshuffle will be extensive, that party factions not closely aligned with Sato will have more representation in Cabinet, and that virtually nothing is firm until Sato returns from Washington. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. LDP politicians confirm that soundings with view to Cabinet reshuffle have been going on since before Sato departure. Prevailing estimates are that FonMin Miki and FinMin Mizuta will retain these key posts and Fukuda will remain as LDP SecGen. Political sources predict that Yasuhiro NAKASONE, youthful standard bearer of intra-LDP opposition to Sato for past two years, will enter Cabinet; Nakasone himself has told press he "willing to cooperate." Former Ikeda faction also appears likely receive better treatment in new Cabinet than in present one, according LDP sources. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

c. Fukuda injected bit of light-hearted, but perhaps revealing comment on Japan political scene into exchange with opposition parties' SecGens November 16, according press. As they met for joint telecast of initial comments on Johnson/Sato communique (Item 1) Fukuda reportedly asked whether opposition parties would not like to nominate one Cabinet member each. JSP SecGen Yamamoto promptly replied he would take Foreign Ministry and abolish U.S.-Japan Security Treaty.

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NND 969000  
By W6D NARA Date 7/25/02

CONFIDENTIAL

Page 5  
A-660 from  
Tokyo

Serious-minded Komeito SecGen Yano said he would take Health and Welfare Ministry in order to benefit populace. DSP SecGen Kasuga said his party would accept any post. JCP SecGen Miyamoto remarked with rare smile that JCP would like to have Defense Agency. (UNCLASSIFIED)

d. Comment: Most local political commentators interpret pending reshuffle in terms Sato preparations for seeking third term as LDP President in December 1968. Retention of Miki, entry of Nakasone, and increased representation for Ikeda faction, in such circumstances, would appear on surface to imply that Sato faces no serious challenge for third term. However, Sato faction Diet member remarked November 16 that forthcoming reshuffle actually aimed at party unity for House of Councillors elections in summer of 1968 and there was possibility Sato would again change Cabinet after those elections to firm up base for third term candidacy. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

4. Anti-VN-War Group Exploits Navy Ship Jumpers

a. On November 13 Beheiren, "intellectual" anti-Vietnam war organization led by leftist writer Makoto ODA, staged press conference to announce desertion of four young U.S. Navy enlisted men from USS Intrepid, carrier that left Yokosuka for Vietnam on October 25. Well attended press conference included statements, recordings, snapshots and home movie to publicize reasons for desertion, i.e., opposition to U.S. actions in Vietnam. Beheiren also played tape and distributed statement by American pacifist Ernest P. Young, identified as one-time special assistant to former Ambassador, who had talked with four in Japan. Beheiren refused disclose whereabouts of four or otherwise to cooperate with police.

b. Press coverage was extensive with front page treatment in all dailies supplemented by city-page stories, editorials and columns. General themes were depth of anti-war sentiment among Americans, Japan's relationship to American war effort and attitude Japanese authorities should take toward foreigners seeking "political asylum." Considerable speculation aroused over whereabouts of four, with several papers suggesting they might have left Japan.

c. U.S. Naval authorities confirmed that four were AWOL from Intrepid as of midnight October 22 and that local police routinely notified November 2. Navy, after consultation with Embassy, made specific formal request to Metropolitan Police evening November 13 for assistance in apprehending men. Foreign Office informed of Embassy interest and cooperating. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

d. Comment: Obvious that considerable planning went into Beheiren handling of case, aimed at obtaining maximum publicity. If four apprehended quickly and quietly by police, only minimum publicity likely. But if they were to

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NND 969000  
By WBD NARA Date 7/25/02

CONFIDENTIAL

Page 6  
A-660 from Tokyo

surface in foreign embassy here or on university campus, (traditionally immune to police entry), apprehension would become much more difficult and would provide media with opportunity to censure "heartless treatment" of U.S. and GOJ. (CONFIDENTIAL)

5. JSP Secretary General Returns from Moscow

a. Japanese press November 14 carried accounts from Moscow correspondents quoting JSP SecGen Yamamoto as saying high CPSU members told him November 13 that Kosygin hint to Foreign Minister Miki in July (Embtel 496) of "something of interim nature" had no substantive meaning in reference to Japanese demands for return of Northern Territories. Yamamoto quoted CPSU Politburo Member Suslov as saying Soviets intended improve relations with Japan by resolving problem of safe navigation for Japanese fishermen and increasing economic and cultural exchange. Yamamoto also said Suslov supported JSP demands for immediate and unconditional return of Okinawa and Bonins and Hanoi/Vietcong conditions for ending Vietnam war.

b. FonOff spokesman, describing Soviet position as "not unexpected," told press that despite Soviet resistance to Japanese pressure on territorial issue, GOJ should raise issue in connection with Kosygin proposal as it necessary for Japan to negotiate for return of Northern Territories "patiently and persistently."

c. In Tokyo press conference on return November 15 Yamamoto mentioned Suslov statements that Soviet policy on Northern Territories remains unchanged and that return of territories to Japan "very difficult" as long as the US-Japan Security Treaty exists. Yamamoto added that Suslov said Soviets would seriously consider return of Northern Territories if JSP became ruling party in Japan. Yamamoto went on to stress Soviet position on Okinawa and Vietnam war.

d. Press coverage of Yamamoto's speech at 50th anniversary celebration of Bolshevik revolution and similar remarks made during speeches during stay in Moscow almost nil. November 6 editions two major Japanese dailies carried squibs of Yamamoto's speech at factory in Moscow suburbs. According Radio Moscow November 5, Yamamoto said Japanese ruling classes forcing revival of militarism, attempting to introduce nuclear weapons into Japan and to send Japanese troops abroad. Yamamoto also reportedly said JSP demanding abrogation of US-Japan Security Treaty, protesting illegal occupation by U.S. of Japanese territories of Okinawa/Bonins and opposing use of U.S. -Japanese bases by atomic submarines of U.S. Seventh Fleet. In addition according Kyodo report, Yamamoto said despite fact post war world has reached new historical era, imperialism increasingly pursues violent policy of aggression and war. "Greatest enemy facing the forces of socialism and democracy is American imperialism and the most important problem which we face is opposing Vietnam war." After upholding Hanoi

CONFIDENTIAL

0 7 8 3  
DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NND 969000  
By W6D NARA Date 7/25/02

CONFIDENTIAL

Page 7  
A-660 from Tokyo

and Vietcong principles for solution of Vietnam war and citing responsibility of "democratic forces" in Japan to oppose war, Yamamoto said "I deeply regret sharp divisions in the international Communist camp. I hope CPSU will overcome this disunity, will strengthen united action against war by forces of socialism, peace and democracy, will triumph in Vietnam war and will succeed in complete banning abolition of nuclear weapons." (UNCLASSIFIED)

d. Comment: Publication of Suslov's remarks on return of Japanese claimed Northern Territories threw cold water on GOJ desire to pursue "Kosygin proposal" with Soviets in Moscow negotiations later this month; Soviet hard line on reversion of Northern Territories contrasted with more reasonable posture of U.S. in Sato-Johnson talks, but most of press has not chosen to play this up. Soviet image in Japan also not helped by irony of hard position on Northern Territories while supporting JSP demands for immediate and unconditional reversion of Okinawa, and of Suslov's remarks that Soviets would "seriously consider return of Northern Territories if JSP government took power. Soviet news source coverage of Yamamoto speeches, as published in Tokyo, did not include remarks about US "imperialism as greatest enemy" or his emphasis on Vietnam war as most urgent issue of the day. Yamamoto speech likely to be carried only in JSP official publications for purpose of showing his "militant socialism" to party rank and file. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

MILITARY

6. Self Defense Force Personnel Shuffle

a. Japanese Cabinet November 10 approved several significant personnel changes in Self Defense Forces. All changes effective on November 15, 1967. Most significant changes are:

Gen. Yoshifusa Amano (GSDF) from Chairman, Joint Staff Council to retirement.

Gen. Hirokuni Muta (ASDF) from Chief of Staff, ASDF to Chairman, Joint Staff Council

Lt. Gen. Tsutomu Omuro (ASDF) from Vice Chief of Staff, ASDF to Chief of Staff, ASDF and promotion to General.

Lt. Gen. Kagetoshi Ogata (ASDF) from Director, Joint Staff Office to Commander, Air Technical Training Command.

Rear Adm. Seizaburo Hoshino (MSDF) from Commander, Training Squadron to Director, Joint Staff Office with promotion to Vice Admiral.

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NND 969000  
By WBD NARA Date 7/25/02





CONFIDENTIAL

Page 8  
A-660 from Tokyo

In addition, there were several changes in command within Air Self Defense Force. Three of four commanders of ASDF major air commands and two of three air defense sector commanders changed. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: Gen. Muta is fourth Chairman since establishment of JSDF in 1954 and first ASDF General to assume post. There are indications that Gen. Muta will be extended on active duty beyond his mandatory retirement date of August 1968 to complete full two-year term. One reason for Muta appointment may be fact that during his tenure Japan will decide on follow-on aircraft to F-104. Changes give no apparent indication of any reorientation of JSDF policies. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

  
OSBORN

  
POL: TBleha  
TWAinsworth  
REArmstrong  
RFPfeiffer  
SDawkins 

ARMA:LtCol. Roach

CONFIDENTIAL

0 7 8 5  
DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NND 969000  
By WBD NARA Date 7/25/02

ACTION			DEPARTMENT OF STATE		POL 2-1 JAPAN FOR RM USE ONLY													
INR-10			AIRGRAM															
RM/R	REP	AF	A-681 NO.		LIMITED OFFICIAL USE													
1.					PRIORITY HANDLING INDICATOR													
ARA	EUR	FE																
	5	4																
NEA	CU	INR																
	5																	
E	P	IO																
4	2																	
L		AID																
3		12																
	SIP	SIL																
AGR	COM	FRB																
2	3																	
INT	LAB	TAR																
	2																	
TR	XMB	AIR																
4		10																
ARMY	CIA	NAVY																
10	20	7																
OSD	USIA	NSA																
49	11	3																
		NSC																
		6																
<p>1967 NOV 27 PM 12 29</p> <p style="writing-mode: vertical-rl; transform: rotate(180deg);">RECEIVED DEPARTMENT OF STATE COMMUNICATIONS SECTION</p>			<p>TO : Department of State</p> <p>INFO: BANGKOK CINC PACFLT DA/ODCSOPS FUKUOKA CINC PAC COMNAVMARIANAS DA/DUSA HICOMRY CINCPACAF COMSEVENFLT DOD/ISA HICOM/POLAD CINCUSARPAC COMUS/J (Halperin) USCAR (con'd)</p> <p>FROM : Amembassy TOKYO</p> <p>SUBJECT : JOINT WEEKA NO. 47</p> <p>DATE: November 24, 1967</p> <p>REF :</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><u>CONTENTS</u></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Okinawa Question</li> <li>2. Maneuvers for Cabinet and LDP Reshuffle</li> <li>3. Komeito Labor Organization Suggested</li> <li>4. Sohyo Dispatches First Mission to US</li> <li>5. Japanese Reaction to Sterling Devaluation</li> </ol> <p><u>POLITICAL</u></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. <u>Okinawa Question</u> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. PriMin at nationally televised press conference November 21 gave first account to public of visit to Washington and defended joint communique as step forward on Okinawa reversion issue which promises setting of date for reversion within two or three years--step which Sato said had involved no secret concessions or "under the table" compensation from GOJ. Sato went on to urge greater interest by Japanese public in national defense problem and greater acceptance</li> </ol> </li> </ol> <table border="0" style="width: 100%;"> <tr> <td>USARYIS (7th Psyop Gp)</td> <td>NAHA</td> <td>SEOUL</td> </tr> <tr> <td>HONG KONG</td> <td>MOSCOW</td> <td>SAIGON</td> </tr> <tr> <td>KOBE-OSAKA</td> <td>NAGOYA</td> <td>SAPPORO</td> </tr> <tr> <td></td> <td></td> <td>TAIPEI</td> </tr> </table> <p style="text-align: center;">Group 3</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Downgraded at 12-year intervals; not automatically declassified</p> <p style="text-align: center;">LIMITED OFFICIAL USE</p> <p style="text-align: right;">FORM 4-62 DS-323</p> <p style="text-align: right;">FOR DEPT. USE ONLY <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> In <input type="checkbox"/> Out</p>				USARYIS (7th Psyop Gp)	NAHA	SEOUL	HONG KONG	MOSCOW	SAIGON	KOBE-OSAKA	NAGOYA	SAPPORO			TAIPEI
USARYIS (7th Psyop Gp)	NAHA	SEOUL																
HONG KONG	MOSCOW	SAIGON																
KOBE-OSAKA	NAGOYA	SAPPORO																
		TAIPEI																
Drafted by: POL: (see last page)			Contents and Classification Approved by: POL: TWAINSWORTH															
Clearances:																		

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NND 969000  
By WBD NARA Date 7/25/02

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

Page 2, A-681  
from Tokyo

by Japan of responsibility for military self defense, which he said might lead to early reversion of Okinawa. In this connection he said it more important for Japanese to accept defense responsibilities now than immediately to decide stand on nuclear role or free use of Okinawa bases after reversion. Sato reaffirmed standing GOJ policy of not introducing nuclear weapons into Japan; however, he went on to point out Soviet and Chicom possession of nuclear weapons and to attack JSP for its position that mere adherence to Japan's "Peace Constitution" and denial of existence external threat would suffice to protect Japan. He said other countries not bound by "Peace Constitution" and for better or worse, Japan's security assured under US nuclear umbrella (Tokyo's 3487).

b. Opposition parties in Japan attacked Sato's claims about prospects for agreeing on reversion target as not consistent with language of joint communique and expressed fears that Sato had committed Japan to heavier military burdens and to support of US position on Vietnam and China. Media, while critical of Sato, appeared willing to let PriMin interpret communique, at least until full debate in extraordinary Diet session scheduled to begin December 4. Sato was even more optimistic in talks November 21 with Chief Executive Matsuoka and Okinawa Affairs Advisory Council Chairman Nobumoto OHAMA, saying date for reversion might be announced within two years. (UNCLASSIFIED)

c. DSP announced SecGen Kasuga would head four man mission to Okinawa for 3-day visit beginning November 29 to confer with OSMP, and Reversion Council leaders. This will be Kasuga's first visit to Okinawa. DSP sources say purpose of mission is to keep party in public eye and to prepare for coming Diet debates. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

d. Various ministries of GOJ had busy week telling press what they have in mind for Bonins after reversion and for Okinawa under concept of promotion of "oneness" outlined in Washington communique. In latter category, Ministry of Education disclosed plans to make Okinawan education system identical with that of Japan in every respect and to bring University of Ryukyus into national university system. Autonomy Ministry said it was working on ideas for incorporating Okinawa into Japanese "grant-in-aid" system for prefectures and municipalities and for rearranging Okinawan election districts.

e. Press this week again resumed speculation about development by GOJ of reversion formula for Okinawa. Chief Cabinet Secretary Kimura, in remarks to press November 21, reportedly "hinted" that return of

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

0 7 8 7  
DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NND 969000  
By WBD NARA Date 7/25/02

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

Page 3, A-681  
from Tokyo

Bonins would place US bases there under restrictions of Security Treaty (e.g. prior consultation applicable to nuclear capability and "free use") and that this would provide precedent for reversion formula to be used in case of Okinawa. "FonOff sources" were quoted by November 23 press as reporting Bonins and Okinawa different kettles of fish, US side had argued in Washington that reversion of Okinawa must not lower military value of US bases there and some concessions would therefore have to be made to US at least on "free use" if US agreement to reversion was to be secured. (UNCLASSIFIED)

f. Comment: Reversion issue likely remain near center of political stage and be a focus of Diet debate in forthcoming extraordinary session. Debate will now take place within context of wide-spread assumption that setting of date for reversion and basic understanding with US about subsequent status of bases will take place in 1969, when US will be prepared to negotiate on basis post-election Presidential mandate and clarification of prospects in Vietnam war. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

2. Maneuvers for Cabinet and LDP Reshuffle

a. With return of PriMin Sato from US visit, maneuvers among LDP factions in preparation for reshuffle of top party posts and Cabinet about November 26 went into high gear. At November 21 press conference PriMin side-stepped direct questions on intentions for reshuffle but intimated FonMin Miki and FinMin Mizuta would retain posts. Continuation of Takeo FUKUDA as LDP SecGen also accepted as beyond question, but reports from press and LDP sources indicated virtually all other posts likely to change. Sato secluded himself at Kamakura villa for most of November 22 and 23 to firm up personnel planning and returned to Tokyo to begin negotiations with factions and candidates November 24. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Earlier promises that new leadership structure would be based on broad range of factional leaders' participation reportedly ran afoul of rivalries among potential aspirants to succeed Sato as PriMin. Series of reports during week suggested SecGen Fukuda and his predecessor Kakuei TANAKA were emerging as chief protagonists in this struggle with Fukuda maneuvering to prevent Tanaka and former FonMin Ohira from both obtaining top LDP posts. At same time some of factional subordinates of "anti-mainstream" leader Nakasone strongly criticized his moves implying possible cooperation with Sato, and Nakasone financial backers, according press, urged him not to enter new Cabinet. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NND 969000  
By WBD NARA Date 7/25/02

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

Page 4, A-681  
from Tokyo

c. Comment: Prominent among Machiavellian interpretations put on personnel reshuffle by press and political observers was thesis that prime mover for reshuffle at this time was Fukuda rather than Sato, and that Fukuda hoped thereby to strengthen his prospects for succeeding Sato. According to this line of analysis, Fukuda sees main threat to his prospects as coming not so much from FonMin Miki as from potential alliance of Tanaka, Ohira and Nakasone. Remarks of Nakasone to EmbOff early in November suggest Fukuda may well be correct in this estimate. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

3. Komeito Labor Organization Suggested

a. Soka Gakkai President Daisaku IKEDA, speaking to youth leaders November 19, proposed that Komeito "study establishment of labor organization" to support party "just as Sohyo supports JSP and Domei supports DSP." At follow-up press conference next day, Komeito Chairman Takeiri said study committee will be set up before year end, but that actual establishment of labor organization on nation-wide basis will not take place until after July 1968 Upper House elections. Komeito sources told press Ikeda proposal was response to desires of Soka Gakkai members who subject to strong pressures from labor union leaders to contribute money to and vote for non-Komeito candidates.

b. Some press commentaries assert that real Soka Gakkai/Komeito potential lies in organizing unions among 19 million unorganized workers in small and medium industries and service sector. In two editorial reactions thus far, Asahi November 22 said Komeito establishment of politically oriented labor organization ran contrary to present trend of greater emphasis on economic unionism, and Mainichi November 24, suggesting possibility of chaos in labor movement, urged existing unions and political parties to create "proper relationship" among themselves, with both individual unions and union members free to support political party of their choice. Sohyo and Domei reportedly discounting significance of Komeito labor organization. JSP SecGen Yamamoto stated JSP giving serious thought to countermeasures, while JCP Presidium member Satomi HAKAMADA, saying proposed new labor organization would result in splits throughout labor movement, November 20 called on both Sohyo and Domei to change policy of support for particular political party. (UNCLASSIFIED)

c. Comment: Soka Gakkai estimates that 640 thousand of its members now belong to unions affiliated with Sohyo or Domei; press estimates that "at most" 10% of organized labor are Gakkai members, mostly in

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NND 969000  
By WBD NARA Date 7/25/02

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

Page 5, A-681  
from Tokyo

Sohyo's Coal Miners (Tanro) and Day Laborers Union (Zen Nichiro) and Domei's Textile Workers, (Zensen Domei) with some in Yahata Steel Workers Union. Proposal, having been launched by Ikeda, is certain to be acted on, although form of new organization not yet clear. Venture into labor-organization field appears virtually certain to increase practical rivalries between Komeito/Soka Gakkai on one hand and JSP/Sohyo-DSP/Domei on other, further reducing likelihood of close cooperation among Japanese opposition parties. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

4. Sohyo Dispatches First Mission to US

a. Sohyo, for first time in its history, dispatched official seven-member mission, headed by Planning Director Shogo OHKI, to US on November 20 for three weeks. Stated purposes of mission are (1) to present to US government officials, Congressmen, journalists, labor unions and "peace in Vietnam" groups "views of Japanese people" on Vietnam (immediate halt of "US aggression" and settlement on basis of Geneva accords) and Okinawa (immediate, unconditional and complete reversion) and thus counter "unrepresentative" views of PriMin Sato as well as (2) to observe current US labor scene and promote exchanges with US unions. Mission includes representatives of moderate Steel, Telecommunications and Metal Mine Workers unions, as well as more extreme elements; both delegate from National Railways union and interpreter from Sohyo International Bureau (Wakabayashi) echo uncompromising Marxist outlook of Sohyo SecGen Iwai. Wakabayashi's haphazard planning of group's itinerary reflected in lack of confirmed appointments; only UAW and SANE have responded favorably to requests for appointments mailed only two weeks before group's departure. Group apparently planning to improvise its schedule upon arrival, and moderate members of group may branch out on their own. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

b. Comment: Mission appears to be brain child of Iwai, who reportedly believes that his position within Sohyo will be enhanced regardless of whether mission succeeds or fails. Otherwise, dispatch of group has met with little enthusiasm in Sohyo, with moderates fearing it will jeopardize steadily developing ties between AFL-CIO and Sohyo affiliates on industrial union level, and with "anti-mainstream" extremists charging that it waste of time. Sohyo President Horii, anxious to lessen extent of damage, counselled Ohki at airport departure to eliminate Miami from itinerary (group had planned to appear uninvited at AFL-CIO convention) and to refrain from joint statements with non-labor groups in US attacking US policy on Vietnam. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NND 969000  
By WBD NARA Date 7/25/02

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

Page 6, A-681  
from Tokyo

5. Japanese Reaction to Sterling Devaluation

a. Announcement November 19 of devaluation of pound sterling by United Kingdom received extensive and prominent coverage in all Japanese mass media throughout the week. Most commentary concluded that Japanese economy and exports will weather devaluation without serious consequences in immediate future. Some concern was voiced about impact on Japanese exports to sterling area in fiscal year beginning April 1, 1968, but most serious concern centered on effect of increased discount rates in United Kingdom, US and European countries on which Japan relies for capital. Stock market reacted dramatically on November 20 with largest yen loss since end of war. Dow Jones average November 20 fell ¥67.30 yen on abnormally high volume and registered loss of ¥8.09 yen next day. Recovery on Wednesday consisted of ¥17.16 yen increase, bringing Dow Jones to ¥1282.40. Reversal of market trend reportedly caused by statements of Governor Bank of Japan and FinMin that discount rate not likely to be increased immediately. Japanese banks, however, reportedly expect discount rate to be raised by end of year.

b. In addition to quoting various statements by BOJ Governor Asami and FinMin Mizuta to effect that tight money policy would now have to be maintained and intensified, press quoted LDP SecGen Fukuda, who also ex-FinMin, as saying he convinced GOJ's tight money policy should continue for some time. Fukuda said most serious effect of sterling devaluation is increase of United Kingdom bank rate to 8% and US to 4.5%, because this will cause general rise in interest rates and probably result in flight of short-term foreign capital from Japan. Second most serious effect of devaluation for Japan is increased cost of imports for sterling bloc countries which is tantamount to higher tariff wall for Japanese exports. Fukuda said least adverse effect would be on settlement of international sterling credits and liabilities because Japanese receipts and payments are now almost equally balanced. (UNCLASSIFIED)

c. Comment: Continued extensive commentary on sterling devaluation in mass media reflects popular interest in news which affects Japanese balance of payments. Decline of pound as international currency also underlines importance for Japan of stability of US dollar and importance of part of Sato/Johnson joint communique referring to cooperation between Japan and US for continuation of increase in world trade and of cooperation to solve bilateral trade and economic problems. (UNCLASSIFIED)

GP-3

POL:RF Pfeiffer:jl 11-24-67  
TWAINsworth  
REArmstrong  
CTBleha  
RMImmerman

JOHNSON  
USIS:HBurleson

AIRA:Maj. JLRussell  
FINATT:VAMack

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NND 969000  
By W&D NARA Date 7/25/02

ORIGIN/ACTION

INR-10

RM/R	REP	AF
1		EA
ARA	EUR	6
NEA	CU	INR
E	P	IO
L	FBO	AID
PC	5/12	RS/R
2	1	1
AGR	COM	FRB
2	3	
INT	LAB	TAR
	20	
TR	AMB	AIR
4		10
ARMY	CIA	NAVY
10	20	7
OSD	USIA	NSA
49	11	3
		NSC
		6

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

# AIRGRAM

Po 42-1 JAPAN

FOR RM USE ONLY

A-719

CONFIDENTIAL

PRIORITY

HANDLING INDICATOR

TO: Department of State

INFO: BANGKOK CINCPACFLT  
CINCPAC COMNAVMAIANAS  
CINCPACAF COMSEVENFLT  
CINCUSARPAC COMUS/J

DA/ODCSOPS FUKUOKA  
DA/DUSA HICOMRY  
DOD/ISA HICOM/POLAD  
(Halperin) USCAR(cont'd)

FROM: Amembassy TOKYO

DATE: December 1, 1967

SUBJECT: JOINT WEEKA NO. 48

REF:

## CONTENTS

1. Cabinet and LDP Officials Reshuffled
2. Buildup for Extraordinary Diet Session
3. New Round on Okinawa
4. Foreign Office Spy Case
5. Police Raid Peking-Friendship Organizations
6. Couve de Murville Visit to Japan
7. Chiang Ching-kuo Arrives in Tokyo
8. Reappointment of JDA Director General

## POLITICAL

1. Cabinet and LDP Officials Reshuffled

a. Revised lineup of Sato Cabinet announced November 25. Sato retained incumbents in key posts of Foreign Affairs, Finance, Agriculture and Forestry, Economic Planning, and Defense, as well as Chief Cabinet Secretary and Postal Ministry. At same time he brought in hitherto "anti-mainstream" faction leader Yasuhiro NAKASONE to

USARYIS (7th Psyop Gp)	NAHA	SEOUL
HONG KONG	MOSCOW	SAIGON
KOBE-OSAKA	NAGOYA	SAPPORO
		PARIS

GP-3

CONFIDENTIAL

FOR DEPT. USE ONLY

☒ In ☐ Out

FORM 4-62 DS-323

Drafted by:

POL:(see last page)

Contents and Classification Approved by:

POL:TWAINSWORTH

Clearances:

DEC 5 AM 9 02

CONFIDENTIAL

Action Assigned  
Action Taken

DEC 10 1967

DEC 8, 1967

11/12/67

FBI

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NND 969000

By WED NARA Date 7/25/02

0 7 9 2



CONFIDENTIAL

Page 2, A-719  
from Tokyo

problem-ridden Transportation Ministry, Sato faction stalwart Shigeru HORI to Construction Ministry, prominent LDP elder statesman Hirokichi NADAO to Education, former Foreign Minister Etsusaburo SHINA to International Trade and Industry, and Vice Speaker of House of Representative Sunao SONODA to Health and Welfare as main new appointments. On LDP side, new lineup announced November 24. Secretary General Takeo FUKUDA retains post, as expected. Former Foreign Minister Masayoshi OHIRA took over Policy Board Chairmanship and Sato lieutenant Tomisaburo HASHIMOTO became Chairman of Executive Board.

b. Full list of new Cabinet (Embtel 3563) is enclosed with copies of this Weeka for information addressees. (UNCLASSIFIED)

c. Comment: New Cabinet and LDP lineup appears significant strengthening of Japan's conservative leadership structure, with representation from all LDP factions except two, those of perennial challenger to Sato for party presidency Aiichiro FUJITYAMA and Isamu MURAKAMI; only Fujiyama can be considered intra-party opposition figure of any significance. Nakasone, Sonoda, and Local Autonomy Minister Akazawa, and Ohira on party side, reinforce more liberal LDP elements in leadership posts but Nadao, Hori and Prime Minister's Office Director General Tatsuo TANAKA offset this and, if anything, move balance of weight toward more conservative side of LDP. Early press comment unenthusiastic (as always) but new leadership group appears chosen with an eye to tackling hard problems, among which campaign on national defense consciousness in relation to Okinawa reversion, foreshadowed in Sato's November 21 press conference (Weeka 4, Item 1), likely be prominent. LDP sources indicate failure of Sato's right-hand man Kakuei TANAKA to obtain post was due to fear he might be implicated in potentially embarrassing financial scandal, rather than to factional rivalries. Rumors are circulating to effect FonMin Miki unhappy over Sato refusal to assure him of future support for Prime Ministerial succession. For this reason, as well as declared rivalry of Fujiyama and reserved position of ex-Ikeda faction leader Maeo, it is difficult to predict whether present degree of factional co-operation will last until Sato faces election for third term as LDP president late next year. See also Item 8. (CONFIDENTIAL)

## 2. Buildup for Extraordinary Diet Session

a. Cabinet November 24 formally decided to convene Extraordinary Diet Session from December 4. One of first items of business will be choice of new Lower House Vice Speaker to replace Sunao SONODA, newly named

CONFIDENTIAL

0 7 9 3  
DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NMD 969000  
By WBD NARA Date 7/25/02

CONFIDENTIAL

Page 3, A-719  
from Tokyo

Health and Welfare Minister (see Item 1). LDP will propose Maeo faction member Hisao KODAIRA, while JSP, asserting it as leading opposition party should hold post, has said it will nominate Shoichi MIYAKE. Main purpose of session is to approve supplemental 1967 budget of approximately \$850 million, mainly to make up deficits in "rice account" and cover public service personnel wage raises. Focus of session, however, expected be PriMin's report on SEA/Pacific tours and recently completed US trip and opposition interpellations. LDP SecGen Fukuda November 30 told press ruling party wishes to limit session to two weeks.

b. Osaka prosecutors November 24 arrested presidents of five leading Osaka taxi firms, charging them with bribing LDP Lower House Member Katsutoshi SEKIYA and former LDP Lower House member and Parliamentary Vice Minister for Transportation Shoichi SUHARA. Diet members allegedly received bribes amounting to ¥20 million in August 1965 for their efforts to water down or eliminate GOJ bill to tax liquid petroleum gas (LPG) used extensively by Japanese taxis as fuel.

c. Comment: Advance press reports differ on whether PriMin Sato will directly take up, in administrative policy address, theme of need for more Japanese attention to national security. In any case this subject, and its connection with Okinawa reversion, appear certain to be focal points of impending Diet session. Opposition has made clear its intention of taking offensive in this field if GOJ/LDP does not beat it to punch. Thus interpellations promise to be both stormy and of more than usual importance. JSP differences with LDP over vice speakership and length of Diet session will pose tactical challenge to conservatives but brewing Osaka taxi scandal may offer opposition better target. There is also rumored be similar Tokyo taxi scandal in which JSP politicians have villains' roles. Increasingly stiff competition among parties over coming July Upper House elections will contribute to heat of session. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

### 3. New Round on Okinawa

a. Okinawa-watchers centered their attention this week on session held November 29 between FonMin Miki and Amb. Johnson--the first high-level meeting on Okinawa topic since PriMin's return from Washington. Press, citing Miki as source, said agreement was reached that: (a) reversion of Bonins would follow pattern of Amami Oshima Agreement of 1952; Miki was quoted as saying necessity for any special arrangements concerning U.S. security responsibilities such as those accompanying the Amami Oshima Agreement was "under study;" (b) efforts would be made to arrive at early Bonins

CONFIDENTIAL

0 7 9 4  
DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NND969000  
By WBD NARA Date 7/25/02

CONFIDENTIAL

Page 4, A-719  
from Tokyo

agreement to be submitted to next regular Diet session; (c) U.S. would make every effort to supply detailed information on present status of Bonins for study by GOJ and would facilitate official GOJ visit to Islands in mid-January; (d) new Advisory Committee to High Commissioner would not be empowered to discuss political issues such as public election of Chief Executive and Diet representation for Okinawans (these would be subjects for discussion through normal diplomatic channels) but Committee would be free, within its designated fields of competence pertaining to economic and social questions, to take initiative in deciding its own agenda; and (e) discussions regarding future of Okinawa would begin as early as possible next year after a free exchange of views at working level. Some papers reported an effort would be made to select representatives for the Advisory Committee before end of 1967 and said it was U.S. opinion that reps should be at the diplomatic level of Minister.

b. JSP, DSP and Komeito accepted PriMin's November 28 offer to meet separately with their respective chairmen on December 2 to report on Washington discussions with President Johnson and top American officials. All three parties have strongly criticized Sato/Johnson communique and are expected to continue criticism in Extraordinary Diet session (Item 2).

c. Five-man DSP inspection mission headed by SecGen Kasuga arrived in Naha November 29 for three-day visit. Tokyo press had Kasuga, at press conference following meeting with Hicom, quoting Hicom as saying that tripartite committee proposed in Sato/Johnson communique would be established within two months and would examine social and economic measures necessary to increase "oneness" between Japan and Okinawa. Kasuga said Hicom also "hinted" he considering public election of Chief Executive and "observer seats" in Diet for Okinawa. Japan press also reported that in Naha press conference November 30 Kasuga repeated earlier DSP charges US-Japan summit conference was complete flop, it attempted to replace Okinawa reversion with reversion of Bonins and vague promises, including unlimited extension of US-Japan Security Treaty. Kasuga reportedly added that Prime Minister's expressions of confidence that reversion of Okinawa would occur within three years not justified by text of joint communique or US attitude and that demand of Ryukyu legislature for reversion by 1970 had been ignored. Kasuga reportedly also said committee to promote "oneness" had no "positive meaning" because it was not empowered to discuss problem of reversion.

d. JSP SecGen YAMAMOTO proposed to other opposition parties that next meeting of SecGens to discuss Okinawa problem (Week 43, 3) be held

CONFIDENTIAL

0 7 9 5  
DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NND 969000  
By WBD NARA Date 7/25/02

CONFIDENTIAL

Page 5, A-719  
from Tokyo

December 2. JCP and Komeito reportedly accepted and press speculated DSP would announce its participation after SecGen Kasuga returned from Okinawa December 1. (UNCLASSIFIED)

e. Comment: While Government's press briefing following FonMin's meeting with Ambassador somewhat slanted to demonstrate GOJ progress on Bonins and Okinawa, Miki did set record straight on limitations of new Okinawa Advisory Committee. Sato meetings with opposition party chairmen generally expected amount to little more than gesture; parties have publicized their positions and there appears no reason expect meeting of minds with PriMin. LDP sources continue express confidence that Washington communique and quick start on follow-up have put Sato in good position to fend off whatever attacks opposition can mount in Diet. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

4. Foreign Office Spy Case

press reported had

a. On November 29/Tokyo Metropolitan Police/arrested former GOJ FonOff employee Shingo YAMAMOTO and alleged North Korean agent LI Je-won (also romanized LI Chai Won) on charges of violating Public Employee Law and complicity therein. Yamamoto allegedly passed to Li secret FonOff documents concerning basic Japanese policy toward both friendly and Communist countries. Arrests according press resulted from five-month police investigation at request FonOff, which reportedly learned of leaks of Japanese diplomatic secrets in North Korea and other Communist countries.

b. Yamamoto identified as FonOff employee (not diplomatic employee) who entered FonOff in 1952 in Archives Section of FonMin's office, moved to International Research Division in 1964 and to East European Section in 1967. He reportedly resigned on November 10. Li identified in press as deputy political director of Federation of Commercial and Industrial Associations of Korean Residents in Japan, an affiliate of North Korea-ling General Federation of Korean Residents in Japan (Chosen Soren); police told press Li entered Japan illegally from North Korea in 1949. (UNCLASSIFIED)

c. Comment: According FonOff source, FonOff considers case "rather serious." (CONFIDENTIAL)

5. Police Raid Peking-Friendship Organizations

a. Press gave prominent coverage to November 29 police raids on offices of pro-Peking Orthodox Japan-China Friendship Association and Japan International Trade Promotion Association (JITPA) and home of officer of

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NND 969000  
By W6D NARA Date 7/25/02

CONFIDENTIAL

Page 6, A-719  
from Tokyo

former organization. Raids were announced as part of police investigation into violent student demonstrations near Haneda airport October 8 and November 12 when PriMin left on second SEA/Pacific tour and US trip respectively. Police have not yet completed their examination of "3,785 items of evidence" seized during raids. Following day JSP SecGen Yamamoto issued statement calling police raids "political in character" and "Sato escalation of anti-China actions" which would work against Japanese trade interests. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: There little doubt that police conducting extremely thorough investigation into Haneda incidents; however probable motive for raid on JTTPA in particular is to determine full spectrum of Japanese recipients of Chicom money said to enter Japan through "friendly firm" trade channel. JSP protest of police actions should serve to keep intra-party pot boiling on "China issue." (CONFIDENTIAL)

6. Couve de Murville Visit to Japan

a. On November 29 French FonMin Couve de Murville and party of five arrived in Japan for fifth regular Franco-Japanese ministerial meeting. According press PriMin Sato, during 30-minute interchange with Couve November 30, sought French assistance in securing return of Northern Territories from Soviet Union; Couve reportedly promised his country's best efforts. PriMin and Couve also exchanged views on China and Vietnam with each advancing their well-known positions. Couve scheduled to confer with FonMin Miki twice prior to former's departure December 2. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: GOJ handling meeting as routine exchange of opinions and neither side appears to expect any significant developments. FonOff sources expressed some surprise over French reluctance to settle on agenda until last minute, but offered explanation French probably involved in problems of "more immediate concern." Vernacular press has given visit minimal coverage and, outside the formal ministerial discussions, Couve has not scheduled any speeches or press conferences which might provide him a forum for further exposition of French policy. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

7. Chiang Ching-kuo Arrives in Tokyo

a. GRC Minister of National Defense Chiang Ching-kuo arrived on his first formal visit to Japan November 27. After being met at airport by FonMin Miki and Chief Cabinet Secretary Kimura and reviewing Self Defense Force honor guard, Chiang Ching-kuo proceeded to scheduled interview with

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NND 969000  
By WBD NARA Date 7/25/02

CONFIDENTIAL

Page 7, A-719  
from Tokyo

PriMin Sato. Pro-GRC demonstrators appeared to outnumber opponents of visit at airport. Taiwan independence movement activists kept their show separate from Peking-oriented groups. Visit proceeding according to schedule with low-keyed press coverage afforded audience with Emporor and factory visits. (Embtels 3228, 3591, 3625) (UNCLASSIFIED)


b. Comment: FonOff officials and GRC Emboffs November 30 both commented that visit had gone well thus far. Chiang Ching-kuo departs December 2 for Taipei. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)


MILITARY


8. Reappointment of JDA Director General

a. In November 25 reshuffle of Cabinet members, Kaneshichi MASUDA was reappointed Director General of Defense Agency. On November 28, announcement was made of appointment of Asao MIHARA as Defense Agency Parliamentary Vice-Minister replacing Sachio URANO. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: Masuda has made an excellent record in one year in this position and his policies have won him support of uniformed members of JDA. Reappointment is in line with recent statements by PriMin emphasizing need for raising Japan's defense posture. In one year as JDA DirGen, Masuda has generally raised public image of Self Defense Forces and seems most appropriate choice to carry out what is apparently government move to raise public understanding of need for increased defense capabilities. Masuda's prestige, force and party seniority combined with his frankness and display of personal interest in improvement of SDF help bolster government effort to increase consciousness of defense requirements now in connection with return of Bonins and the Okinawa problem as step toward increases in defense capability in future. No special significance is seen in appointment of new Parliamentary Vice-Minister for Defense inasmuch as this position has not been one of great influence on policy or actions. (CONFIDENTIAL)

  
POL:TBleha/mv 12/1/67  
TWAinsworth  
HLevin  
REArmstrong  
TSawyer  
RFPfeiffer  
RMRuenitz

  
ARMA:Lt. Col. Marsh

  
JOHNSON

CONFIDENTIAL

0 7 9 8  
DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NND 969000  
By WBD NARA Date 7/25/02

ORIGIN/ACTION

1	REP	AF
1	ARA	EUR
2	NEA	CU
2	E	P
2	L	FBO
2	AGR	COM
2	INT	LAB
4	TR	XMB
10	ARMY	CIA
10	OSD	USIA
49		NSC

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

# AIRGRAM

1042-1 JAPAN

FOR RM USE ONLY

A-784

CONFIDENTIAL

PRIORITY

HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : Department of State

INFO: BANGKOK CINCPACFLT DA/ODCSOPS FUKUOKA  
CINCPAC COMNAVMARIANAS DA/DUSA HICOMRY  
CINCPACAF COMSEVENFLT DOD/ISA HICOM/POLAD  
CINCUSARPAC COMUS/J (Halperin) USCAR (con'd)

FROM : Amembassy TOKYO

DATE: December 15, 1967

SUBJECT: JOINT WEEKA NO. 50

REF :

## CONTENTS

1. Diet Hearings Focus on Defense and Okinawa
2. GOJ and City Hall Argue Over Bonins Jurisdiction
3. Taxi Scandal Plot Thickens

## POLITICAL:

1. Diet Hearings Focus on Defense and Okinawa

a. Interpellations in budget committees of both Houses of Diet December 11 through 13 saw leading opposition party spokesmen make determined effort to draw PriMin Sato into compromising statements on national defense and Okinawa reversion in aftermath of November visit to Washington. For JSP, former SecGen Narita December 11 tried to pin PriMin down on question whether nuclear bases would be permitted in Okinawa following its reversion to Japan.

USARYTS (7th Psyop Gp)	NAHA	SEOUL
HONG KONG	MOSCOW	SAIGON
OSAKA	NAGOYA	SAPPORO

Group 3

Downgraded at 12-year intervals; not automatically declassified.

CONFIDENTIAL

FOR DEPT. USE ONLY

☒ In ☐ Out

FORM 4-62 DS-323

Drafted by:

POL: (see last page)

Contents and Classification Approved by:

POL:TWainsworth

Clearances:

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NND 969000  
By WBD NARA Date 7/25/02

CONFIDENTIAL

Page 2, A-784  
from Tokyo

Sato refused either to affirm or deny that he considering agreeing to such bases, or to admit that he was deviating from "three nuclear principles" of no Japanese production, no Japanese possession, and no introduction into Japan of nuclear weapons. Saying a change in circumstances in next few years might alter pertinent considerations, Sato stuck firmly to position that question whether nuclear weapons should be permitted at Okinawa bases after reversion should be thought of "with clean slate" at time of reversion. Other JSP questioners failed in efforts to make Sato admit that his statement that Japanese people should show new resolution on national defense meant that they should accept Okinawa reversion with nuclear option and free use of US bases there. Sato admitted "impression" that such terms might speed reversion but said his call for greater resolution on national defense meant strengthening self-defense capabilities within limits of "Peace Constitution" and country's economic capacities, plus supporting continuation of US-Japan security relationship.

b. DSP SecGen Kasuga in December 12 hearing attempted to lead Sato from general recognition of importance US bases in Okinawa for security of Japan and other non-communist countries of Far East (as expressed in joint communique at Washington) to specific acknowledgement that importance of nuclear bases in Okinawa had been recognized. Sato threw Kasuga off track--and out of temper--by staunchly denying that he knew whether there were nuclear bases in Okinawa. At end of long and involved debate, Sato returned to same point he had left Narita with, i.e. time to make decision on status of Okinawa bases would be when reversion became possible. In December 13 hearings, Sato mollified DSP somewhat by conceding to questioner Aso that although he did not know whether Okinawa had nuclear bases, he was willing to admit for purpose of debate that there appeared to be reason to believe that it might. This was only satisfaction Aso received, however, as PriMin patiently and skillfully avoided being cornered on intentions concerning US bases in Okinawa.  
(UNCLASSIFIED)

c. Comment: At same time as Sato left opposition thoroughly frustrated at his refusal to clarify intentions, he threw into clear relief the idea that Japanese decisions on post-reversion bases in Okinawa should be made on basis of national interest, not of ideological preconceptions, and by implication left press and public faced with thought that alternative on reversion might be earlier reversion with US bases accorded freedom of use and nuclear option, or postponement of reversion if Japan sought

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NND 969000

By WBD NARA Date 7/25/02



CONFIDENTIAL

Page 3, A-784  
from Tokyo

to apply to Okinawa bases same restrictions as now affect US bases in rest of Japan. Press comment has been limited; most of what there has been appeared rather sobered by these concepts but thus far there has been no repetition of earlier outcry against hypothetical possibility of "nuclearized" reversion. (CONFIDENTIAL)

2. GOJ and City Hall Argue Over Bonins Jurisdiction

a. Following establishment of Bonins Reversion Headquarters in PriMin's Office (Week 49, 4), Tokyo Metropolitan Administration and Governor Minobe's JSP allies in Diet launched effort to bring Bonin Islands back under Tokyo Metropolis (as they were before WW II occupation) upon reversion. JSP Diet member Narita in December 11 interpellation of PriMin Sato (Item 1) charged direct central government administration of Bonins would "involve problems" under Constitution and Local Entities Administration Law, and that Sato attempting take this line in order to facilitate strengthening of Japanese military presence in islands. Sato replied that purpose in establishing special Reversion Headquarters and in applying direct central government administration, if latter eventually decided on, would be to promote economic redevelopment of islands and he anticipated maintaining close liaison with Metropolitan Administration on subject. Decision on direct administration, Chief Cabinet Secretary Kimura told press same day, not likely be made until after Japanese survey mission to Bonins in early 1968.

b. Following day Metropolitan Assembly by unanimous vote passed resolution calling for return of islands, without military bases, to Tokyo Metropolis control, and set up special committee to deal with question. Chief Cabinet Secretary Kimura December 13 told press he anticipated Sato and Governor Minobe would meet, perhaps before end of 1967, to discuss subject. Defense Agency Director General Masuda December 14 told House of Representatives budget committee that JDA planned station small number Self-Defense Force personnel on Bonins after reversion.

c. Country Team facilitated visit to Bonins last week by group of about 40 Japanese newsmen. Coverage began appearing in December 14 press, in form of extensive photo spreads and dispatches newsmen filed from Guam before returning to Japan. TV networks carried many film clips of island scenes and interviews with islanders in regular news

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority *NND 969000*  
By *WBD* NARA Date *7/25/02*

CONFIDENTIAL

Page 4, A-784  
from Tokyo

programs during day and evening December 14; at least two networks telecast special half-hour reports on subject during evening December 14. Most of coverage emphasized fact that economic development has been held back by small population, and reported mixed feelings of islanders about reversion. Older islanders generally were found favoring return of Japanese administration and hoping for economic benefits, but anxious about specific problems like land allocation when former Japanese residents return and about schooling of their children, who have been taught in English since return to islands after war. Several reports quoted children as identifying themselves as Americans. (UNCLASSIFIED)

d. Comment: GOJ appears have valid practical reasons for preferring direct administration of Bonins after reversion, at least as interim measure, since 80% of land in islands reportedly government owned (in Japanese legal view) and GOJ appears aware of potentially complex problems in coping with status of present residents and claims of former residents. Some Japanese constitutional scholars expressed view plebiscite of residents of affected area required to place Bonins under direct central government administration, but unable agree whether "area" for this purpose would be Tokyo or only islands.

e. GOJ and LDP also appear to suspect that turning islands over to "progressive" administration of Governor Minobe and opposition-controlled Tokyo Assembly would offer opportunity for leftist parties to launch embarrassing anti-defense campaign in connection with Bonins reversion and Okinawa issue. LDP joining in unanimous Tokyo Assembly vote on "no bases" resolution reportedly resulted from "connection with other bills", not further identified. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

### 3. Taxi Scandal Plot Thickens

a. With helping hand from Komeito, number of individuals and groups implicated in Osaka taxi scandal (Week 49, 2) increased considerably during week. Osaka procurators December 8 called in LDP Lower House member Katsutoshi SEKIYA, who had resigned December 6 as Lower House Cabinet Committee Chairman, for another eight hours of questioning. Press reported December 12 "several Dietmen" questioned at unknown location in Tokyo in connection with scandal. In "bomb-shell testimony" December 13 Komeito Representative Yoshiyuki ASAI read from "secret documents" of Tokyo and Osaka Taxi Associations. He

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NND969000  
By W6D NARA Date 7/25/02

CONFIDENTIAL


Page 5, A-784  
from Tokyo

charged that LDP received over ¥100 million from Kansai taxi associations and number of LDP members' support organizations also received taxi firm contributions, and specifically named LDP Representatives Tadanori NAGAYAMA (former HomeMin) and Sadanori YAMANAKA (former Finance Committee Chairman) as recipients. JSP and DSP, Asai alleged, also accepted money. In December 14 follow-up Komeito Councillor Akira KUROYANAGI claimed more than one-third of money which taxi firms contributed to political parties had "evaporated" and demanded procurators look into matter. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: PriMin Sato and JusMin Akama, who former Osaka Governor and still powerful figure in Osaka politics, continued tactic of claiming any comment on matter during procurators' investigation "inappropriate". At same time Komeito revelations strengthened suspicions that deafening silence on issue from other opposition parties was due to latters' own involvement. Despite modesty of press coverage and colleagues' discomfort, however, Komeito likely press on with scandal revelations which prime element in party's Upper House election strategy. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

GP-3

  
JOHNSON

  
POL: RFPfeiffer:jl 12/15/67  
TWAinsworth  
TBleha

USIS:HLBurleson

NAVA:Lt. Col. Smola

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NND 969000  
By WBD NARA Date 7/25/02

ORIGIN/ACTION			DEPARTMENT OF STATE		POL-2-1 JAPAN			
AIRGRAM					FOR RM USE ONLY			
<div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-between;"> <div>           1 NR-10            1 ARA            2 NEA            3 E            4 L            5 PC            6 AGR            7 INT            8 TR            9 ARMY            10 OSD            11 49            12 6         </div> <div>           1 REP            2 EUR            3 CU            4 P            5 5/16            6 1            7 COM            8 XMB            9 CIA            10 20            11 11            12 NSC         </div> <div>           1 AF            2 INR            3 IO            4 AID            5 RS/R            6 FRB            7 AIR            8 NAVY            9 NSA            10 3            11 6         </div> </div>			1 9 2 A-814 3 NO. 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12		1 LIMITED OFFICIAL USE 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12		1 PRIORITY 2 HANDLING INDICATOR 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	
<div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-between;"> <div>           TO : Department of State            INFO: BANGKOK CINCPACFLT DA/ODCSOPS FUKUOKA            CINCPAC COMNAV MARIANAS DA/DUSA HICOMRY            CINCPACAF COMSEVENFLT DOD/ISA HICOM/POLAD            CINCUSARPAC COMUS/J Halperin USCAR(cont'd)         </div> <div>           RECEIVED            ACTION 15-11            REA 10-2            DATE: December 22, 1967            CONTENTS            1. Diet Hears More on Defense and Okinawa Reversion            2. Asia Policy Re-affirmed in Diet Hearings            3. Bonins Reversion and Sato-Minobe Summit Meetings            4. Taxi Scandal Closes on LDP Lawmaker            5. Diet Passes Supplementary Budget         </div> <div>           DEPT. OF STATE            RECEIVED            DEC 28 1967            96 7-10-1            1 NR/REA/NA            2 2            3 3         </div> </div>								
FROM : Amembassy TOKYO SUBJECT : JOINT WEEK NO. 51 REF :								
<u>POLITICAL</u> 1. <u>Diet Hears More on Defense and Okinawa Reversion</u> a. With passage of supplementary budget in House of Representatives December 15 Diet spotlight shifted to House of Councillors Budget Committee where interpellations again focused on defense policy, Okinawa reversion and related Asia policy questions. b. On December 16 Sato, according press, told Socialist questioner that US "nuclear umbrella" would ensure security of Japan in accordance with US-Japan Security Treaty, and on basis of his talks during his visit to Washington in 1965 and in November 1967 he was confident US								
USARYIS (7th Psyop Gp) NAHA SEOUL HONG KONG MOSCOW SAIGON TAIPEI KOBE-OSAKA NAGOYA SAPPORO								
Group 3 Downgraded at 12-year intervals; not automatically declassified LIMITED OFFICIAL USE								
FORM 4-62 DS-323			FOR DEPT. USE ONLY <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> In <input type="checkbox"/> Out					
Drafted by: POL: (see last page)			Contents and Classification Approved by: POL: TWAINSWORTH					
Clearances:								

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

would "protect this country against any form of attack" no matter what weapons the attack might involve. Sato also called US military bases in Ryukyus deterrent against possible nuclear attack from Communist China but declined (as he had in earlier Lower House hearings) to comment concerning status of bases after reversion of Okinawa to Japan.

c. In December 19 hearing Sato again refused commit himself in response to repeated opposition probes on post-reversion status of Okinawa bases. He reaffirmed GOJ "three nuclear principles" (no Japanese manufacture, no Japan possession and no introduction into Japan of nuclear weapons) but added that for sake of expediting Okinawa reversion, it desirable that GOJ not be bound by any pre-determined formula regarding reversion. Status of bases, including (in reply to Communist hypothetical question) Okinawa role in Vietnam war effort after reversion, would be subject for US-Japan agreement on basis of consideration of international situation, technical progress, and public opinion trends, Sato stated. Komeito questioner asked whether GOJ would bring Okinawa issue before UN if reversion issue encountered difficulties; Sato replied problem could best be solved on basis of "friendly relations" between Japan and US. Foreign Minister Miki on same occasion stated that US-Japan Security Treaty would apply to Okinawa after reversion but did not elaborate.

d. Defense Agency Director General Masuda was quoted as telling Upper House Committee December 19 that US Okinawa bases reportedly had 36 Mace B missiles, and next day told Socialist questioner that Japan could not possess such weapons. Nike Hercules, Masuda said, were permissible under Japan Constitution, even with nuclear warheads, because their effective range meant that they did not "directly threaten" other countries. (UNCLASSIFIED)

e. COMMENT: Upper House replies on Okinawa and defense policy amounted to clarification of some details of GOJ views but Sato and colleagues continued successfully to evade opposition attempts to corner them on major point of policy concerning US bases after reversion. Opposition, increasingly frustrated on this potential major issue, turned larger share of attention to effort to trip up government leaders on related subjects (next item). (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

2. Asia Policy Re-affirmed in Diet Hearings

a. Upper House Budget Committee opposition spokesmen attempted lure Prime Minister Sato and Foreign Minister Miki into publicly embarrassing positions on broader issues of Asian policy, centering on China and Vietnam

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

Page 3, A-814  
from Tokyo

issues. According press coverage, member of Sato's own Liberal Democratic Party December 18 elicited Sato agreement that Asian stability required rectification of "Japan's lopsided relations" with Communist China but Sato disagreed with suggestion by same questioner that "post-war period in Asia would not end" unless Japan established diplomatic relations with Peking. Sato said peaceful co-existence with Communist China was possible if both countries respected each other's independence and refrained from interfering in each other's domestic affairs, but in view of Peking and Taipei insistence on "no two Chinas" Japan would continue policy of maintaining amicable relations with Peking "putting legal points aside." Foreign Minister Miki same day told committee that GOJ would not change policy of support for "important question" position on Chinese representation in UN but Japan's policy toward Communist China differed from that of US because Japan would maintain "positive contact with Peking" through travel and trade. Miki said Communist China posed threat not only from its own development of nuclear weapons but also from its "negative" attitude toward international efforts to prevent proliferation.

b. At same session Miki called "mutual distrust between North Vietnam and South Vietnam" chiefly responsible for continuation of war, and added that such distrust caused Hanoi and Saigon to continue fighting although neither had prospect of conquering other and they had no long-term choice but peaceful existence. Japan, Miki added, "understands" US objective of keeping South Vietnam free and independent, although this did not necessarily mean support for all individual military tactics, and believed US would withdraw armed forces from Vietnam within six months of termination of hostilities. Concerning Soviet-held northern territories, Miki said Japan would continue patiently to seek for return but question could not be settled "in one stroke." JDA Director General Masuda told same JSP questioner that Japan's protection from external aggression resulted not from US-USSR nuclear balance "but from overwhelming nuclear retaliatory power of US," and raised JSP hackles by quoting Khrushchev to effect that Mao Tse-tung was dangerous militant with expansionist inclinations.

c. To further JSP questions on China policy December 20, Miki reportedly avoided description "expansionist" with which Socialist tried to tempt him and instead called Communist China "unconciliatory." He added that peace and security in Asia were impossible unless Peking became "conciliatory" toward other countries of area. Miki expressed opposition to "containment policy," however, saying free nations should have contact with Communist China in fields of trade and travel.

d. COMMENT: Sato and Miki, clearly putting Okinawa defense issue at top of priorities, took care to avoid statements on China and Vietnam which

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NND 969000  
By WBD NARA Date 7/25/02

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

Page 4, A-814  
from Tokyo

opposition and press could attack as evidence GOJ was merely following US policy in Far East. However, GOJ replies gave little ground for comfort to Japanese advocates of non-commitment as between US and Communist China and were certainly not calculated to appeal to Peking. LDP questioner on China policy is member of Sato's own faction. Questions therefore do not appear to reflect intra-party dissatisfaction with GOJ China policy. Reference to "rectification of lopsided relations" was not clarified during hearing, but areas in which relations are most obviously "lopsided" are military strength, efforts to influence opposite party's internal affairs, and violent denunciation of other side, in all of which Peking has commanding lead. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

3. Bonins Reversion and Sato-Minobe "Summit Meeting"

a. Bonins Reversion Headquarters in Office of Prime Minister (Week 49, 4) decided December 18 to dispatch survey team to Bonins in mid-January to dig out facts necessary for economic development plans, subsequent surveys and for preparation of poll of former residents now in Japan. Press reported meeting did not discuss "political" question of which Japanese authority would administer Bonins after reversion.

b. In Diet interpellations, and in special statement issued December 19, Japan Socialist Party took position that direct administration by central government of Bonins after reversion would violate local autonomy provisions of Constitution and demanded that GOJ allow Tokyo Metropolitan Government to resume administration of Bonins. Chief Cabinet Secretary Kimura had told press last week that GOJ expected Bonins to be administered by Tokyo Metropolis eventually, but that direct administration by central government desirable "for time being" in order prepare Bonins for autonomy. At House of Councillors Budget Committee meeting December 20, FonMin Miki stated that in absence of special legislation authorizing direct administration of Bonins by GOJ the islands would come under Tokyo Metropolitan government after reversion. Director of Cabinet Legislation Bureau Masami TAKATSUJI said such legislation would not violate Constitution. Defense Agency Director Masuda told same committee GOJ was considering plan to install Nike-Hercules and Hawk missile range in Bonins, but hoped to "share" US naval and air facilities on Chichi and Iwo Jima, not to take them over.

c. Press reported that in 30-minute meeting December 20 Prime Minister and Governor Minobe agreed (1) that there was need for cooperation between central government and Tokyo in efforts for development of Bonins and (2) that question of administrative jurisdiction after reversion could be discussed later. Press quoted Chief Cabinet Secretary Kimura as saying after meeting

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NND 969000  
By WBD NARA Date 7/25/02

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

Page 5, A-814  
from Tokyo

that Tokyo and central government not at odds on question of post-reversion administration of Bonins, and that GOJ position on problem would be reached after careful consideration of findings of government mission (para a). Kimura also said Sato and Minobe agreed on need to improve educational and public facilities and to protect property of present residents. Minobe told press that he agreed with PriMin that cooperation necessary for development of Bonins, especially in 5-year period after reversion, when islands would not be self-sufficient. Minobe reportedly said population of six thousand necessary in order for Bonins to have viable economy and there was question whether this many people would wish to return to Bonins. (UNCLASSIFIED)

d. COMMENT: Minobe's reported statements in meeting with PriMin showed him to be far more cautious and practical politician than JSP national-level leaders who are attempting to use Bonins issue to score Sato government as "undemocratic" and/or trying to "reintroduce militarism into Japan." GOJ emphasis on Bonin development problem and on findings of survey team intended to give impression of reasonableness and to prepare general public for debate on special legislation necessary to give GOJ administrative control of Bonins after reversion. Because of feeling that Bonins reversion may set example for Okinawa, opposition parties can be expected to try to keep issue alive and in public eye. Sato however told Upper House Budget Committee December 21 that direct central government control of Okinawa after reversion "inconceivable." (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

#### 4. Taxi Scandal Closes in on LDP Lawmaker

a. Press reports during week continued to focus on LDP Lower House member Katsutoshi SEKIYA's alleged role in Osaka taxi scandal (see Weeka 50, 3). Sekiya's house and office were searched for evidence December 16. Osaka District Court December 20 requested Lower House permission to arrest Sekiya as "suspect." Cabinet approved request same day, but full Lower House delayed granting permission until December 22. Reacting swiftly, Sekiya entered hospital December 20, suffering from what his doctor described as high blood pressure and "serious mental depression." Procurators, however, promised to send own doctors to examine Sekiya. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. COMMENT: Lower House permission to arrest Diet member Sekiya valid only one day, until end of Extraordinary Session on December 23. If arrest not made before Regular Diet Session convenes December 27, Lower

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NND 969000  
By WBD NARA Date 7/25/02



LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

Page 6, A-814  
from Tokyo


House permission must again be obtained. Session will recess immediately for New Year's holidays. Thus effective permission to arrest Sekiya might not be granted before mid-January. Interval likely see continued press clamor with LDP (and JSP) leadership voicing cautious cooperation with investigation while busily trying cover tracks of any other followers who appear likely be involved in case. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

5. Diet Passes Supplementary Budget

a. Almost unnoticed in concentration of debate and press attention on defense and foreign policy issue, House of Representatives December 15 passed supplementary budget totaling about ¥252,000 million, and House of Councillors followed suit December 21. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. COMMENT: Also virtually unnoticed in Japanese comment has been fact this is first time since December 1964 that Diet session has reached end of its substantive business without determined opposition effort (or reasonable facsimile) at obstruction or procedural delay of sessions in hope of embarrassing Government. Absence of such tactics this time is the more surprising in view of highly controversial nature of defense questions in past, which to all appearances continue in full force as partisan political issue. Opposition leopards may have changed their tactical spots, but for present we are more inclined to attribute unusual tranquility to Sato adroitness in debating defense and Okinawa issues, and absence of any sign of popular objection to PriMin's stand on these questions. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

  
JOHNSON

  
POL:RFPfeiffer:miv - 12/22/67  
TWAinsworth  
TBleha  
ARMA:LtCol. Marsh

USIS:HBurleson

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NND 969000  
By W6D NARA Date 7/25/02

0 8 0 9

ORIGIN/ACTON

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

# AIRGRAM

Pol 2-1 Japan  
FOR RM USE ONLY

RM/R	REP	AF
1		
ARA	EUR	27
NEA	CU	3
E	P	5
L	FBO	12
S/L	ACDA	RSK
1	19	10
AGR	COM	FRB
2	3	
INT	LAB	TAR
TR	XMB	AIR
4		10
ARMY	CIA	NAVY
10	20	7
OSO	USIA	NSA
49	11	3
ACC		MSC
8		6

A-841  
NO.

CONFIDENTIAL

PRIORITY  
HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : Department of State

INFO: BANGKOK CINCPACFLT DA/ODCSOPS FUKUOKA  
CINCPAC COMNAVMAIANAS DA/DUSA HICOMRY  
CINCPACAF COMSEVENFLT DOD/ISA HICOM/POLAD  
CINCUSARPAC COMUS/J (Halperin) USCAR (con'd)

FROM : Amembassy TOKYO

DATE: December 29, 1967

SUBJECT: JOINT WEEKA NO. 52

REF :

## CONTENTS

1. Diet Closes, Opens, Recesses
2. JSP Reveals 1968 Draft Policy
3. Okinawa and Bonins
4. LDP Diet Member Arrested in Taxi Scandal
5. Media Reaction to 7th Chicom N-Test

## POLITICAL:

1. Diet Closes, Opens, Recesses
  - a. Extraordinary Diet session closed December 23 with no further significant debate (Weeka 51, 46. 11, 1968)
  - b. Within minutes after convening December 27, Regular Diet session recessed until around January 27. Recess permits Diet members to enjoy traditional New Year holidays and takes into account LDP convention scheduled for January 20 and JSP convention

USARYIS (7th Psyop Gp) NAHA SEOUL  
HONG KONG MOSCOW SAIGON TAIPEI  
KOBE-OSAKA NAGOYA SAPPORO

Group 3

Downgraded at 12-year intervals; not automatically declassified

FORM 4-62 DS-323

CONFIDENTIAL

FOR DEPT. USE ONLY  
☒ In ☐ Out

Drafted by:

POL: (see last page)

Contents and Classification Approved by:  
POL:TWainsworth

Clearances:

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NND 969000  
By WBD NARA Date 7/25/02

CONFIDENTIAL

Page 2, A-841  
from Tokyo

scheduled for January 24-26. One hundred and fifty day session expected end May 24, 1968.

c. At what press called "unprecedented meeting" December 28, full Cabinet and 7 key LDP officers agreed to "squeeze" JFY 1968 budget in light of "harsh economic climate" at home and abroad. (UNCLASSIFIED)

d. Comment: Following Diet recess most attention focussed on adjustment of budget views between LDP and GOJ, essentially FinMin. Press has noted LDP's relative restraint thus far in this year's edition of scramble for pork-barrel funds, however, and as result of December 28 agreement budget total may not exceed by much ¥5.8 trillion (\$16.2 billion) FinMin estimate. Prospect of Upper House election in July will nevertheless inspire LDP Councillors to keep up pressure for politically helpful apportionment of funds within what appears likely be austere budget. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

## 2. JSP Reveals 1968 Draft Policy

a. JSP Central Executive Committee December 24 made known contents of 1968 draft policy which will be presented for approval to January 24-26 JSP convention. According draft, JSP 1968 action policy should aim at (1) opposing Vietnam war, realizing early return of Okinawa and crushing US-Japan Security Treaty; (2) preserving Constitution; (3) opposing price increases; and (4) insuring JSP victory in July Upper House elections. Among these aims, early return of Okinawa given priority because "masses can be united behind goal" and Okinawa reversion ties in with Vietnam and Security Treaty issues. At same time, draft asserts, Okinawa campaign "may lead" to collapse of "anti-ComChina alliance" and provide basis for JSP to play leading role in creating "unarmed, neutral Japan"; success of party's efforts to obtain early reversion would also pave way for restoration of official relations between Chicoms and Japan. On other subjects draft says Chicom "Great Cultural Revolution" in final stages and increases in agricultural production, etc. resulting from GCR have "confounded reactionaries", urges party seek support from other labor groupings in addition to Sohyo, and interprets Haneda student incidents (Weeks 41, 1 and Weeks 46, 2) not simply as examples of student violence, but primarily fault of PriMin Sato. (UNCLASSIFIED)

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NND 969000  
By WBD NARA Date 7/25/02

CONFIDENTIAL

Page 3, A-841  
from Tokyo

b. Comment: Most notable aspects of policy draft are prevalence of China-related thinking and implied willingness to end party's nearly complete dependence on Sohyo. Both are likely to cause trouble at January convention. At JSP's December 1966 convention, delegates argued over China for day and a half with less reason than present draft (which constitutes first "official JSP evaluation" of "Cultural Revolution") provides. Decision to go beyond Sohyo and seek support of rival labor groupings even more serious step since party may endanger its main financial, electoral and mobilization base without assurance of success in making inroads into other labor groupings. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

3. Okinawa and Bonins

a. Press this week speculated at length regarding alleged differences between US and GOJ on terms of reference of new tripartite advisory committee to High Commissioner to be established in Naha and to reports that negotiations for return of Bonins might be sewed up by late January with two Governments then able turn to review Okinawa question promised by Sato-Johnson communique. FonMin Miki was quoted as saying, following his initial meeting with Ambassador December 28 on specifics of Bonins return, that agreement on broad outline reached.

b. Ohama Subcommittee to study ways to "promote oneness" between Okinawa and Japan, subsidiary to Ohama's full Okinawa Problems Council, held first meeting December 27. Ohama quoted as saying "oneness" process would take several years and as noting complicated "political" questions such as direct election of GRI Chief Executive and Diet representation should not be considered within context "oneness" discussions at this stage.

c. In related event JSP, Komeito and JCP SecGens met December 25 to discuss joint measures three parties might take on reversion issue. Meeting produced no agreement on tangible joint action beyond rather vague suggestion that parties might send joint survey group to Bonins. SecGens did, however, agree on five-point interpretation of Extraordinary Session Diet debates: (1) GOJ refusal to rule out Okinawa reversion with nuclear weapons showed it willing to accept Okinawa on those terms, (2) setting reversion date for 3 years meant foisting US terms on Japanese people within 3 years, (3) real meaning of PriMin's emphasis on self-defense was Japanese rearmament as part of US Far Eastern policy, (4) GOJ support of US Vietnam policy, including

CONFIDENTIAL

0 8 1 2  
DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NND 969000  
By WBD NARA Date 7/25/02

CONFIDENTIAL

Page 4, A-841  
from Tokyo

North bombing, ignored Japanese public opinion and was impermissible, and (5) three parties insist Bonins should be administered by Tokyo Metropolis, rather than central government, after reversion. (UNCLASSIFIED)

d. Comment: GOJ is most anxious that Bonins return be done neatly and swiftly without too much exposure in Diet, and optimistic stories about advanced stage of negotiations probably based on leaks from high levels in FonOff. At same time neither press nor opposition parties have forgotten Okinawa issue and much of debate on Bonins issue being offered with eye to precedents for Okinawa reversion. (CONFIDENTIAL)

4. LDP Diet Member Arrested in Taxi Scandal

a. Within hours of Lower House's December 22 granting of permission to arrest LDP Representative Toshikatsu SEKIYA in connection with Osaka taxi scandal (Week 51, 4), Osaka District Court issued warrant for arrest. On doctor's advice, however, actual arrest delayed until December 25. Sekiya's arrest came two days after arrest of his private secretary on suspicion of destruction of evidence. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: Although Osaka procurators' investigation continues and Komeito source told Embassy over 70 Diet members may be involved in scandal, available information suggests that Sekiya, who was also arrested in ship-building scandal in 1954, likely emerge as main villain (or scapegoat). (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

PSYCHOLOGICAL

5. Media Reaction to 7th Chicom N-Test

a. US AEC announcement of 7th Chicom nuclear test was prominently front-paged in Christmas morning press in Japan, and several accompanying analysis sought to fathom significance of test for Chicom nuclear arsenal development. Press editorials tended to accept test fatalistically; some repeated line from past comment that nuclear arsenal may eventually promote Chicom peaceful coexistence with US. Several suggested timing was keyed to President Johnson's round-world tour.

b. Asahi editorial December 26 said: "As long as US and USSR adhere to 'principle' of maintaining peace through nuclear balance and push own concepts onto smaller nations, they cannot prevent China

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NND 969000  
By WBD NARA Date 7/25/02

CONFIDENTIAL

Page 5, A-841  
from Tokyo

from developing own nuclear arms. . . Is entirely possible that development of Chinese nuclear capacity may cause changes in attitudes of both US and China. . . . But merely waiting for this to happen does not guarantee that world will not unwittingly proceed along road to destruction. Therefore, we urge unrelenting efforts to bring China into international community."

c. Same day Yomiuri editorial suggested Chicom aim "probably to get US and USSR to change containment policy through having some degree of capacity for nuclear retaliation. . . . Japan, needing stability and peace in Far East, should seek opportunities to reduce China-US tensions rather than taking road of power confrontation."

d. Tokyo Shimbun December 26 editorial, referring to President's recent peace efforts, suggested latest test "may be aimed at suppressing such moves, displaying Chicom strength to enable NVN and VC to adhere firmly to 'basic principles.' . . . Question is how world tensions can be reduced while confronting reality of ComChinese nuclear development."

e. On NHK TV network news program same day, commentator Okamura called latest test "frightful Christmas present . . . and menace to Japan (because) . . . Chinese nuclear development affects security of Okinawa and Japan." (UNCLASSIFIED)

GP-3

  
JOHNSON

 POL: TEL:jl 12/29/67  
R. E. Armstrong

USIS:HLBurlison 

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NND 969000  
By WBD NARA Date 7/25/02

ORIGIN/ACTION

1MR-10

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

# AIRGRAM

POL 2-1 JAPAN

FOR RM USE ONLY

RM/R	REP	AF
1		
ARA	EUR	EA
	5	6
NEA	CU	INR
	5	
E	SP	IO
	1	
L	SIL	AIO
	1	12
PC	RS/R	HOCMAN
	1	
AGR	COM	FRB
2	3	
INT	LAB	TAR
	2	
TR	XMB	AIR
4		10
ARMY	CIA	NAVY
10	20	7
OSO	USIA	NSA
49	11	3
NSC		
6		

A-909

CONFIDENTIAL

PRIORITY

HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : Department of State  
INFO: BANGKOK CINCPACFLT DA/ODCSOPS FUKUOKA  
CINCPAC COMNAVMARIANAS DA/DUSA HICOMRY  
CINCPACAF COMSEVENFLT DOD/ISA HICOM/POLAD  
CINCUSARPAC COMUS/J (Halperin) USCAR (cont'd)

FROM : Amembassy TOKYO DATE: January 12, 1968

SUBJECT : JOINT WEEKEND

REF :

## CONTENTS

1. Left Readies Drive Against USS Enterprise Visit
2. UK Foreign Secretary Brown Visits Tokyo
3. Okinawa Return in 1972?
4. Japan-US Consultative Committee on Okinawa Meets
5. Komeito Urges Expanded Opposition Cooperation
6. Griggs on the Loose

## POLITICAL

1. Left Readies Drive Against USS Enterprise Visit

a. Press reports January 8, stating "government sources" expect USS Enterprise and escort ship to enter Sasebo on January 18 (rather than previously rumored date of January 20 or 21) sent leftist opposition parties and students scurrying to firm up plans for protest demonstrations in Sasebo and elsewhere. Sasebo demonstrations designed to block shore leave for crew members, according sponsors, and protest "introduction of

USARYIS (7th Psyop Gp)	NAHA	SAIGON
HONG KONG	MOSCOW	TAIPEI
KOBE-OSAKA	NAGOYA	LONDON
	SEOU	

Group 3

Downgraded at 12-year intervals; not automatically declassified

CONFIDENTIAL

FOR DEPT. USE ONLY  
☒ In ☐ Out

FORM 4-62 DS-323

Contents and Classification Approved by:

Drafted by: POL: (see last page)

POL: TWAINSWORTH

Clearances:

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NND 969000  
By WBD NARA Date 7/25/02

CONFIDENTIAL

Page 2

A- from Tokyo  
909

nuclear weapons into Japan." Probability of violent clash between ultra-left students and police in Sasebo prominently featured in mass media.

b. Although plans not firm, Akahata announced January 10 that JCP would sponsor demonstration in Sasebo on January 17. JSP on previous day had announced it would mobilize 50,000 demonstrators in Sasebo on January 18. JSP General Affairs Director Ishibashi quoted by press as saying that final decision on whether JCP would participate in rally with JSP/Sohyo would be made by local groups in Sasebo at January 13 meeting and that possibility of violence by students great. After discussing student participation, main point of contention between JSP and JCP, JSP Central Executive Committee January 10 took position that groups which did not submit to discipline of sponsors of joint demonstrations would be excluded from participation. Sohyo Executive Board reportedly took similar position in Tokyo meeting following day. Press interpreted both decisions as effort to disassociate JSP/Sohyo demonstrations from expected violence of anti-JCP Zengakuren students. Press has also reported JSP considering shifting date of demonstration from January 18 to January 21, a Sunday, "to get better turn out." Press has carried conflicting reports of joint JSP/JCP demonstration plans in Tokyo, and possibility of joint demonstrations on smaller scale in other major cities remains. DSP announced January 10 that it would stage demonstration with 10,000 participants in Sasebo on January 15 and 16.

c. In any event militant anti-JCP Zengakuren students prepared to demonstrate in Sasebo on January 18. Press quote police estimates that students may field up to 2,000 demonstrators. January 18 and students saying they ready for "showdown" with police. Four hundred supporters of right-wing extremist Bin AKAO also expected in Sasebo to demonstrate support for Enterprise entry.

d. To meet challenge press reported police will mobilize about 5,800 in Sasebo including riot units from other areas, use tear gas if necessary and apply law prohibiting assembly for violent purposes to students carrying poles like those used in Haneda riots (Weekas 41, 1; 46, 2) or other apparent weapons.

e. Press reported Chief Cabinet Secretary Kimura would ask FonOff to request US shore leave be restricted as much as possible on January 18, when biggest demonstration expected. LDP, according press, called off welcoming parades because of fear of clash with left-wing demonstrators. However, LDP will send welcoming party to Sasebo which will include DirGen of Science and Technology Agency Nabeshima and former Speaker of Lower House Naka FUNADA.(UNCLASSIFIED)

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NND 969000

By WBD NARA Date 7/25/02



CONFIDENTIAL

Page 3  
A-~~11~~ from Tokyo

909

f. Comment: General confusion in demonstration plans of left reflects ambivalence concerning association with violence-prone anti-JCP student groups. JCP takes clear position that anti-JCP Zengakuren students should be excluded from its demonstrations or joint demonstrations in which it participates. However SecGen Miyamoto told press January 10 this was not because students were violent, but because they "hampered JCP/JSP cooperation." JSP position does not exclude anti-JCP Zengakuren by name; certain quarters in JSP reportedly hope that relationship with radical student group will pay off in campaign against Security Treaty in 1970. Other elements in Sohyo and in JSP which oppose cooperation with JCP also tend to flirt with anti-JCP students.  
(CONFIDENTIAL)

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NND 969000  
By WBD NARA Date 7/25/02

CONFIDENTIAL

Page 4

A-~~24~~ from Tokyo

909

2. UK Foreign Secretary Brown Visits Tokyo

a. UK Foreign Secretary George Brown, accompanied by his wife and party including Under Secretary Wilkinson, visited Tokyo January 7-10. Purpose of visit was to meet with FonMin Miki in Sixth Anglo-Japanese Ministerial consultations. Brown, in addition to two meetings with FonMin, also had half hour meeting with PriMin Sato and one press conference before his departure for US. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Focus of January 9 discussions between Brown and Miki was Vietnam. They agreed to maintain closest contact in their efforts to achieve peace there (Tokyo 4570). Brown also expressed concern regarding official criticism of US role in Vietnam and cautioned that American withdrawal from treaty obligations in one part of world could also lead to "most dangerous" withdrawal in other parts of world. Views also exchanged on China, Cambodia, and Britain's position vis-a-vis European Common Market. (CONFIDENTIAL)

c. In public statements Brown emphasized that British determined to straighten out UK economy and shore up pound sterling, that Japan should strive to contribute 1% of its GNP as economic aid and that UK already doing more than this. He also re-emphasized British displeasure with Japanese trade with Southern Rhodesia, although British Embassy sources pessimistic as to likelihood of GOJ adopting additional trade control measures. (CONFIDENTIAL)

d. Comment: Underlying current of Tokyo discussions was Brown's belief that UK must put additional emphasis on its relations with Europe and his hope that Japan will assume greater responsibility for Asia. Japanese considered visit more successful than former FonMin Shiina's 1967 visit to London. Foreign Secretary disappointed Japanese press somewhat by failing to come up with gossip-worthy social behavior even at geisha party in his honor. (CONFIDENTIAL)

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NND 969000

By WBD NARA Date 7/25/02

CONFIDENTIAL

Page 5

A-241 from Tokyo  
909

3. Okinawa Return in 1972?

a. Sparked by Tokyo press replay of January 8 statement by Okinawa expert Nobumoto OHAMA while visiting his hometown of Ishigaki in Ryukyus, extensive press play given in past week to speculation on timing of US-Japan negotiations for return of Okinawa. Ohama quoted as having said GOJ has in mind visit by PriMin Sato to US in spring of 1969 during which he would attempt to negotiate return of Okinawan administrative rights by 1972. In clear effort to cool off this line of speculation, LDP SecGen Fukuda was quoted in January 10 press as saying PriMin had made point of telling him that prospects for reversion in 1972 and trip to US in 1969 were news to him, and that Sato thought Ohama had put forth only latter's own personal views. Fukuda reportedly added that LDP not prepared to decide on specifics of reversion formula and that hyperbole natural for Okinawan such as Ohama on occasion of visit to native soil. Notwithstanding Fukuda disclaimer, Tokyo Shimbun January 11 lead quoted "high ranking FonOff official" as saying monthly sessions at top diplomatic level in Tokyo would start in April to pave way for PriMin's early 1969 visit. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: Ohama, in his self-appointed role as goad to conservatives on Okinawa issue, unlikely to forget prediction and it almost certain to bob up in future debate. (UNCLASSIFIED)

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NND 969000  
By WBD NARA Date 7/25/02

CONFIDENTIAL

A-~~600~~ from Tokyo  
909

4. Japan-US Consultative Committee on Okinawa Meets

a. Thirteenth session of US-Japan Consultative Committee met January 11 to approve GOJ Okinawa aid program of \$42.7 million for next aid cycle year (Tokyo 4610). Brief formal session went smoothly and received favorable press attention. Press noted degree to which US authorities cooperated in meeting Japanese wishes, particularly in such matters as permitting GRI to accept loans from GOJ for first time, in development this year's record aid program. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: Smooth appearance of ConCom workings concealed mad scurrying on both sides necessitated by FinMin delays. Working out lean overall budget FinMin officials scrutinized with exquisite care individual projects which make up unprecedentedly large Okinawa aid total. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

5. Komeito Urges Expanded Opposition Cooperation

a. To counter what he called LDP's "dangerous turn to right", Komeito SecGen Junya YANO at January 8 press conference urged expanded cooperation among JSP, Komeito and JCP. Basis for cooperation would be present loose alliance of same three parties to promote Okinawa reversion (see Weeka 52, 3). As examples of LDP alleged turn to right, Yano cited (1) attempts to eliminate Japan's "nuclear allergy", (2) consent to nuclear weapons on Okinawa after reversion, (3) recent calls for emphasis on patriotism and national defense in school curricula and (4) increase in JFY 1968 defense expenditures at expense of social welfare programs. Yano also urged renewed participation of DSP in opposition struggle as well as that of anti-Sato-LDP elements. Saying JSP SecGen Yamamoto agreed with Komeito thinking, Yano predicted JSP, Komeito and JCP SecGens would meet early in week of January 14 to discuss further cooperation. (UNCLASSIFIED).

b. Comment: Yano statement obviously made with July Upper House elections in mind. In this regard continued opposition "cooperation" brings with it certain advantages to Komeito, such as further isolation of DSP and increased publicity. JSP apparently acquiesced in permitting Komeito to take lead in proposing opposition cooperation on security issue, which promises to be one of regular Diet session focal points. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NND 969000  
By WBD NARA Date 7/25/02



CONFIDENTIAL

A-~~225~~ from Tokyo  
9096. Griggs on the Loose

a. US Army PFC Kenneth C. Griggs (born KIM Kin Suh), who sought asylum in Cuban Embassy in Tokyo on April 3, 1967, left Cuban Embassy December 29 and his whereabouts still unknown. Cuban Embassy notified Foreign Office of Griggs disappearance and the Foreign Office in turn notified Embassy. FonMin made public announcement of Griggs departure on January 10. Japanese police have staked out Cuban Embassy but so far have no leads. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: Cuban Embassy had previously informed FonMin that Griggs spent December 1 night out but returned to Embassy next day. More recent departure may tie in with speculation Griggs trying make contact with local anti-Viet war group, Beheiren, which assisted four deserters from aircraft carrier Intrepid to reach Moscow and then Stockholm. GOJ cooperating in trying locate Griggs but not optimistic. US military authorities also searching since December 30, but so far without success. (CONFIDENTIAL)

GP-3

  
JOHNSON  
POL: TBlaha/jl/mv  
TWAinsworth  
REArmstrong  
RFPfeifferP/M:SDawkins  
D/EX:RMRuenitz 

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NND 969000

By WBD NARA Date 7/25/02

ORIGIN/ACTION <b>NR-10</b>			DEPARTMENT OF STATE			<div style="text-align: center;"><b>AIRGRAM</b></div> <div style="text-align: right;"><i>Pol 2-1 Japan</i></div>		
RM/R	REP	AF	A-874			CONFIDENTIAL		
1	EUR	6	NO.			PRIORITY		
ARA	EUR	6				HANDLING INDICATOR		
NEA	CU	INR						
3			TO : Department of State					
4	PIA	10	INFO: BANGKOK CINCPACFLT			DA/ODCSOPS FUKUOKA		
2	2		CINCPAC COMNAVMAIANAS			DA/DUSA HICOMRY		
L	EDD	AID	CINCPACAF COMSEVENFLT			DOE/ISA HICOM/POLAD		
5/5/10	5/11/1	12	CINCUSARPAC COMUS/J			(Halperin) USCAR (con'd)		
AGR	COM	FRB	FROM : Amembassy TOKYO			DATE: JANUARY 5, 1968		
2	3		SUBJECT: JOINT WEEKA NO. 1					
INT	LAB	TAR	REF :					
2								
TR	XMB	AIR						
4		10						
ARMY	CIA	NAVY						
10	20	7						
OSD	USIA	NSA						
49	11	3						
		NSC						
		6						

ACTION TAKEN  
 REACTION  
 Notes  
 JAN 16 1968  
 INC/RE/INP  
 96 JUNE 8  
 File

CONTENTS

- PriMin and Opposition Leaders Greet New Year
- Rostow Visit
- Japanese Educational Diplomacy and Education on Defense
- Opinion Polls on Defense and Foreign Affairs

POLITICAL

- PriMin and Opposition Leaders Greet New Year
  - PriMin Sato in brief New Year statement expressed view domestic politics and economics would provide major challenges of 1968, which he noted was centennial of Meiji restoration. PriMin expressed hope economic prosperity would "go hand in hand with spiritual progress of our people" so that Japan could create society with benefits enjoyed by other advanced countries and make unique and respected contribution to progress of world civilization. In supplementary press conference, PriMin reviewed pending political problems.

USARYIS (7th Psyop Gp)	NAHA	SAIGON
HONG KONG	MOSCOW	SAPPORO
KOBE-OSAKA	NAGOYA	SEOUL
		TAIPEI

Group 3

☐ Downgraded at 12-year intervals; not automatically declassified

FORM 4-62 DS-323

CONFIDENTIAL

FOR DEPT. USE ONLY  
☐ In ☐ Out

Drafted by: POL: (see last page)

Contents and Classification Approved by: POL: TWA insworth

Clearances:

*Sub*

1968 JAN 10 AM 10 53

COPYFILE-PBR

DECLASSIFIED  
 Authority NND 969000  
 By W6D NARA Date 7/25/02

0 8 2 2

CONFIDENTIAL

Page 2, A-874  
from Tokyo

He denied that his statements in Extraordinary Diet Session (Week 49, 1) on increased defense consciousness, aimed at revising "Peace Constitution" or sending Self-Defense Forces outside Japan. He promised to continue efforts for earliest possible reversion of Okinawa but with due regard for role of US military bases in islands. On nuclear issue, Sato again rejected concept of Japan developing nuclear weapons, which he called "unusable weapons" but stressed need for country not to be left behind in important field of peaceful uses. Sato said he neither optimistic nor pessimistic on Vietnam solution and <sup>that</sup> current attitude of Peking gave no opening for change in Japan's cautious policies of continuing to separate politics and economics on basis of mutual respect for independence and non-interference in internal affairs. On domestic front, Sato side-stepped question whether he would seek third term as LDP president, but acknowledged that defense question appeared likely be focus of House of Councillors elections in coming summer.

b. Opposition party leaders in New Year statements stressed criticisms of alleged Sato intentions with regard to defense and Okinawa. JSP Chairman Katsumata cast statement in form of "3 tasks": (1) opposition to nuclearized defense system and efforts to develop "positive neutralism" foreign policy; (2) struggle to safeguard people's "livelihood" in face of anticipated economic adversity; and, (3) opposition to "plutocracy and thought control" and "creation of democratic ideals" and culture based on life of the working man. DSP Chairman Nishimura similarly warned of economic problems ahead, restated DSP "emergency stations" thesis on US-Japan Security Treaty, and called for "peaceful coexistence" with Communist China. Komeito Chairman Takeiri said only way to avoid acceptance of nuclear bases on Okinawa when reversion takes place was to "force US to alter Asian policy" by expediting admission of Communist China to UN. He called for phased dissolution of Security Treaty and "Japan's complete neutrality" but specified disagreement with JSP and JCP advocacy of immediate abrogation of Security Treaty. JCP Chairman Nosaka issued unequivocal promise to fight against alleged Sato intention to make Japan "cooperate with US in war of aggression in Vietnam while arming Japan with nuclear weapons". (UNCLASSIFIED)

c. Comment: Conservative politicians and their supporters are putting good deal of stress on "Meiji centennial" as appropriate occasion for positive efforts in such fields as defense, education and promotion of Japan's international position. There is little unanimity even among conservatives, however, as to concrete contents of program for this purpose, apart from fighting to preserve LDP strength in mid-year Upper House election. Sato New Year message reflected more cautious views within LDP. PriMin earlier had rejected idea of using message for major inspirational policy statement

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NND 969000  
By WBD NARA Date 7/25/02

CONFIDENTIAL

Page 3, A-874  
from Tokyo

because Transportation Minister Nakasone and PMO DirGen Tatsuo TANAKA, who represent near-extremes of liberal and conservative views of LDP, respectively, were unable to come up with satisfactory draft. Pessimistic forecasts in economic field, bolstered early in New Year by news of US balance of payments measures (Item 2), tended to dampen enthusiasm for centennial Japan's emergence into modern world. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

2. Rostow Visit

a. Undersecretary Rostow arrived January 2 to discuss President's State of Union message and dollar-defense measures with Japanese leaders. Following day he met with PriMin, FonMin, Economic Planning Agency Director and Chief Cabinet Secretary at PriMin's private residence at Kamakura, and on January 4 Mr. Rostow had talks with FinMin Mizuta and with high officials of Finance, International Trade and Industry Ministries and Economic Planning Agency.

b. In press conference in Ise January 4, PriMin Sato said he had pledged "basic cooperation" to defend US dollar and that GOJ would consider US requests that Japan increase aid to Indonesia and its contribution to Asian Development Bank, but that there would be no decision before the end of the month. Press implied that requests would be discussed further at January 25-26 meeting in Honolulu of Subcommittee of Joint US/Japan Committee on Trade and Economic Affairs. Sato said GOJ would not change present policy on purchase of US weapons and that problem of purchase of US weapons and US government bonds had not been discussed with Rostow.

c. Considerable coverage and comment appeared in mass media on President's January 1 announcement of sweeping dollar-defense measures and on Rostow visit. General tone was both explicit and implicit acceptance of necessity for US action but with some doubts about efficacy of certain measures and many fears about impact on Japanese economy. Some Japanese commentators were disturbed by apparent lack of consensus in US on measures to be taken. Anonymous commentary in January 3 Yomiuri said "effective results (in US) will not appear without further tightening of finances and upping of taxes." January 4 Sankei editorial doubted that dollar-defense possible while huge Vietnam war outlay continued, and said: "We fear American economy will distort international economy, . . . and are not sure that other nations will cooperate as . . . US hopes." Sankei also saw countermeasures of other nations "inviting shrinkage in international economy", and net result of severe inconvenience to Japanese economy. January 4 Mainichi also saw possible "global deflationary trend", possibly becoming "backlash against US efforts to improve payments balance." (UNCLASSIFIED)

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NND 969000  
By WBD NARA Date 7/25/02

0 8 2 4



CONFIDENTIAL

Page 4, A-874  
from Tokyo

d. In conversations with Mr. Rostow on January 4, FinMin Mizuta and high officials of concerned Japanese ministries made it clear that they intended to cooperate closely to defend dollar. They said they were generally satisfied with program proposed by President, and understood need for action in capital, tourism and overseas expenditure fields. They were very worried, however, about US intention to consider legislation on border taxes. Japanese objection to possible US action in this field based on fact it could have adverse effects on world trade and would hurt Japanese exports to US and third countries, could cause series of worldwide retaliatory actions, and could encourage "protectionist movement" in US. On other aspects of President's policy, Japanese said they satisfied that they can get necessary capital from US market although they expressed fear of increased cost of borrowing and decreased availability of Eurodollars. (CONFIDENTIAL)

e. Comment: Although opposition parties can be expected to attack PriMin for "cooperation with US" in dollar-defense program, Japanese public believed to be well acquainted with reliance of Japanese economy on sound US dollar. Strong GOJ reaction to proposed US retaliation on border tax, however, went beyond fear of handicap for Japanese exports to US; Japanese afraid US border tax proposal may be first step in series of US and European trade measures which will cut into Japan's worldwide exports. GOJ representatives can be expected to press US for assurances that dollar-defense program will not lead to increased protectionism and slowing down or reversal of trend of expanding world trade. (CONFIDENTIAL)

3. Japanese Educational Diplomacy and Education on Defense

a. Press January 4 carried stories that Educational Minister Nadao had announced policy of "educational diplomacy" as part of Meiji centennial celebration. Steps reportedly contemplated are international conferences in September in Tokyo and Kyoto to publicize Japanese educational progress in last 100 years, attendance by EdMin at 15th UNESCO Conference in Paris in October, and presentation at UNESCO conference of plan for increased Japanese educational assistance to Asian countries. EdMin quoted as saying present program of inviting Asian students to Japan to study and Asian educational leaders to observe Japanese school system did not meet desires of Asian countries and that PriMin Sato had received many requests for increased educational aid during his two tours of Southeast Asia last year. EdMin went on to say that UNESCO budget for Asia only 1/5th of that for Africa and Middle East and 1/3rd of budget for South America, and said that Japan only country in Asia that can help solve problem. EdMin plans

CONFIDENTIAL

0 8 2 5  
DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NND 969000  
By W&D NARA Date 7/25/02

CONFIDENTIAL

Page 5, A-874  
from Tokyo

invite Asian UNESCO members and observers to preliminary meeting in Japan to consider Japanese proposals to be made at Paris UNESCO Conference for increasing present educational aid program and setting up new programs which would include establishment of (1) agricultural schools in Southeast Asian countries and use of TV in agricultural education, and of (2) regional centers in Asia to improve teaching materials and methods.

b. Nadao also disclosed to press his view that time had come to lift "taboo" concerning national defense from field of public education, down to the elementary school level. Disclosure came in context of EdMin's comments on 1967 report concerning proposed revision of elementary school curriculum. Nadao indicated he believed that in connection with highlighting importance of education in development of Japan since 1868 Meiji restoration, it was high time to de-emphasize "war guilt" content of teaching of recent Japanese history. (UNCLASSIFIED)

c. Comment: Details of EdMin's plans not known, but connection with Meiji centennial and image of Japan as "teacher" of other Asian nations have obvious appeal to Japanese pride in their own educational achievements. In this connection EdMin's plan likely to redound to political advantage of LDP government. Proposal to modify anti-war, "war guilt" tenor of current history and social studies courses, which has been point of controversy between conservatives and left for some years, appears certain to draw fire of opposition parties and particularly of left-leaning Japan Teachers Union. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

#### PSYCHOLOGICAL

#### 4. Opinion Polls on Defense and Foreign Affairs

a. January 1 newspapers published results of several recent public opinion polls which included questions on defense and foreign affairs issues. (Tokyo 4386).

b. Asked about countermeasures to Chicom nuclear arms development, respondents to Mainichi Shimbun poll conducted December 1-3, 1967, replied:

Exert efforts to get China to sign NPT and test-ban treaty	59%
Strengthen Japan's own defenses	13%
US will protect Japan under Security Treaty	5%
Threat would disappear if US Forces left Japan and JSDF were disbanded	7%

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NND 969000  
By WBD NARA Date 7/25/02

CONFIDENTIAL

Page 6, A-874  
from Tokyo

Kyodo Press poll conducted December 2-3, 1967, and reported in Japan Times, found 90% favored retention of Article 9 of Constitution (which renounced war), 60% opposed Japan's having nuclear arms and 14% said Japan would be safer with nuclear weapons. 80% opposed reviving military conscription. Over 43% would fight if Japan were attacked but 29% said they would not fight. Asked how Japan should ensure its peace and security, 17% favored reliance on US-Japan Security Treaty, and 11% favored increasing Self-Defense Forces. In answer to another question, 54% found varying degrees of usefulness in the Security Treaty in maintaining Japan's peace and security.

c. Questions were asked also on Vietnam. Mainichi poll respondents were asked to suggest one or two things Japan could do to help end Vietnam war. Findings:

Work hard on UN	52%
" " " US	43%
" " " SVN	10%
" " " NVN	10%
" " " ComChina	2%
Cannot influence, and so should stand by	24%

In Kyodo Press poll which also asked for multiple answers, 34% of respondents said that to help bring peace in Vietnam, Japan should appeal to United Nations. 50% favored "immediate" halt in US northern bombing, while 18% said US air strikes against North "are unavoidable actions." (UNCLASSIFIED)

d. Comment: Even without information on methodology (not yet available) necessary for definitive analysis, polls are important as soundings of Japanese public opinion at starting point of public debate on security issue called for by PriMin (Week 47, 1), and as point of comparison for future polls on security attitudes of Japanese public. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

GP-3



JOHNSON

POL: RFPfeiffer:jl 1/5/68  
TWAinsworth

USIS:HLBurleson  
FINATT:VAMack  
NAVA:LCDR-SPStrickland

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NND 969000  
By WBD NARA Date 7/25/02

0 1 2 7

ORIGIN/ACTION			DEPARTMENT OF STATE			66 2-1 Japan		
INR-10			AIRGRAM			FOR RM USE ONLY		
RM/R	REP	AF	A-760			CONFIDENTIAL		
1			NO.			PRIORITY		
ARA	EUR	FE				HANDLING INDICATOR		
NEA	CU	INR						
E	P	IO						
L	FBO	AID						
1	1	12						
2	2	2						
INT	LAB	TAR						
TR	XMB	AIR						
4		10						
ARMY	CIA	NAVY						
10	20	7						
OSD	USIA	NSA						
49	11	3						
RS/R-Hockma			7-1					
			TO : Department of State					
			INFO : BANGKOK CINC PACFLT DA/ODCSOPS FUKUOKA					
			CINCPAC COMNAVMARIANAS DA/DUSA HICOMRY					
			CINCPACAF COMSEVENFLT DOD/ISA HICOM/POLAD					
			CINCUSARPAC COMUS/J (Halperin) USCAR (con'd)					
			FROM : Amembassy TOKYO			DATE: DEC 8, 1967		
			SUBJECT : JOINT WEEKA NO. 49					
			REF :					
			CONTENTS					
			1. PriMin Sparks Debate on Japan's Security					
			2. Extraordinary Diet Session Opens					
			3. Ambassador Shimoda Feeds Defense Debate					
			4. Okinawa Issue Recedes Into Background					
			POLITICAL:					
			1. PriMin Sparks Debate on Japan's Security					
			a. PriMin Sato, stressing in four different forums theme that Japan must face up to the responsibility of defending itself, opened new round in public debate of Japan's defense posture. At December 4 LDP caucus which elected Shojiro KAWASHIMA Vice President of party, Sato said Japanese history enters new stages every 20 or 25 years and that it now time for Japan to "form its own way of thinking that would lead nation in new direction." LDP SecGen Fukuda was quoted by press as saying at same meeting that					
			USARYIS (7th Psyop Gp) NAHA SEOUL					
			HONG KONG MOSCOW SAIGON TAIPEI					
			KOBE-OSAKA NAGOYA SAPPORO					
			Group 3					
			Downgraded at 12-year intervals; not automatically declassified.					
			CONFIDENTIAL			FOR DEPT. USE ONLY		
			FORM 4-62 DS-323			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> In <input type="checkbox"/> Out		
			Drafted by: POL: (see last page)			Contents and Classification Approved by: POL: TWAINSWORTH		
			Clearances:					

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NND 969000  
By WBD NARA Date 7/25/02

CONFIDENTIAL

Page 2, A-760  
from Tokyo

Extraordinary Diet Session would mark start of debate over US-Japan security relations which would last until 1970.

b. In policy speech to Diet December 5, PriMin stressed need for Japan to play major role in bringing political and economic stability to international affairs, especially in Asia. PriMin said he convinced that Japanese people, by fulfilling international responsibilities and showing determination and pride to defend their country through their own efforts as united nation, can contribute to enhancement of Japan's international position, stability in Asia and return of Okinawa to Japan. He declared it impossible to ignore role of Okinawa in security of Far East, including Japan, and said he convinced continuous consultations would result in agreement within "two or three years" on timing of reversion. He hailed agreement on reversion of Bonins as great step forward in settlement of Okinawa problem and asked for "even greater cooperation" of Japanese people by "recognition of essence of Okinawa problem." In brief mention of Northern Territories, Sato said GOJ intends to seize every possible opportunity for solution (Tokyo's 3797).

c. In speech to Foreign Correspondents Club evening of December 4, PriMin said biggest problem facing Asian nations is how to cope with challenge of Communist Chinese ideology and nuclear weapons. He expressed hope that patient attitude by Japan and encouragement of cultural exchange and trade, under policy of separating economics from politics, would help bring about moderation of Peking's policies. In reply to question, PriMin said Japan not interested in anti-communist alliance of Asian nations but would emphasize "development of regional solidarity". Saying recent Asian tours gave him the impression Asian nations favor NPT, he reaffirmed Japan's "support in principle" for NPT, but called for steps toward nuclear disarmament and stressed Japan's interest in peaceful uses of atomic energy. In reply to question of nuclear bases on Okinawa, PriMin reportedly said present not time to decide on "nuclearization of Japan" and decision should be postponed until reversion date set.

d. In response to interpellations by JSP Chairman Katsumata in Diet December 7, PriMin called "unrealistic" JSP contention that US-Japan Security Treaty would involve Japan and Okinawa in war and inhibit return of Okinawa to Japan. He said long-standing Japanese policy of peace and non-use of military power is correct and denied any "secret" defense commitment in his agreement with President Johnson on need to retain

CONFIDENTIAL

0 8 2 9  
DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NND 969000  
By WBD NARA Date 7/25/02

CONFIDENTIAL

Page 3, A760  
from Tokyo

Security Treaty in light of prevailing international conditions. He said he did not change Japanese policy or assume "new burden" in talks with President, and that to consider it that way was to miss the point. In reply to LDP question, PriMin said it "only natural" that Japan assume responsibility for defense of Bonins after they are returned, and that scope of defense should include protection of Japanese shipping outside Japan's territorial waters. PriMin emphasized several times need for people to begin "earnest discussions" to build national consensus on Japan's defense. Sato denied he planned to expand Third Defense Plan or to amend Constitution, and said concern with Chinese nuclear capability natural for neighboring countries in view of world-wide opinion against increasing number of nuclear powers, but Japan had no intention of possessing nuclear weapons and hoped for early conclusion of NPT.

e. Commenting on security issue December 6, Komeito Chairman Takeiri told press conference that Japan must aim at future "complete neutrality". Since this impossible to realize by 1970 Komeito supports automatic extension of Security Treaty, but continued existence of present security system throughout 1970's would not serve Japanese interests. Takeiri explained "complete neutrality" by saying Japan would not conclude military treaties with either East or West.

f. Press reported December 8 that DSP had instructed its regional organizations to cooperate in passing resolutions in local legislatures calling for reversion of administrative rights in Okinawa but to oppose resolutions which called for removal of military bases. Instruction reminded party organization that DSP position demands complete reversion by 1970 with Okinawan bases treated like other US bases within Japan. DSP reportedly sent instruction to counter JSP/JCP pressure to include abolition of bases in local resolutions because DSP felt JSP/JCP position unrealistic basis for reversion and therefore not likely to get popular support. (UNCLASSIFIED)

g. Comment: LDP sources commented PriMin has launched major psychological campaign on defense issue, and JSP and DSP sources have told Embassy they also feel defense debate has started. JSP sources claim they ready for debate but give no indication they will do more than oppose GOJ/LDP position; DSP leaders look forward to debate in hope DSP can play active and constructive role which will help it gain in popularity at expense of JSP. Nature of debate and degree of popular interest it generates remain to be seen, but direct interjection of Japan's defense

CONFIDENTIAL

0 8 3 0  
DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NND 969000  
By WBD NARA Date 7/25/02

CONFIDENTIAL

Page 4, A-760  
from Tokyo

problems into political arena by the LDP holds potential for significant remolding of post-war Japanese political and psychological climate. Even if LDP succeeds in bringing about greater public support for positive attitude toward active role in strengthening non-communist Asia and security relationship with US, however, effects in terms of concrete defense buildup unlikely be spectacular or immediate. (CONFIDENTIAL)

2. Extraordinary Diet Session Opens

a. LDP member Hisao KODAIRA elected Lower House Vice Speaker December 4 replacing newly named Health and Welfare Minister Sonoda. PriMin's policy address delivered following day (see Item 1).

b. Osaka procurators December 6 arrested former LDP representative Shoichi SUHARA for allegedly accepting bribes in exchange for his efforts to water down or kill proposed government bill to tax liquid petroleum gas (LPG) used extensively by taxi firms (see Week 48, 2). Same day LDP Lower House member Katsutoshi SEKIYA, who also questioned by Osaka procurators concerning taxi scandal, resigned as Chairman of Lower Cabinet Committee. Protesting innocence, Sekiya said he resigned because he did not wish his private affairs to intrude into matters of state. Same day LDP representative and former chairman of Financial Affairs Committee Makoto MIKKE, named to replace Sekiya.

c. Lower House interpellations December 7 devoted primarily to defense question (Item 1). In response on Vietnam, PriMin said it not fair to denounce US for North bombing because North Vietnamese have failed to respond to numerous peace calls.

d. Cabinet decided December 5 that ordinary Diet session would begin December 27 on heels of 20-day Extraordinary Session. (UNCLASSIFIED)

e. Comment: Despite continuing Osaka taxi scandal investigations with their potential for embarrassment and continuing sensitivity of media (not to mention opposition parties) concerning security discussions, PriMin Sato appears more confident and LDP, in general, appears more in step than they have for some time. While Diet just getting under way, conservatives definitely in complete control at outset. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority *NMD 969000*  
By *WBD* NARA Date *7/25/02*

CONFIDENTIAL

Page 5, A-760  
from Tokyo

3. Ambassador Shimoda Feeds Defense Debate

a. Speech December 1 before Japan-America Society at Washington by Japanese Ambassador Shimoda, as handled by Tokyo media, intensified controversy over Sato administration's aims in defense field and led to Socialist demands for Shimoda's recall to clarify statements, at minimum, and for his possible dismissal. Major Tokyo dailies, in summaries of speech from their special Washington correspondents carried evening editions December 2, focussed on reports Shimoda said (1) majority of Japanese people quietly supported US policies in Vietnam; (2) final decision on nuclear arming of Japan should be left to future generations. Asahi article asserted these two controversial points "clearly based on partnership road laid out at Johnson-Sato talks," Yomiuri called speech further step in support for US Vietnam policy and "subtle divergence" from Japan's established no-nuclear policy. All headlined "nuclear option" reservation. Most accounts also noted that Shimoda said present Japanese public consensus and government policy against nuclear armament and GOJ cooperating in effort for NPT. Only Sankei, however, included his expression of appreciation for US attitude on Okinawa and Bonins problems and his declaration of GOJ's intention to continue "patient efforts" for peaceful solution in Vietnam. Only AP article carried December 3 English edition of Yomiuri put statements into context of GOJ desire for review provision in NPT.

b. Press December 3 briefly carried defensive reactions by FonMin Miki and other officials, labelling alleged statements on nuclear option "private view" and saying speech text not cleared by FonOff. Asahi column said Shimoda ideas would be "terrible change" if became policy. Yomiuri December 4 column denounced "trial balloons" of this sort and said PriMin should make such statements responsibly and publicly if he wanted them made.

c. After JSP CEC meeting December 4 Socialist spokesman told press party would demand Shimoda recall for explanations and possible dismissal, on grounds his reported statements contravened "national principle" of peace as set forth in Constitution which he obligated, as civil servant, to uphold. FonMin Miki told press he had no intention of recalling Shimoda, whose principal points were in line with GOJ policy. Cabinet Legislative Bureau, executive branch legal arm, said Diet resolution demanding removal of Ambassador, which JSP threatened, would have no binding legal force.

CONFIDENTIAL

0 8 3 2  
DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NND 969000  
By WBD NARA Date 7/25/02



CONFIDENTIAL

Page 6, A-760  
from Tokyo

d. Column in Tokyo Shimbun and editorial in English-language Japan Times December 6 both defended Shimoda and attempted put his reported statements into context and perspective. Both took line that present GOJ security policy, including rejection of nuclear arming and dependence on US deterrent, correct in present situation but no one, including government, could make promises which would endure for all time and in all possible contingencies, on question of this sort. Yomiuri, however, in editorial devoted principally to Sato policy speech (Item 1) cited Shimoda statements as additional evidence "arousing suspicion Mr. Sato may be considering introduction of nuclear weapons;" acceptance of such move, editorial suggested, appeared to be what Sato meant in asking people to show they willing to defend Japan themselves. Lack of clarity in PriMin's statements, Yomiuri warned, would confuse the people rather than leading to genuine patriotism. Press evening December 6 and morning December 7 carried summaries of Shimoda press conference at Washington December 5 to clarify his earlier statements, but only comment was Yomiuri cartoon showing Shimoda hiding in manhole, ducking projectiles. (UNCLASSIFIED)

e. Comment: Timing of Shimoda speech, shortly after Sato visit to Washington and immediately before opening of Extraordinary Diet Session which was expected feature defense-issue fireworks, contributed to press inclination to pick up controversial aspects of speech. Unfortunate corollary was virtual black-out on major constructive contributions it contained. Shimoda was already marked man for leftist parties and their sympathizers within media for his statements on Okinawa reversion and nuclear bases (Weeks 24, 3) while he was Vice FonMin. Below-surface focus of intense interest in Tokyo political circles is whether Shimoda in fact authorized by PriMin to fly these trial balloons; experienced Yomiuri political reporter told EmbOff categorically that such was case. (CONFIDENTIAL)

4. Okinawa Issue Recedes Into Background

a. PriMin Sato met December 1 for thirty minutes each with JSP, DSP and Komeito chairmen to "explain outcome" of recent US talks and hear opposition chairmen voice their dissatisfaction with Sato's "failure" to resolve Okinawa problem. PriMin reportedly countered that President Johnson, in view of up-coming presidential election, said he could not bind next President by making decision now on Okinawa. In exchange with Komeito Chairman Takeiri, PriMin reportedly said that when administrative rights

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NND 969000  
By W&D NARA Date 7/25/02

CONFIDENTIAL

Page 7, A-760  
from Tokyo

over Okinawa returned, US bases would remain "as at present"; Chief Cabinet Secretary later said Takeiri misinterpreted Sato in taking statement to mean "under present conditions."

b. Same day PriMin and FonMin Miki briefed Dr. Ohama's Okinawa Problems Council on Washington talk results. In response to PriMin's request, council decided to create special committee within larger body to consider removal of economic and social barriers between Japanese main islands and Okinawa pending reversion. New special committee to be headed by Ohama himself, and will consist of at least six prominent Japanese, including Yomiuri President Yosaji KOBAYASHI.

c. December 2 third meeting of JSP, DSP, Komeito and JCP SecGens to consider Okinawa strategy provided setting for DSP withdrawal from loose opposition alliance. DSP SecGen Ikko KASUGA said that his party's anti-JCP stance well known and repeated that reversion of Okinawa should be suprapartisan not ideological matter, thus DSP would no longer attend SecGen meetings if JCP were included. In follow-up to meeting JSP, Komeito and JCP SecGens December 6 presented six demands concerning Okinawa to Chief Cabinet Secretary Kimura. Reportedly agreed on at October 23 second meeting of SecGens (Week 43, 3) six are: (1) opposition to using Okinawa or Bonins for "aggressive" or nuclear bases, (2) public election of Okinawa chief executive, (3) elimination of travel restrictions between Okinawa and Japan, (4) increase of "autonomous" GOJ economic aid and "rehabilitation of Okinawan economy", (5) opposition to US confiscation of land for bases, and (6) return of Bonin Islanders to Bonins.

d. PriMin, FonMin and other top leaders December 6 reviewed joint communique article by article in preparation for Diet interpellations. Reporting on meeting at same day press conference, Chief Cabinet Secretary Kimura said it's government's "unified view" that tripartite advisory committee referred to in communique would "not only advise but make recommendations to Hicom". Kimura added it still undecided whether GOJ representative on committee would be government official or private citizen. Same day FonOff issued "corrected" translation of Sato-Johnson communique which, while retaining controversial "2 or 3 years" phrase in article VII, changed verb describing state of President's mind from "conscious of" to "understands" desires of Japanese people for early reversion.

e. Cabinet December 8 decided to set up Bonins Reversion Headquarters, consisting of representatives of all concerned GOJ agencies, under PriMin's Office DirGen Tatsuo TANAKA. (UNCLASSIFIED)

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NND 969000

By WBD NARA Date 7/25/02

0 8 3 4

CONFIDENTIAL

Page 8, A-760  
from Tokyo

f. Comment: During past week Okinawa/Bonins issue has taken back seat to broader question of Japan's security (Items 1 and 3). Break-down of always-tenuous opposition party "alliance" on Okinawa, while not unexpected, yet another indication of opposition disarray. It now questionable whether they can unite on any issue except opposition to adoption of small electoral district system which could threaten existence of smaller parties. Establishment of formal Bonins Reversion Headquarters reflects GOJ determination to move ahead on Bonins' return quickly, with likely goal of demonstrating concrete progress, if not completing task, before July Upper House elections. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

GP-3



JOHNSON

POL: Tbleha:jl 12/8/67  
TWainsworth  
RFPfeiffer



CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NND 969000  
By WBD NARA Date 7/25/02

0 8 3 5

ORIGIN/ACTION <i>1NR-10</i>			DEPARTMENT OF STATE <b>AIRGRAM</b>			<i>60 L 2-1 Japan</i> FOR RM USE ONLY											
RM/R <i>7</i>	REP <i>5</i>	AF <i>6</i>	A-940 NO.			CONFIDENTIAL											
ARA <i>5</i>	EUR <i>5</i>	FE <i>6</i>	TO : Department of State			PRIORITY											
NEA <i>5</i>	CU <i>5</i>	INR <i>5</i>	INFO: BANGKOK CINCPCFLT DA/ODCSOPS FUKUOKA			HANDLING INDICATOR											
E <i>5</i>	P <i>5</i>	IO <i>5</i>	CINCPAC COMNAVMARIANAS DA/DUSA HICOMRY														
L <i>5</i>	FBO <i>5</i>	AID <i>5</i>	CINCPACAF COMSEVENFLT DOD/ISA HICOM/POLAD														
ASR <i>5</i>	COM <i>5</i>	FRB <i>5</i>	CINCUSARPAC COMUS/J (Halperin) USCAR(cont'd)														
INT <i>5</i>	LAB <i>5</i>	TAR <i>5</i>	FROM : Amembassy TOKYO			DATE: JANUARY 19, 1968											
TR <i>5</i>	XMB <i>5</i>	AIR <i>5</i>	SUBJECT : JOINT WEEKA NO. 3														
ARMY <i>5</i>	CIA <i>5</i>	NAVY <i>5</i>	REF :														
OSD <i>5</i>	USIA <i>5</i>	NSA <i>5</i>	CONTENTS														
			<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>1. Enterprise Enters Sasebo</li><li>2. Opposition Parties Oppose Nuclear Weapon</li><li>3. Komeito Moves Outside Diet</li><li>4. LDP 1968 Draft Action Policy</li><li>5. Okinawa-Bonins Roundup</li><li>6. Domei Convention Opens</li><li>7. Soviet "Gosplan" Chief Visits Japan</li><li>8. Reaction to "Enterprise" Port Call</li><li>9. Press Comment on British Retrenchment</li><li>10. Opinion Polls on Okinawa, Defense and Security</li></ul>														
			<u>POLITICAL</u>														
			<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>1. <u>Enterprise Enters Sasebo</u><ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>a. Mass media riveted attention of Japanese public this week on activities of opposition parties and Zengakuren students in protesting visit</li></ul></li></ul>														
			<table><tr><td>USARYIS (7th Psyop Gp)</td><td>NAHA</td><td>SAIGON</td></tr><tr><td>HONG KONG</td><td>MOSCOW</td><td>TAIPEI</td></tr><tr><td>KOBE-OSAKA</td><td>NAGOYA</td><td>LONDON</td></tr></table>						USARYIS (7th Psyop Gp)	NAHA	SAIGON	HONG KONG	MOSCOW	TAIPEI	KOBE-OSAKA	NAGOYA	LONDON
USARYIS (7th Psyop Gp)	NAHA	SAIGON															
HONG KONG	MOSCOW	TAIPEI															
KOBE-OSAKA	NAGOYA	LONDON															
			Group 3 Downgraded at 12-year intervals; not automatically declassified.														
			CONFIDENTIAL														
			FORM 4-62 DS-323														
			FOR DEPT. USE ONLY <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> In <input type="checkbox"/> Out														
			Drafted by: POL:(see last page)														
			Contents and Classification Approved by: POL:TWAINSWORTH														
			Clearances:														

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority *NND 969000*  
By *WBD* NARA Date *7/25/02*

CONFIDENTIAL

Page 2  
A-940 from  
Tokyo

of USS Enterprise. Focus was on violent clashes between police and leftist but anti-JCP Zengakuren students (Sampa Rengo); demonstrations by pro-JCP Zengakuren students and opposition parties were orderly. Tension began to mount last week-end, as Sampa students gathered in Tokyo for trip to Sasebo, and Komeito announced it would hold first outdoor rallies in its history in Sasebo on January 17.

b. First dramatic action took place Monday evening, January 15, in Tokyo, when police confronted group of about 200 Sampa Zengakuren students as they left Hosei University campus on way to board train for Sasebo. Students charged, and police arrested 131 students for carrying dangerous weapons and obstructing police activity. Other Sampa students moved from Tokyo and points west to gathering point at Kyushu University in Fukuoka in preparation for demonstrations in Sasebo later in week. JSP and JCP Sasebo representatives announced on morning January 15, after two days of negotiating (Week 2, 1) that they would exclude anti-JCP Zengakuren students from January 18 joint rally. Newspapers also reported arrival of over 100 members of rightist groups in Sasebo, and that some were supporting Enterprise visit and Security Treaty in speeches from sound-trucks.

c. DSP/Domei January 15 protest rally against Enterprise visit was mild affair attended by only 3500. DSP SecGen Kasuga pledged party would press GOJ to conclude agreement with US specifically prohibiting introduction of nuclear weapons into Japan.

d. On Tuesday, January 16, JSP, JCP and Komeito representatives (see Item 2) in Tokyo meeting with Chief Cabinet Secretary Kimura, urged GOJ to cancel Enterprise visit because it would bring nuclear weapons into Japan, destroy Japanese people's "nuclear allergy," aid US aggression in Vietnam, and promote nuclearization of Japan and Okinawa.

e. Second dramatic clash between student extremists and police took place morning January 17 when approximately 800 Sampa students detrained at Sasebo, and armed with poles and rocks, attempted for two hours to storm police barricade on Hirase bridge leading to U.S. Naval Base. Police defended barrier by spraying students with tear gas in pressurized water. Toward noon, a second police unit sandwiched students against barricade and broke their ranks. At end of melee, 52 policemen, 68 students, 7 railway guards, 5 newsmen and 3 by-standers had been injured, 20 seriously. Police arrested 27 students. TV coverage focused on police clubbing students and on patients at near-by hospital who had been overcome by tear gas, and press asserted local populace "appalled" at police aggressiveness. DSP/Domei and JSP representatives protested to local police alleged excesses in handling students and injuries to by-standers. High official of Nagasaki Prefectural

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NND 969000  
By WBD NARA Date 7/25/02

CONFIDENTIAL

Page 3  
A-940 from Tokyo

Police apologized to Sasebo City News Club for injuries to reporters caused by police action and promised greater care would be taken in future. In Tokyo JSP SecGen Yamamoto in meeting with Chief Cabinet Secretary Kimura also protested "police brutality" in Sasebo. Kimura reportedly replied that police action "may have been too strong" and that GOJ would see that police were more restrained. Same day in Tokyo, twelve anti-JCP Zengakuren students were arrested as group of about 300 attempted to break through police lines guarding approach to Prime Minister's residence.

f. Also on January 17 in Sasebo, Komeito sponsored first outdoor political protest rallies in its history. Press reported approximately 20,000 Komeito supporters held six separate rallies in Sasebo protesting Enterprise visit and Japan's cooperation in Vietnam war. Press quoted Komeito Chairman TAKEIRI as saying party would introduce Diet resolution to keep nuclear weapons out of Japan.

g. January 17 activity in Sasebo ended with snake-dance demonstration by JSP/Sohyo-affiliated Anti-War Youth Committee in which anti-JCP Zengakuren Kakumuru-ha participated. Police reportedly made no arrests and took no special precautions because demonstrators were unarmed and not violent.

h. As they had promised beforehand, anti-JCP Zengakuren students crashed jointly sponsored JSP-JCP Sohyo rally and demonstration which began at 12:30 on January 18 and reportedly consisted of 23,000 people. After rally which was addressed by JSP Chairman Katsumata, Sohyo President Horii and JCP SecGen Miyamoto, Sampa Rengo students put themselves at head of demonstration march and attempted to lead it over bridge into base area. Police blocked students in clash which, although not as violent as that of previous day, lasted for two hours. JSP/JCP demonstrators changed march route, at police direction. Police arrested 15 students; 31 policemen, 38 students and 3 labor unionists were injured. Unlike previous day, students were not armed. On same day in Tokyo, police arrested 108 of group of 300 Sampa students who attempted unauthorized demonstration march on Prime Minister's residence. Rush hour throngs at Yuraku-cho station were treated to spectacle of students attacking police with poles, milk bottles and rocks. Later in evening in Tokyo JCP mobilized reported 15,000 for demonstration which passed Embassy but there were no reported incidents of violence. Press said similar demonstrations were held in Yokohama and Sapporo.

i. In Sasebo on January 19, small group of Sohyo unionists and pro-JCP students staged sit down protest in front of base area between 8 and 9 o'clock before Enterprise arrived. However, most dramatic was repeat performance of January 17 melee by armed Sampa Rengo students who arrived in Sasebo by train

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NND 969000  
By WBD NARA Date 7/25/02

CONFIDENTIAL

Page 4  
A-940 from Tokyo

at about same time as Enterprise entered port. Police, taking care not to include by-standers, again took after students with hoses, clubs and tear gas, and by noon students were reported leaving Sasebo to re-group in neighboring towns.

j. Press quoted government sources as saying Public Safety Commission considering dissolution of Sampa Rengo organization under Article 7 of Anti-Subversive Activities Law. Tokyo District Court on January 18 also ordered release of 98 of 131 students arrested in Tokyo January 15. (UNCLASSIFIED)

k. Comment: Peak of demonstrations and of student violence seemed to have passed by time Enterprise came into port, but clear possibility remained that some Sampa Rengo students would return to Sasebo to try to keep up appearance of unending struggle against port call. Mass media, while keeping alert for newsworthy incidents, can be expected to continue critical attitude toward alleged US motives in bringing Enterprise into Japan at this time. Opposition parties apparently have made their gesture and left for Tokyo and Diet debates, leaving field in Sasebo to Sampa students. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NND 969000  
By WBD NARA Date 7/25/02

0 8 3 9

CONFIDENTIAL

Page 5  
A-940 from Tokyo

2. Opposition Parties Oppose Nuclear Weapons

a. In response to Komeito SecGen Yano's January 8 call for further opposition cooperation (Weeks 2, 5), JSP SecGen Yamamoto, JCP SecGen Miyamoto and Yano agreed January 16 to five points concerning nuclear weapons. They were: (1) opposition to introduction of nuclear weapons into Japan and opposition to Enterprise entry, (2) opposition to equipping Self-Defense Forces with nuclear missiles or weapons, (3) demand for removal of US Okinawan "nuclear bases" and opposition to use of Okinawa reversion issue as wedge to make nuclear base of Japanese mainland, (4) demand for progress toward conclusion of international agreement to prohibit use of existing nuclear weapons and realization of complete prohibition of nuclear weapons, and (5) demand for compensative medical care and guaranteed living expenses for Japanese atomic bomb victims. Dispatch of three SecGens to Naha for February Fatherland Reversion Council (Fukkikyo) rally also agreed to in principle. JSP SecGen Yamamoto proposed general meeting of three parties' chairmen to discuss Japanese independence of "US dollar and nuclear umbrellas." Yano and Miyamoto took matter under consideration.  
(UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: Significance of three-party agreement attributable for most part to participation of Komeito which had not been expected to be as shrill on nuclear issue as JSP/JCP. Komeito cooperation with JSP/JCP likely represents mixture of concern about nuclear issue and expectation of political advantage through alignment with radical left. Focus of interest will be on whether Komeito can hew to reasonably moderate line or whether it will be drawn further and further to the left. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

CONFIDENTIAL

0 8 4 0  
DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NND 969000  
By WBD NARA Date 7/25/02



CONFIDENTIAL

Page 6  
A-940 from Tokyo

3. Komeito Moves Outside Diet

a. Komeito Chairman Takeiri January 13 announced that Komeito would, for first time, hold six separate rallies at Sasebo January 17 (Item 1). Reiterating party's strong opposition to nuclear weapons, Takeiri said that it necessary to protest entry of Enterprise which, in addition to raising safety question, meant likely introduction of nuclear weapons into Japan. Moreover because of Enterprise role in Vietnam war, visit meant Japanese cooperation in US Far East strategy which party opposed. Takeiri further charged Enterprise visit connected with recent LDP "turn to right" (Weeks 2,5) which among other things seeking reduce nuclear "allergy" of Japanese. Takeiri said "appropriate" scale for combined rallies would be 20,000 participants.

b. As scheduled, 20,000 gathered for rallies in Sasebo January 17. Despite some provocation from rightists as well as leftist students, rallies were peaceful and there no demonstration marches. Takeiri, at evening press conference, called rallies successful and said party would consider sponsorship of similar rallies in future on "case by case" basis. Party leadership returned to Tokyo following day. (UNCLASSIFIED)

c. Comment: Komeito source assured EmbOff that Sasebo rallies not special mobilization effort but simply already scheduled Upper House election meetings given different name. Of far more significance than rallies themselves, however, was precedent set. No one doubted Soka Gakkai/Komeito ability to mobilize large numbers of followers. Now that they have got their feet wet in political rally business, their future utilization of this favorite tactic of Japanese opposition parties will warrant attention. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NND 969000  
By WBD NARA Date 7/25/02

0 8 4 1

CONFIDENTIAL

Page 7  
A-940 from Tokyo

4. LDP 1968 Draft Action Policy

a. In preparation for 20th regular convention January 20, LDP January 16 published Draft Action Policy for 1968, approved by party officials and Executive Board. Highlight of contents was stress on need to combine maintenance of US-Japan Security Treaty and reliance on U.S. nuclear deterrent with Japan's own self-defense capabilities to guard against "direct or indirect aggression." Draft warned against merely depending on U.S. military strength "while dreaming of peace" and linked attitude of "defending country with own hands" with consciousness and self-respect as people of independent country. Foreign policy planks, while continuing to call for maintenance of Japan's position as member of free world and friendly relations with all countries in spirit of respect for sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs, termed Chicom development of nuclear weapons and "uncompromising foreign policy line" serious "handicaps" for Asia. It said Japan must seek ways to get Chicoms to abandon this road and turn to peaceful co-existence. Domestic section stressed need for elevating both popular "national spirit and morals" and morals and discipline in party politics. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comments: Political press commentators, always alert for signs of almost imperceptible process of change in conservative party formal positions, focused on close linking of defense consciousness and self-respect as people of independent nation" as hint that conservative leadership plans to make defense consciousness campaign major feature of LDP 1968 efforts. Draft Action Policy and comments of LDP source January 18 suggested, however, that LDP would seek to promote "defense consciousness" through appeals and organizations in local areas, in addition to and perhaps in preference to formal arena of Diet hearings where media coverage tends to support opposition attacks on and suspicion of GOJ/LDP defense policies. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

5. Okinawa-Bonins Roundup

a. Okinawa expert Nobumoto OHAMA returned from his visit to Ryukyus January 13 to tell reporters that, while his statement about reversion of Okinawa in 1972 (Weeks 2, 3) had been personal in nature, he planned to recommend to PriMin SATO that PriMin visit Washington in early 1969 and press for setting of 1972 date. Subsequently, press reported that Ohama, in call on Sato January 18, made his recommendation in form "personal hope." Sato was quoted as saying that while he had not set any timing either for visit to Washington or for reversion of Okinawa, statement by Ohama of his "personal hope" was not embarrassing.

b. Notes establishing new GRI-GOJ-USG Advisory Committee to High Commissioner were exchanged in modest ceremony held afternoon January 19. Press speculation about terms of reference new organ had for most part died down

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NND 969000  
By WBD NARA Date 7/25/02

0 8 4 2

CONFIDENTIAL

Page 8  
A-940 from Tokyo

by end of week, doubtless because of detailed briefings by FonOff sources to effect new committee would deal with economic, social and related matters, and not with political issues.

c. Forty-man GOJ mission departed for Bonins January 18 aboard two GOJ vessels in order survey in minute detail situation of islands and their present residents. Mission carried message from Director-General TANAKA of PriMin's Office stating GOJ will seek ways resolve islanders' worries about their children's education and about their future livelihood under Japanese administration. In meantime, press speculated conflict between central government and Tokyo Metropolis over control of islands after reversion (Weeks 50, 2) had been resolved in favor of City Hall. Reports alleged legal difficulties involved in putting Bonins under direct control after return have been found insuperable and necessity for direct control reduced from GOJ viewpoint by fact Socialist Governor of Tokyo MINOBE had softened his opposition to permitting bases in islands. (UNCLASSIFIED)

d. Comment: Ohama is obviously impatient with what he must see as current doldrum in substantive movement towards reversion. US interest in effecting smooth return of Bonins would be met if Minobe and GOJ settled their differences and if GOJ followed Tanaka message with substantive measures <sup>which</sup> meet islanders' problems. (CONFIDENTIAL)

6. Domei Convention Opens

a. Fourth National Convention of 1,800,000 member labor federation Domei opened in Tokyo January 18, with speeches by DSP Chairman NISHIMURA, last year's unsuccessful Tokyo gubernatorial candidate Masatoshi MATSUSHITA (who will run in Upper House Election this year on DSP ticket) and ICFTU representative Morris PALADINO. In keynote address, outgoing Domei President Kumazo NAKACHI stressed Domei's concern with economic issues such as industrial policy and wage systems in order to better lot of Japanese workers, and sharply attacked "anti-democratic" organizations which utilize anti-Americanism in order to build up revolutionary mass movements in Japan.

b. Major business of Convention will be election of new officers, first change in top leadership since Domei's founding in 1964, and the adoption of a new action policy calling for general 14% wage increase in 1968. (UNCLASSIFIED)

c. Comment: Election by Convention delegates of Textile Workers' Minoru TAKITA as new Domei President and Coal Miners' Takumi SHIGEEDA as Secretary General is certainty.

confidential

4

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NND 969000  
By WBD NARA Date 7/25/02

0 8 4 3

CONFIDENTIAL

Page 9  
A-940 from Tokyo

d. Press and labor circles already speculating that new attractive leadership may result in even greater membership gains for Domei (which recently surpassed Sohyo in private sector membership) and a lessening of public exchanges of invective between Domei and Sohyo, because of good personal relationship between Takita and Sohyo President HORII. Domei's ambitious wage increase demands will be difficult to realize: Nikkeiren, on opening day of Domei Convention, released its own wage White Paper for 1968, which urged employers not to grant more than 8% in wage increases. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

7. Soviet "Gosplan" Chief Visits Japan

a. Nikolay K. BAYBAKOV, Soviet Deputy Premier and Chairman Soviet State Planning Committee (Gosplan), arrived Tokyo January 16 for 17-day visit as official guest Japanese Government. He was accompanied by his wife and five-man suite.

b. During his stay in Japan, Baybakov will hold personal talks with PriMin Sato, FonMin Miki, FinMin Mizuta, and other Japanese Government and business leaders. He and his party will also visit Yokohama, Osaka, Nagoya and Kyoto areas.

c. In his talks with the Japanese, Baybakov is expected to discuss Soviet-Japanese trade and economic relations, including possible Japanese cooperation in economic development of Siberia. PriMin Sato and FonMin Miki reportedly intend to initiate dialogue with Baybakov on political aspects current Soviet-Japanese relations, i.e., Northern Territories issue, and to discuss international crises including Viet-Nam. (UNCLASSIFIED)

PSYCHOLOGICAL

8. Reaction to "Enterprise" Port Call

a. During past week, news media have devoted much time and space to Japanese reactions to Enterprise port call. Much attention has been given to opposition contentions that (1) U.S. is trying to use port call to break down Japanese "nuclear allergy" and establish right to bring nuclear arms into Japanese ports, thereby turning Japan into nuclear base; and that (2) through this port call, U.S. is drawing Japan into closer identification with Vietnam war. At same time, most commentary has urged student demonstrators to exercise restraint and avoid bloodshed.

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NND 969000  
By WBD NARA Date 7/25/02

0 8 4 4

CONFIDENTIAL

Page 10  
A-940, from Tokyo

In January 15 evening edition of Mainichi, several military affairs commentators gave views. Uchihiro KOYAMA saw Enterprise visit aimed at advancing "US strategic setup by having 7th Fleet's core strength call at Japanese ports." Well-known conservative critic Tadao KUSUMI said one aim of visit was "restraint on Communist China", that ship "should be received as 'pioneer of 21st century civilization'" and "mere presence of this mighty fleet has effect of deterring total war." Tokyo University Assistant Professor and Sinologist Shinkichi ETO said US was trying to "draw Japan into its Far East strategic military system by ridding Japanese of nuclear allergy" and "this will eventually lead to Polaris submarine visits."

b. Conservative Sankei and Tokyo Shimbun editorials and commentaries and even some Asahi columns have repeatedly called on students and nation to remain cool and avoid bloodshed. Conservative papers have pooh-poohed opposition arguments, equating them to irrational uproar that greeted Commodore Perry's "black ships" 115 years ago. However, more frequent line was that of January 17 Asahi editorial, which held that Japanese "cannot banish fear that nuclear arms will be brought in", and worried that port call will "arouse popular fears and anxieties . . . and be first step in creating political crisis splitting public opinion over 1970 matter." TBS-TV network carried approximately hour of live coverage of "Enterprise" arrival January 19 morning, while other networks reported arrival as straight news with film clips. Tone of latest commentary is less cold toward students and more critical of police because of alleged brutality; but remonstrations against violence continue. (UNCLASSIFIED)

c. Comment: Treatment by news media in general has tended to incite public by creating impression major incident is all but inevitable at Sasebo. Such approach undoubtedly is directly reflected in increased newsstand sales and higher audience ratings for broadcast media. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

#### 9. Press Comment on British Retrenchment

a. PriMin Wilson's announcement of British retrenchment and military pullout east of Suez drew significant press comment, despite priority attention given Enterprise port call. Daily Mainichi, in particular, speculated on need for Japan to assume greater responsibility in Asian area as result.

b. In January 17 Mainichi evening edition, Washington correspondent Aoki wrote: "It may not be wide of mark to speculate that if US really is not going to fill gap, Japan may be asked to share part of that burden." And, Mainichi editorial following day concluded: "To some extent, US will be obliged to adopt military measures to fill vacuum; and Japan can and should contribute to security of area through economic cooperation..." (UNCLASSIFIED)

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NMD 969000  
By WBD NARA Date 7/25/02

0 8 4 5

CONFIDENTIAL

Page 11  
A-940, from Tokyo

10. Opinion Polls on Okinawa, Defense and Security

a. January 15 Mainichi published results of public opinion poll conducted last December by Ryukyu Shimpō on random sample of 1200 registered voters throughout Ryukyu Islands; 856 interviews were completed. Poll showed 59 percent said preparatory period would be needed before reversion of Okinawa to Japan, 12 percent said "not necessary" and 29 percent "don't know." Among majority accepting preparatory period, most said period "within three years" or "between three to five years" would be needed. Sixty-seven percent were aware of Sato-Johnson talks having been held on reversion issue, while 33 percent were not. Among those who were aware of talks--taken as base of 100 percent--total of 29 percent said either "satisfied" or "dissatisfied," but regard talks as step forward"; 16 percent said "cannot expect more under present circumstances", 35 percent were "dissatisfied" or "very dissatisfied", while 20 percent replied "don't know". On whether target date for reversion will become clear within next "two or three years", 18 percent said "think so", 40 percent said "don't think so", and 42 percent said "don't know". Mainichi regarded this as "evidence Prime Minister Sato's repeated statement that outlook will become clear within next two or three years is not believed in Okinawa." As for things regarded as obstacles to reversion, 32 percent blamed US bases, 11 percent Vietnam war, 10 percent lack of "self-reliance" of GOJ, 6 percent "East-West tension" and 6 percent "war policy of US." On formulas for reversion, 25 percent chose "reversion after bases reduced to level of bases in Japan proper", 24 percent "removal of all bases", 12 percent "removal of nuclear weapons, leaving bases as at present", 11 percent "retain bases as at present, including nuclear arms", 1 percent "other" responses and 27 percent "don't know."

b. Latest Jiji Press poll, conducted January 10-12 on random nationwide sample of 1250 Japanese adults, with 990 interviews completed, included some questions on Okinawa reversion, defense and security. On Okinawa reversion formula, 6 percent said "cannot help but continue with nuclear bases", 7 percent were for "free use of bases after removal of nuclear weapons", 27 percent wanted "bases on par with those in Japan Proper", 18 percent were "opposed to any and all bases" and 42 percent responded "don't know." On Prime Minister Sato's challenge to public to support "defending own nation with own hands", 62 percent said statement is "natural", while 12 percent did not think so and 26 percent had no opinion.

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NND 969000  
By W&D NARA Date 7/25/02

0 8 4 6


CONFIDENTIAL

Page 12  
A-940, from Tokyo

Asked whether Japan's defense capacity should be "more and more strengthened from now on, 21 percent agreed, 42 percent said "all right to keep at present level", 11 percent said "should reduce" Japanese defense forces and 27 percent replied "don't know." On US-Japan Security Treaty question for 1970, 15 percent said "continue it in present form", 25 percent said "continue after reversion", 12 percent said "abolish" and remaining 48 percent answered "don't know." (UNCLASSIFIED)

GP-3

  
JOHNSON

  
POL: RFPfeiffer;mv 1/19/68  
TWainsworth  
REArmstrong  
TBleha  
RImmerman  
TSawyer

USIS:HLBurleson

AirAtt:Maj. JLRussell

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NND 969000  
By WBD NARA Date 7/25/02

ORIGIN/ACTION			DEPARTMENT OF STATE			POL 2-1 JAPAN		
1NR-10			AIRGRAM			FOR RM USE ONLY		
RM/R	REP	AF	A-979			CONFIDENTIAL		
1		EA	NO.			PRIORITY		
ARA	EUR	4				HANDLING INDICATOR		
NEA	CU	1NR						
E	P	IO						
L	FBO	AID						
2	1	127						
AGR	COM	FRB						
2	3							
INT	LAB	TAR						
TR	XMB	AIR						
4		10						
ARMY	CIA	NAVY						
10	20	7						
OSD	USIA	NSA						
49	11	3						
		NSC						
		6						

TO : Department of State

INFO: BANGKOK CINCPACFLT DA/ODCSOPS FUKUOKA  
CINCPAC COMNAVMARIANAS DA/DUSA HICOMRY  
CINCPACAF COMSEVENFLT DOD/ISA HICOM/POLAD  
CINCUSARPAC COMUS/J (Halperin) USCAR (con'd)

FROM : Amembassy TOKYO

SUBJECT : JOINT WEEKA NO. 4

DATE: January 26, 1968

REF :

RECEIVED  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
JAN 31 7 19 AM 1968  
ANALYSIS BRANCH  
RS/AN

1. Enterprise Visits Sasebo  
2. Kimura Turned Around  
3. JSP Convention  
4. LDP Convention  
5. JCP Visitors Suslov and Kiszko  
6. Visiting Soviet "Gosplan" Chief Attacked by Rightist Youth  
7. L-T Trade Negotiations  
8. Domei Elects New Leaders  
9. Okinawa: "Oneness", Oil and DirGen Tanaka  
10. Japanese Media Reaction to "Pueblo" Incident

POLITICAL:

1. Enterprise Visits Sasebo

a. Nuclear-powered aircraft carrier Enterprise, with escorts Truxton (also nuclear-powered) and Halsey, arrived Sasebo morning January 19 for five-day visit (Week 3, 1). Earlier in day

USARYIS (7th Psyop Gp)	NAHA	SEOUL
HONG KONG	MOSCOW	SAIGON
KOBE-OSAKA	NAGOYA	SAPPORO
		WARSAW

Group 3

Downgraded at 12-year intervals; not automatically declassified

CONFIDENTIAL

FORM 4-62 DS-323

FOR DEPT. USE ONLY  
☒ In ☐ Out

Drafted by: POL: (see last page)

Clearances:

Contents and Classification Approved by: POL: TWAINSWORTH

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NND 969000  
By WBD NARA Date 7/25/02



CONFIDENTIAL

Page 2  
A-979 from Tokyo

several hundred extremist Three-Faction Alliance (Sampa Rengo) students clashed with police in Sasebo for third time. JSP, Sohyo and JCP protested separately in small groups but demonstrations ran out of steam around noon. First liberty parties entered Sasebo City in mid-afternoon to be greeted by handful of leftist League for Vietnam Peace (Beheiren) members who attempted hand sailors English language pamphlets urging defection. In Tokyo that evening about 90 Sampa Rengo students broke away from demonstration and invaded Foreign Ministry where they staged sit-down in corridors for hour or so until police, who rushed to scene, removed them one by one.

Sasebo quiet January 20.  
b. / That afternoon JCP and front groups mobilized about 10,000 in Tokyo for anti-Enterprise, anti-Vietnam demonstration. In evening JSP-affiliated Youth League to Oppose War (Hansen Domei) mobilized 10,000 demonstrators. Both groups marched past Chancery; group of Sampa students accompanying second march clashed briefly with police--six arrests, no damage. In Sapporo same day, DSP SecGen Kasuga said party would submit to Diet resolution calling for US-Japan agreement banning introduction of nuclear weapons into Japan. Move necessary, Kasuga said, because of popular unrest over whether nuclear weapons aboard Enterprise.

c. Sampa Rengo clashed with police for fourth time in Sasebo January 21. At same time joint JSP/Sohyo/JCP sponsored demonstration there mobilized 10,000 demonstrators. Considerable confusion ensued as JSP and JCP quarreled over student participation in adults' demonstration; students fought among themselves as well as with police, and some "ordinary citizens" refused to heed police request to back away from rioting students and reportedly threw stones at police. Liberties curtailed during height of melee.

d. On January 22 calm returned to Sasebo; most JSP/Sohyo/JCP demonstrators left town. Student "pass-the-helmet" funds campaign, which took place during calm, attracted more than expected sympathy and support.

e. Enterprise and Truxton left Sasebo in early morning January 23 (Halsey had left January 21) as small JSP, JCP and student groups, meeting separately, shouted defiance. Police estimated that during January 16-23 period, cumulative total (counting high proportion of repeaters) of demonstrators in Sasebo reached 46,000 (including 2,700 Sampa Rengo students) and cumulative total of police mobilized 40,900. (UNCLASSIFIED)

CONFIDENTIAL

0 8 4 9  
DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NMD 969000  
By WBD NARA Date 7/25/02

CONFIDENTIAL

Page 3  
A-979 from Tokyo

f. Comment: Enterprise liberty parties were affected only briefly by demonstrations in Sasebo and worries about possible clashes between sailors and protesters and about possible defection proved unfounded. At same time four clashes between Sampa Rengo and police attracted most of publicity prompted by five-day visit. After media focussed on allegations of excessive harshness in police tactics during January 17 clash with students (carried by nation-wide television broadcasts), popular sentiment in Sasebo appeared to become more sympathetic to students and less understanding of police. Thus in later three clashes police took posture of passive defense. Controversy over whether anti-police bystanders in Sasebo January 21 were "ordinary citizens" or ringers sympathetic to students likely to continue but fact that "citizens" took full force of water cannons without leaving scene of clash lent support to latter theory.

g. Large opposition rallies in both Sasebo and Tokyo received very little publicity. Enterprise visit abruptly displaced from headlines by North Korean attempted assassination strike in Seoul and seizure of USS Pueblo. Enterprise shortly thereafter came back in news due to reports that ship heading for Korea. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

2. Kimura Turned Around

Chief Cabinet  
a. Secretary Kimura January 22 told press GOJ would not like to refuse future NPSS entry requests but, due Sasebo citizens actions, government must consider seriously state of popular sentiment at time of request. In making statement, Kimura drew distinction between NPSS and SSN visits. That afternoon LDP SecGen Fukuda, when told of Kimura's statement, said flatly there "no need" for GOJ to consider popular sentiment in future. At following day Cabinet meeting Kimura statement roundly criticized with TransMin Nakasone leading attack by saying Kimura statement could be interpreted as change of GOJ policy. No one supported Kimura statement and Cabinet solidly reaffirmed GOJ policy that future NPSS visits would be permitted under Security Treaty. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: Even allowing for Kimura statement, GOJ and particularly PriMin Sato very firm throughout visit and seem more than willing to tackle opposition charges that Enterprise visit conscious attempt to reduce Japanese "nuclear allergy" and meant introduction of nuclear weapons into Japan at Diet sessions scheduled resume January 27. As fact of political life, LDP obviously will take popular emotion into account in connection future visits, but LDP sources felt Kimura's telling press so was egregious tactical blunder. (CONFIDENTIAL)

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NMD 969000  
By WBD NARA Date 7/25/02

CONFIDENTIAL

Page 4  
A-979 from Tokyo

3. JSP Convention

a. JSP opened three-day annual convention January 24 in order to kick off Upper House election campaign, <sup>and</sup> approve action policy for 1968 and "Near Term Policy" on party campaign against Security Treaty.

b. In address on opening day Chairman KATSUMATA stressed need to fight "militarism" of Sato cabinet and cited move of Enterprise into Japan Sea on way to North Korean waters as proving "validity of JSP's Sasebo campaign against Enterprise" (Item 1) and intention of LDP government to "nuclearize Japan in 1970." Katsumata sounded warning against danger of Japanese reliance on unstable American dollar and urged party to push this and other issues "with popular appeal" like reversion of Okinawa, anti-Vietnam campaign, protest against rising prices and LDP attempt to "nuclearize" Security Treaty. Katsumata also urged party regulars to exert utmost for JSP candidates in Upper House election this summer and to force dissolution of Diet and general election as soon as possible.

c. Both action policy and "Near Term Policy" stress Okinawa reversion, anti-Vietnam war and restoration of diplomatic relations between Japan and Communist China as major elements in party's primary campaign to abrogate Security Treaty in 1970. Both documents state need for formation of new "Committee to Defend Constitution and Abrogate Security Treaty" as co-ordinating body for party's campaigns in next three years. Party leaders said new committee would be set up soon, and will attempt to enlist individuals and existing leftwing organizations not affiliated with JSP in series of "joint actions" on agreed issues in order to build up to massive attack by opposition on Security Treaty in 1970. SecGen Yamamoto, former SecGen Narita and other JSP leaders stressed need for JSP to overcome ideological squabbles of various components of left wing and assert JSP leadership of entire opposition. Action policy statement on Sampa Rengo condemns student tactics (presumably violence) but approves of student cause in Haneda incidents (Week 41, 1) and calls for greater JSP efforts to exert influence on "existing organizations" (presumably Sampa Rengo) and on entire student movement. Action policy singles out anti-War Youth Committee as principal instrument in JSP youth program. In labor field, action policy calls for party efforts among all unions, but with emphasis on Sohyo, to encourage unification of labor movement and development of industrial policy. JSP opposes JCP plan for labor unification "ignoring existing labor federations." Party also opposes IMF-JC purpose in organizing metal workers for greater contact with international labor movement, but will cooperate with IMF-JC in practical matters that benefit workers and solidarity of Japanese labor movement. Action policy, and "Near Term Policy" which was approved by convention on second day, both included strong attack on Japanese economic reliance on US.

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NND 969000  
By WBD NARA Date 7/25/02

0 8 5 1

CONFIDENTIAL

Page 5  
A-979 from Tokyo

d. Central point in convention subcommittee debates was whether and how JSP should cooperate with JCP or Sampa students. JSP participation in Sasebo demonstrations against Enterprise was in effect used as case study. Criticism of cooperation with JCP in Sasebo unexpectedly strong, particularly from pro-Peking Heiwa Doshikai delegates who blocked approval of action policy on second day by proposing amendment which would have excluded future cooperation with JCP. Amendment failed to pass on last day and party leadership succeeded in maintaining position that cooperation on agreed issues was only way of avoiding ideological struggles among leftist groups.

e. Campaign against Enterprise was dominant leitmotiv in discussions on convention floor and in corridors. On first day, convention passed emergency resolution protesting "provocative" act of sending Enterprise into Korean waters and demanding both US and Japanese governments take steps to have Enterprise withdrawn. Second emergency resolution alleged that none of 931 party organizers' applications to enter Okinawa in order to attend Reversion Council rally February 7 (to demand immediate reversion of Okinawa and elimination of nuclear bases) had been granted and protested "unfair suppression" by USCAR and GOJ. Resolution demanded immediate issuance of entry permits.

f. Last day of convention expected to approve action policy with minor changes and to pass traditional resolution supporting Sohyo spring wage offensive. (UNCLASSIFIED)

g. Comment: Perhaps because delegates' attention was focused on Enterprise issue, there was little direct criticism of Katsumata leadership. However, pro-Peking Heiwa Doshikai attempt to ban joint struggles with JCP and organizational weaknesses proposed new "Committee to Defend Constitution and Abrogate Security Treaty" is designed to cure, showed how deeply JSP is divided on "China issue" and JSP long way from leading leftwing campaign against Treaty or from being able to mobilize demonstrators on anywhere near 1960 scale. It likely JSP will attempt to create sub-rosa working relationship with anti-JCP students while piously condemning their violence, on belief students will be crucial factor in 1970 Security Treaty campaign. Largely lost during heat of convention debates was general pessimism about election prospects. Also lost, but likely to reappear in Diet debates, were convention attacks on soundness of U.S. dollar and Japan's undesirable economic "reliance" on United States. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NND 969000  
By WED NARA Date 7/25/02

0 8 5 2

CONFIDENTIAL

Page 6  
A-979 from Tokyo

4. LDP Convention

a. LDP regular convention January 20 heard PriMin Sato declare that Meiji centennial (Weeka 1, 1) aim was not to celebrate past glories but to prepare Japan to move toward the 21st century. Sato also told meeting his call for all Japanese to be willing defend country implied not merely "defense consciousness" or military hardware, but "independent hearts". Deploring leftist student violence at Sasebo, PriMin called Enterprise visit "natural" from standpoint of US-Japan Security Treaty, and rebuked those Japanese who said visit likely lead to Japan's involvement in war. SecGen Fukuda stressed need for "national consciousness" and "national sense of mission" to complement Japan's economic progress. He charged present era was "age of irresponsible 100 million". Concrete business of convention included introduction of candidates for summer Upper House election, 33 in national constituency and 53 in local constituency, and confirmation of party officials chosen in November (Weeka 48, 1). (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: Controversy-free LDP convention as usual attracted little press attention. Sato reference to Enterprise visit as "natural", however, was factor in triggering media hunt for divergent views within GOJ and LDP on attitude toward port calls (Item 2). (UNCLASSIFIED)

5. JCP Visitors Suslov and Kliszko

a. Akahata January 24 reported JCP Central Committee (CC) announcement that five-member CPSU CC mission, headed by Politburo member Mikhail A. SUSLOV, scheduled to arrive in Tokyo January 30 for talks with JCP (Weeka 42, 3). Akahata listed CPSU representatives, in addition to Suslov, as CC Secretary B. N. PONOMAREV, CC Secretary and Director of CC's Marxism-Leninism Institute P. N. FEDOSEYEV and CC members L. S. ULIANOVSKIY and I. I. KOVALENKO. Press, noting this first time CPSU group of this stature scheduled visit Japan, listed probable topics for discussion as normalization of JCP-CPSU relations and strong CPSU request for JCP attendance at February 26 "preparatory conference" in Budapest.

b. In related event, three-member Polish United Workers Party mission, headed by Politburo member Zenon KLISZKO, arrived in Tokyo January 23 for discussions with JCP. Poles met at Haneda Airport by JCP Presidium member Satomi HAKAMADA and International Affairs Director Tomio NISHIZAWA and went immediately into talks with JCP. (UNCLASSIFIED)

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NND 969000  
By WBD NARA Date 7/25/02

0 8 5 3

CONFIDENTIAL

Page 7  
A-979 from Tokyo

c. Comment: Main obstacle to normalization of JCP-CPSU relations is alleged continued CPSU support for Yoshio SHIGA and followers who formed right-wing splinter "Voice of Japan" group after being expelled from JCP in 1964. JCP attitude on Budapest conference remains question mark, although SecGen Miyamoto at early January press conference indicated some reluctance send representatives. Speculation here is that Polish mission smoothing way for JCP-CPSU talks in general and making coordinated pitch with Soviets on JCP Budapest attendance in particular. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

6. Visiting Soviet "Gosplan" Chief Attacked by Rightist Youth

a. Nikolay K. BAYBAKOV, Soviet Deputy Premier and Chairman Soviet State Planning Committee (Gosplan), who now visiting Japan (see Weeka 3, Item 7), was attacked by Japanese rightist youth organization "Showa Seinen No Kai" member while entraining at Nagoya RR Station, Jan. 24. Youth identified at 25-year-old Toshitaka SURIDATE, who arrested previously for similar incidents. He attempted attack Baybakov with wooden sword, but was forcibly subdued and taken into police custody before inflicting serious injury to Baybakov. (Baybakov was bruised on left shoulder, but not otherwise injured.) (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: Japanese police and GOJ officials embarrassed by incident and formal GOJ apologies have been conveyed to Soviet Government. (UNCLASSIFIED)

7. L-T Trade Negotiations

a. Chou En-lai January 18 expression of willingness to receive a small delegation to discuss L-T trade was reported fully in the Japanese press. JSP Lower House member Hisao ISHINO brought a message for China Trade proponent<sup>and</sup> aged LDP Diet member Kenzo MATSUMURA when he returned from Peking to Tokyo on January 20. The message indicated that if a small number of Japanese representatives were to visit Peking concerning L-T Trade, there could be a "contact." Ishino attributed political importance to such talks since the Chicoms indicated to him that they were taking a hard line on renegotiating the L-T Agreement in view of the Sato government's hostility to China. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. Comment: Foreign Office has informed the Embassy that positions to be taken by the Japanese delegation to Peking have not yet been fixed. However, LDP Diet members Yoshimi FURUI, Seiichi TAGAWA and

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NND 969000  
By WBD NARA Date 7/25/02

0 8 5 4

CONFIDENTIAL

Page 8  
A-979 from Tokyo

Takasaki. Trade Office Vice Chief Okubo as well as Trade Committee Chairman Okazaki, will be prepared to discuss economic dealings, political cosmetics and responses to earlier Chicom requests on such matters as immigration procedures governing their entry into Japan. It now appears that the Japanese will delay their departure for Peking until after the Jan. 30 - Feb. 1 Lunar New Year Holiday there. (CONFIDENTIAL)

8. Domei Elects New Leaders

a. At January 19 session, Domei convention adopted 1968 action policy calling for large wage increases, full-fledged minimum wage system and new policies to deal with Japan's changing industrial structure (Weeks 3, 6). Action policy also urged replacement by Domei of Sohyo influence among public service workers unions. Convention, at final January 20 session, elected Textile Workers' Minoru TAKITA new (and second) Domei President and Coal Workers' Takumi SHIGEEDA as SecGen. Former Domei SecGen Seiji AMAIKE became one of seven vice presidents.

b. In inaugural address Takita said status of laborers could not be improved through "anti-government" labor movement based on "out-dated ideology". Instead, Takita asserted, Japanese labor movement should continue its attack on "establishment" from standpoint of "opposition political party". This necessary, Takita added, because at present labor unions have no direct part in government decision making and no power to apply real pressure on government. (UNCLASSIFIED)

9. Okinawa: "Oneness", Oil and DirGen Tanaka

a. Tokyo press gave restrained reception to formal establishment (by exchange of notes January 19) of new Advisory Committee to High Commissioner. Press pointed out that, despite addition phrase "related matters" to terms of reference of new committee, body still unable discuss purely political matters. Some comment, however, more enthusiastic: Mainichi said new committee and other actions taken as result of Sato-Johnson talks led to what is for all practical purposes US-GOJ "condominium" in Okinawa. Japanese Ambassador to Burma, Jiro TAKASE, informally tabbed as GOJ representative to new committee, indicated he would return to Tokyo for instructions as soon as possible.

b. Outcropping of critical stories quoting MITI sources greeted announcement by GRI January 20 of its approval of applications by four US oil companies for permission invest in Okinawa refineries.

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NND 969000  
By WBD NARA Date 7/25/02

0 8 5 5

CONFIDENTIAL

Page 9  
A-979 from Tokyo

c. Visit to Okinawa and outer islands by new PriMin Office DirGen Tatsuo TANAKA went off smoothly but drew almost no attention in Tokyo press. Small squibs reported Tanaka met with High Commissioner, discussed "oneness" and proposed visit by GOJ "oneness" study team, made some rather cautious noises of protest against GRI decision on refinery investment and learned that US authorities in Okinawa looked forward quite hopefully to prospects for productive work by new Advisory Committee.  
(UNCLASSIFIED)

d. Comment: Serious news of week concerned oil. In press, MITI depicted itself as alert defender Japanese oil industry from rapacious American oil interests who seeking squeeze through Okinawa back door into Japanese market. In fact, however, opinion within GOJ was divided and there was nothing in nature of unified position against GRI action. MITI Deputy Section Chief made hasty visit to Okinawa following announcement, and was treated, Embassy told by FonOff, to lecture by GRI officials about necessity either accepting GRI actions or presenting views in timely and forthright fashion which reflect some concern for Okinawan interests. Before wading into other short-range Okinawa issues, there appears general disposition in GOJ to await further development of new Advisory Committee.  
(LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

PSYCHOLOGICAL:

10. Japanese Media Reaction to "Pueblo" Incident

a. North Korean seizure of "Pueblo" immediately became top news story this week, following departure of "Enterprise" from Sasebo, and has been treated as extremely grave incident.

b. Initial press analysis tied North Korean action to North Korea's internal political situation, which was also seen motive for earlier guerrilla raid into Seoul. Press analysis fastened on wire-service stories from Washington suggesting that "Pueblo" perhaps within North Korean territorial waters when first detected. January 24 Mainichi tended to view that "trespass" did occur, making ship's capture "appropriate measure by sovereign state." Most papers foresaw "prolonged complications" in words of Yomiuri January 24.

c. January 25 press editorials unanimously urged "cool action" by both sides, and expressed grave concern over situation. These also went further into speculative exploration of North Korean motives. For example, Sankei spoke of recent economic malaise in North Korea and said Pyongyang

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NND 969000  
By WBD NARA Date 7/25/02

0 8 5 6




CONFIDENTIAL

Page 10  
A-979 from Tokyo

precipitated incidents "to deflect popular discontent outward." However, Mainichi editorial asserted that such incidents could be avoided if US were more prudent and restrained.

d. January 26 morning media treated very prominently President's call-up of air and navy reservists; broadcast media reported his call for convening UNSC. NHK Washington correspondent analyzed these moves as designed to apply diplomatic pressure on North Korea and USSR.  
(UNCLASSIFIED)

GP-3

  
JOHNSON

POL: TBleha:jl/mv 1/26/68  
TWainsworth  
REArmstrong  
RFPfeiffer  
HLevin  
TESawyer

ECON:JMGregory

USIS:HLBurleson

CONFIDENTIAL

0 8 5 7  
DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NND 969000  
By WBD NARA Date 7/25/02